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CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

Certified that the books microfilmed as per details hereunder are authentic publications preserved in the Library of the Directorate of Archaeology and Museums, Government of Karnataka, Palace Complex, Mysore-570001. The Originals are available in the Library of the Directorate of Archaeology and Museums, Palace Complex, Mysore, for verification.

Mysore.

6/5/93
(J.V. GAYATHRI)
Deputy Director
Divisional Archives Office
Mysore-570 001
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LIST OF BOOKS MICROFILMED IN THE LIBRARY OF THE DIRECTORATE OF ARCHAEOLOGY AND MUSEUMS, PALACE COMPLEX, MYSORE.

1. Select views in Mysore, The Country of Tipoo Sultan; From Drawings Taken on the spot by Mr.Home; with Historical descriptions, London, 1794.

2. A Narrative of the campaign in India which Terminated the war with Tipoo Sultan, in 1792 with Maps and Plans illustrative of the subject, and a view of Seringapatam, By Majore Dirom, The second edition, London, 1794.

available in lib said library
22/2

3. A Sketch of the war with Tipoo Sultan; OR, A detail of Military operations, From The commencement of Hostilities at the lines of Travancore in December 1789, until the peace concluded Before Seringapatam in February 1792, By Roderick Nackenzie, Vol.I, Calcutta, 1799.

4. -Do- Vol.II.

5. An Account of the capaign in Mysore (1799) By Sir Alexander Allan, Bart, Edited by Nareshchandra Sinha, The University Printing and Publishing co., Ltd., Calcutta.

6. Memoirs of the Northern Purgannahs of Mysore surveyed in 1800 and 1801 under the Provincial Divisions of the Partition of 1799 by C.Mackenzie, March 15th, 1803.

7. L.Bowring, Eastern Experiences, London, 1871.

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این تصویرات در ملک میسور کشیده با نقل مختصر
متضمن بر واقعات جنک تیپو سلطان با انکریزان و رفیقان
ایشان بخدمت سرداران رفیقان مذکور سپرده میشوند

SELECT VIEWS

IN

MYSORE,

THE COUNTRY OF TIPPOO SULTAN;

FROM

DRAWINGS TAKEN ON THE SPOT

BY MR. HOME;

WITH

HISTORICAL DESCRIPTIONS.

LONDON:

PUBLISHED BY MR. BOWYER,

HISTORIC GALLERY, PALL MALL.

THE LETTER-PRESS BY T. BENSLEY,

FROM FIGGINS'S TYPES.

1794.

677
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677

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

CHARLES MARQUIS CORNWALLIS,

KNIGHT OF THE MOST NOBLE ORDER OF THE GARTER,

LIEUTENANT GENERAL OF HIS MAJESTY'S FORCES,

GOVERNOR GENERAL AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF ALL THE BRITISH

POSSESSIONS IN INDIA, &c.

THESE VIEWS IN THE MYSORE COUNTRY,

WITH HISTORICAL DESCRIPTIONS,

ARE, WITH HIS LORDSHIP'S PERMISSION,

MOST RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED,

BY HIS LORDSHIP'S

MOST OBEDIENT AND OBLIGED

HUMBLE SERVANT,

HISTORIC GALLERY, PALL MALL,
1794.

R. BOWYER.

PREFACE.

WHATEVER tends to increase the sphere of man's knowledge is unquestionably important, and in this respect history and geography have a conspicuous claim to our attention. Since the year 1497, *when Vasco de Gama discovered a passage to India round the Cape of Good Hope, the southern coasts of Asia have been repeatedly visited by an uninterrupted succession of navigators from the different maritime states of Europe. For a long time, however, these were merely plunderers or merchants, prompted solely by the love of gain, or the spirit of enterprize; which once gratified, they had no farther object. At length, not contented with the precarious benefits derived from occasional voyages, though often highly lucrative, they began to extend their views, and form permanent establishments, for the enjoyment of a constant and settled trade.*

Amongst these more politic adventurers the english soon distinguished themselves; till a simple band of merchants, from the possession of a few petty factories, established in India an empire so powerful as to give laws to it's native princes. Still our geographical knowledge of this country, which in ages past probably diffused science throughout the world, as of late it has administered to it's luxury, was nearly confined to it's shores: and this to such a degree,

that the names of paltry towns to which Alexander had extended his arms were far more familiar to us, than those of provinces of which the revenues flowed into our own coffers. Now indeed science hails the dawn of a more propitious era. Asia holds in it's bosom natives of Britain, who feel more gratification from an increase of knowledge, than an increase of wealth; and from whom therefore we may hope the amplest additions to the general store.

For our parts, we pretend not to add much to the stock of information, though we tread almost unbeaten ground. It is our province to stimulate curiosity, not to gratify it. This we leave to abler pens: and we do it with the more satisfaction, as the speedily promised work of major Dirom will undoubtedly afford a rich banquet to every one who thirsts after science; and to this we must beg leave to refer, for a fuller account of the places, of which we have given views, than was consistent with our plan.

Yet we trust we have not been uselessly employed, in presenting to the public this sketch, as a tribute of respect to that able commander, and those gallant officers, by whom the british dominion in the east has been preserved from the utter destruction with which it was threatened. Aspiring to the foundation of a new empire in India, and the extension of the mohammedan faith over those parts of Asia, where to the crescent no homage had ever been paid, the politic and ambitious Hyder Ali, and his no less politic and ambitious successor, were well aware, that the power of Britain could by no means accord with their designs. Totally to expel from Indostan, therefore, a potent band of strangers, whom they could never hope to reduce under their sovereignty, or subject to the moslemim creed, was an indispensable preliminary to an accomplishment of their grand purpose.

Unfortunately for themselves, they had to do with an enemy too politic, and too powerful. Their ambitious dreams have vanished; and the present sultan of Mysore has found himself compelled to relinquish half his dominions, as a security that he would no more attempt to disturb the tranquillity of his neighbours.

Of some of the leading events of this glorious war, into which we were by necessity impelled, it is our intention to give a concise yet faithful sketch: and whilst we do this, we presume the annexed views of places, for the accuracy of which we can vouch, and in engraving which no expence has been spared, will be highly gratifying to those to whose eyes such scenes are not familiar, and not less so to those who will recognize in them the places where they gallantly fought and conquered.

INSIDE VIEW of the PALACE at BANGALORE.

Published as the Act directs, by R. Bowyer Historic Gallery, Pall Mall, London, & H. Sharp, at Madras, 1st. 1791

Heine del.t Morris sculp.t

EAST VIEW of BANGALORE with the CYPRESS GARDEN.

Published as the Act directs by R. Bowyer Historic Gallery Pall Mall London & W. Sharp at Madrass Feb.y 1794.

Hoole del. Sutter sculp.

VIEW of the PETTAH GATEWAY, where COLONEL MOORHOUSE fell.

Published as the Act directs by R. Bowyer, Historic Gallery, Pall Mall, London, & W. Sharp, Madrass, Feb.y 1794.



Home del. Hawksworth sculp.

VIEW OF THE DELHI GATEWAY AFTER IT WAS REPAIRED.

Published as the Act directs by R. Bowyer Historic Gallery Pall Mall London & W. Sharp Madrass Feb.y 1794

Home del. Reading sculp.

NORTH VIEW of BANGALORE from the PETTAH, shewing the Curtain & Bastions that were breached.

Published as the Act directs, by R. Bowyer, Historic Gallery, Pall Mall, London. J. H. Sharp, Madrass. Feb.y 1, 1794.



Home del. Fuller sculp.

SOUTH VIEW of BANGALORE, one Mile & a half distant on the Road to Seringapatam.

Published as the Act directs by R. Cooper Historic Gallery, Pall Mall, London, & W. Sharp Mathews Sd. 1794.

VIEW of the INSIDE GATE at BANGALORE with the GUARD ROOM.

Published as the Act directs by R. Bowyer Historic Gallery Pall Mall London 1794



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VIEW of the BURIAL GROUND at BANGALORE.

Published as the Act directs by R. Cooper Historic Gallery Pall Mall London & W. Sharp Madrasp. Feb.y 1794

MONUMENTS

ERECTED TO THE MEMORY OF THOSE BRAVE OFFICERS WHO FELL AT THE TAKING OF BANGALORE, &c.

As it was not possible in so small a space to engrave the inscriptions on the Monuments in the annexed plate, the Reader will please to observe the figures underneath the View refer to the following inscriptions.

N° 1. Interred the remains of lieutenant Conan, of the madrass artillery, who died in storming the pettah of Bangalore, march 7th, 1791.

2. Sacred to the memory of lieutenant-colonel Gratton, quarter-master-general of his majesty's forces in India, who died 31st december, 1791.

3. To the memory of captain James Smith, of the bengal artillery, who died october 24th, 1791, aged 33.

4. Captain James Williamson, of the first battalion of bengal volunteers, and commandant of Bangalore, died february 20th, 1790. His brother, and the other officers of the corps, with equal and joint zeal, erect this monument to his memory.

5. Sacred to the memory of captain John Slipper, who fell in the service of his country, 18th march, 1791.

6. Sacred to the memory of captain Nathaniel Dawes, commandant of the fourth battalion of N. I. who died march 25th, 1791.

7. To the memory of captain Jeremiah Delany, of his majesty's 36th regiment, who gallantly fell in storming the pettah of Bangalore, march 7th, 1791.

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بنکالور

شهر بنکالور بسیار کشاده است قلعه سورت
دایره طولانی دارد و خوب محکم است اول شهر
و قلعه معمور هندوان بودند لیکن زیادتی کرفته اند
بحکم نولب حیدر علي و تیپو سلطان
تیپو اینجا دولت خانه عالي شان بناکرده اند الحال
صد سال کذشته که در تصرف راجه میسور امده است
دراین اثنا قوم مرهته دوبار شهررا کرفته اند اول
بحدایت هندو راو بار دیکر بحدایت کوپال راو
صاحب کلان انکریزان نواب ارل کارنوالس بهادر روز
پنجم ماه مارچ سال ۱۷۹۱ انکریزي محاصره بنکالور
فر موده بودند روز۷ هجوم اورده شهررا کر فتند و شب
روز۲۱ هجوم اورده قلعهرا کرفتند

BANGALORE.

Bangalore, the capital of a province of the same name, in the kingdom of Mysore, is situated in latitude 12° 57′ 30″, and in longitude 77° 22′ 17″ east from Greenwich. From Madras it is distant two hundred and twenty-one miles, and from Seringapatam seventy-seven. Of the surrounding country the elevation is considerable; for the mercury in the barometer is always below twenty-seven inches. It's climate may justly be deemed temperate, as the thermometer commonly stands at 70°, has been sometimes observed below 60°, and seldom rises higher than 85°. The soil is not deficient in fertility, being capable of producing most of the vegetables of Europe in abundance and perfection.

The pettah, or town, is of considerable extent, being two thousand yards long, by seven hundred and fifty broad, within the fortifications, which consist of a rampart, a thick hedge, and a deep dry ditch. These do not completely surround the place, it being left open at the part opposite the fort, to the north of which it is situated.

The fort is of an oval figure, extending somewhat more than nine hundred yards in it's longest diameter. It is fortified with a broad double rampart, about thirty semicircular bastions, or turrets, and five cavaliers. There are two entrances to it; one at each end. That on

the north, called the Delhi gate, consists of five strong, large gates, finished with considerable elegance: that on the south, called the Mysore gate, consists of four only, low, and far inferiour to the others in beauty. Both these gates are covered with outworks. The ramparts of the fort are extremely well built: the ditch is deep, and wide, but dry in most parts of it: the faussebraye and covert way are both very broad.*

Originally built by the hindus, as some figures sculptured in the walls, and an ancient pagoda in the middle of the place, sufficiently evince, it has been considerably altered and improved in the modern style by Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultan; who have added many outworks, and by whom the Delhi gate has been entirely rebuilt. They likewise established here a mint, a foundry for brass cannon, a machine for boring them, another for musket barrels, which will bore a hundred and thirty at once, an arsenal for military stores, and magazines for grain and gunpowder.

Though these are in point of utility the most important, the most splendid fabric within the walls is the palace built by Tippoo for his own residence. This is grand and spacious, displaying to the four winds of heaven as many ample fronts, each composing a lofty hall, the wooden roof of which is supported by colonnades of the same material. The pillars are connected by scolloped arches; and the whole is superbly painted and gilt. The walls in front of the entrances to the east and west halls have balconies, richly carved, and raised by small pillars, united by arches. In the middle of each balcony is a square projection, which we suppose to have been intended for the seat of state, whenever the Sultan held a durbar. The north and south fronts are extremely airy, no wall dividing them, so that the eye com-

* For a plan of the fort and pettah, see plate 30, at the end of the book.

pletely pervades the building. In front of each face of the palace is a fountain: and on the north, south, and west, are jenanas, not yet finished, low, but highly ornamented with painting and gilding. Opposite the north and south fronts are small flower gardens, on the right and left, in which the pink of Europe vies with the variegated flowers of the east.

With regard to the ancient history of Bangalore much information cannot yet be expected. About the middle of the seventeenth century it belonged to a poligar rajah, named Kempy Gowr, from whom it was taken in 1655 by Remdoula Khan, a general of Audil Shaw, king of Bejapour. By him it was left in charge to Shahajee, the father of Sewajee, from whom it devolved to Yekojee, one of his sons. Cassim Khan, a general of Aurung-zebe, investing it in 1689, Yekojee surrendered the place, and retired to Tanjore; after which it was sold by Cassim Khan to the Mysore rajah. About the year 1730, a mahratta army under Hindoo Row, attacked it, and took the pettah, but failed of success against the fort. In 1746 the mahrattas again besieged it, under Gopaul Row. On this occasion the pettah was once more taken, batteries were erected, and a breach was made in the fort; but a sum of money induced the assailants to desist from pursuing their enterprise farther.

Bangalore was deemed a place of great importance at the beginning of the late war: but, as our commander in chief was desirous if possible to bring the enemy to a decisive action in the open field, it's attack was not determined upon, till it plainly appeared, that Tippoo was too prudent to stake his fortune on the event of a general engagement. Thus it was late in 1790 before the siege of this place was resolved on, and early in 1791 earl Cornwallis took the command of the army, avowedly with the intention of attacking it. He began his

march from Vellout on the 5th of february; on the 20th the whole of his forces had ascended the ghauts, by the Muglee pass; and on the 5th of march the army was encamped before Bangalore.

Tippoo, having been deceived into a firm belief, that his lordship meant to take the road of the Barramaul valley, had fortified the Changamah pass in that quarter, and made dispositions to prevent our army from ascending the ghauts there. To call our general's attention homewards too, already had he begun to ravage the Carnatic, and had even taken Permacoil. Astonished when he found himself so egregiously duped, and learnt, that the british forces, having without interruption surmounted the formidable barrier opposed by nature to their progress, were rapidly penetrating into his dominions; he found himself compelled to abandon his purpose, and repair with speed to the protection of his own country. Marching with incredible diligence, he arrived near Bangalore on the same day with our army, and made a show of offering battle: but lord Cornwallis, not deceived by this feint, opposed to him his left wing only, while the right, covering the battering train, baggage, and stores, pursued it's march. The enemy began a cannonade at a great distance; which, as they did not advance, was not returned. In the evening the whole army encamped within three miles of the fort; and next morning took a more convenient position on the north east of the pettah.

The same morning the fort and pettah were reconnoitered; and in the afternoon another reconnoitering party went out, escorted by colonel Floyd, with the whole cavalry, and a brigade of infantry. The colonel, observing the rear of Tippoo's army at a great distance from the main body, pursued and attacked it with the horse, and made himself master of some guns: but a body of infantry advantageously posted behind some rocks, which he had not observed, galled him severely,

and obliged him to retreat. He was himself wounded, and his loss was considerable, chiefly owing to the badness of the ground.

It being on many accounts desirable for our forces to have possession of the pettah, it was resolved not to defer it's attack. Accordingly the king's 36th regiment, and the 26th battalion of bengal sepoys, under the command of lieutenant-colonel Cockerell, with a body of artillery under lieutenant-colonel Moorhouse, were ordered to storm it the following morning.

On the 7th, at dawn, they advanced to the north gate, which had been fixed on as the point of attack. The first barrier was soon penetrated, and they rushed on to the second, but were opposed there by a well directed and close fire of musketry from the walls, accompanied by showers of ground rockets, which did considerable execution. A six-pounder was run up with it's muzzle to the gate; but it's explosion had no other effect than making a small hole. A second time it was fired with no better success. At this critical juncture fell the gallant Moorhouse. As he was giving directions for an iron twelve-pounder to be brought up, he received a ball under his left shoulder, and almost instantaneously expired. Still the attack was continued with undaunted perseverance, and the gate being at length considerably shattered by reiterated explosions, it was forced open, and the whole detachment rushed in. The enemy fled from the gate, but continued firing from the houses for some time. Parties were sent in different directions to dislodge them; and before nine we were in complete possession of the place. Captain Delany, of the 36th, was killed at the beginning of the attack, and our loss altogether amounted to about a hundred men.

In the afternoon Tippoo made an attempt to dislodge us, and

three kushoons of his infantry entered the pettah, at the opening on the south, which we have already noticed. Marching in regular divisions, their attack was conducted with great spirit, whilst Tippoo advanced from the north-west side of the fort, and cannonaded our main army. The steady bravery of our troops, however, reinforced with the 76th regiment, compelled them to retreat, with the loss of their standards, and at least five hundred men.

Our batteries were soon after begun, and on the 12th three of them opened on the fort, with considerable effect on the defences, but too distant for making a breach. Two others were erected therefore, about four or five hundred yards from the works. These soon demolished the stone facing; but the solid body of the rampart, which was of red clay, crumbled but slowly.

On the 17th Tippoo again cannonaded our camp, from the heights on the north-east, but at too great distance to occasion any serious mischief.

On the 21st he once more attempted to interrupt our operations, appearing with his army on the east side of the fort, and seeming to meditate an attack on our batteries. He had likewise opened embrasures in the bank of a tank, in which he had planted some heavy cannon, that would have enfiladed our trenches. His right wing and rear, however, being exposed to the attack of one of our wings, which made a movement towards him, he drew off, leaving part of his guns behind him. Thus had he now made an attack from each of the three open quarters, and found them equally unsuccessful.

Notwithstanding the heavy and well directed fire from the fort, from which the mud walls and other cover in the pettah greatly protected our troops, the breach was now practicable; and accordingly it was resolved to storm the fort without delay. The flank companies of all the king's regiments, under the command of major Skelly, and supported by some battalions of sepoys, were ordered upon this service.

Colonel Maxwell commanded the attack, which commenced about eleven o'clock. The fort, in a moment, was completely illumined by a number of blue lights suspended from the ramparts, for the purpose of discovering the assailants; a practice very common in indian camps and garrisons. These lights exhibited to the camp a striking and interesting scene, during the mounting of the breach, and the climbing over the different parts of the gateway, which was a principal object of the attack. The grenadiers with their usual intrepidity first ascended the breach, clearing the way with their bayonets, and dispersing the enemy with great slaughter. Thence they proceeded along the rampart to the right, whilst the light infantry took the contrary direction, and the rest of the troops descended into the body of the place. They all met near the opposite gate, which the fugitives in their tumultuous retreat had now choked up, and a horrible scene of carnage ensued. The killahdar, or governor, Bahaudar Khan, a venerable old soldier, and a favourite of his master, fell, bravely fighting to the last, near the colours of his fort. Above six hundred of the garrison shared his fate; three hundred, most of them wounded, were made prisoners; and near two thousand are said to have escaped. Our loss was only about fifty officers and men, killed and wounded.

The body of the killahdar was found the next day, amidst a heap of slain, and pierced through and through with balls and bayonets. Earl Cornwallis sent a message to Tippoo, with an offer of the corpse for interment; to which the latter with equal spirit and prudence re-

plied, that the proper place for the burial of a soldier was the spot where he fell. In consequence the body was buried in the fort, by people of the mussulman religion, and with every mark of distinction.

If we consider the circumstances attending the siege, that the enemy was in full possession of the open country, so as to preclude the possibility of our getting supplies, that during our operations in the pettah we had but a small force in the camp to withstand the attacks of their whole army, and that both our provision and ammunition were nearly exhausted, the capture of Bangalore may be deemed one of the greatest achievements of the british arms in India. Nor will it's importance be diminished, if we advert to it's consequences. Independent of the immediate advantages accruing to us from the possession of a post and magazine so important, and the consequent loss, disappointment, and disgrace to the enemy, it was attended with others, which, though more remote, were not less beneficial: for by furnishing an unequivocal proof of our superiour prowess and military skill, it operated to our advantage equally in the camps of our allies, and in the garrisons they were then besieging; the spirits of the former rising, whilst those of the latter were proportionally depressed. More strongly was it evinced by the immediate revolt of Tippoo's new subjects, the Poligars, in the vicinity of our conquest: they not only bringing in provision to the army, but even seizing on some of Tippoo's ill-garrisoned forts; as if they anticipated his approaching fall.

Since Bangalore has been in our possession, elegant monuments have been erected in the cemetry, to the memory of the officers who fell at the taking of the fortress, and in it's vicinity.

NORTH VIEW of SAVENDROOG from MATGREE.

ساوندروک

ساوندروک کوهي است از سنگ عظیم و بلند محفوظ به دیوار هرجا که دخل تواند بود متفرق به دو سر بر هر یک جنگلي کرداکردش کوههاي سنگین و بیشه است ازاین جهت مطلقا حصین دانسته شده دیو راوز راجه میسور ساوندروکرا بحیله برد از پولیکار نام کپپي کاور سال یک هزار هفت صد و سي

روز دهم ماه دسمبر سال یک هزار هفت صد نود ویک فرقه از لشکر ارل کارنوالس تابع حکم کرنل ستوارت محاصره اینجاکرد روز بیست و یکم بحمله برداشت و در لشکر انگریزي کسي نکشته شد

SAVENDROOG.

This stupendous fortress, situated nineteen miles nearly west by south from Bangalore, enjoys such advantages from nature, as to need little assistance from art; though art seems to have neglected nothing to render it absolutely impregnable. It is a vast mountain of rock, supposed to rise above half a mile in perpendicular height, from a base of eight or ten miles in circumference.

Completely surrounded by walls, and defended by cross walls and barriers wherever it was deemed accessible, it has the farther advantage of being divided above by a vast chasm, separating it into two hills; each of which having it's own defences, two distinct citadels are formed, capable of being maintained independant of the lower works. Beside all this, added to the rocky hills and natural forest thickened with clumps of planted bamboos, which constitute no easily surmountable barricade, the pestiferous atmosphere threatens with inevitable destruction the hardiest troops, should they lie long before it. Hence it's significant appellation of Savendroog, or the Rock of Death. So confident indeed was Tippoo Sultan in it's strength, that he was highly pleased when he heard the british troops had run their heads against the tremendous Gurdun Shekô, a name he had himself given it, implying the Neck of Majesty; and his courtiers even congratulated him on the event, as on a victory.

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About the commencement of the present century Savendroog belonged to an independant chieftain, or poligar, named Kempy Gowr, from whom it was taken by treachery in 1730, by Deo Rauze, rajah of Mysore, after a long siege.

In the lower fort or pettah were some time confined twenty british officers, and thirty soldiers, taken prisoners by Hyder Ali. Whilst they were here, Ameen Sahib was sent hither by his nephew, Tippoo Sultan, who had succeeded to the throne, and was kept for some days without food in a small enclosure on the top of the rock. He broke loose, but was soon retaken; and, being tied hand and foot, in a standing posture, to a stake driven into the ground, he was thus exposed for some time to the scorching sun, till an order arrived for the bowstring to put a period to his existence and his sufferings. This example before their eyes, with the accounts they frequently received of the murder of their fellows in other prisons, tended by no means to cheer our countrymen in their confinement: but the treaty of Mangalore taking place in the beginning of 1783, they heard the glad tidings of peace, and soon after experienced the happiness of revisiting the territories of the british empire.

Towards the end of the year 1791, lord Cornwallis, having to wait in this part of the country for convoys from the Carnatic, judged it a favourable opportunity to attempt the reduction of Savendroog; as it's remaining in possession of the enemy would have been a considerable impediment to the success of his grand enterprize. Posting therefore the main body of his army in such a situation as to support the attack, and cover an important convoy he expected; and three detachments, under lieutenant-colonel Cockerell, captain Welch, and captain Alexander Read, on the northern, middle, and southern roads; he entrusted the execution of this arduous enterprize to lieutenant-colonel Stuart,

who commanded the right wing of the army, and had been employed, in the first campaign, in reducing the forts of Dindigul and Palgautcherry.

On the 11th of december the colonel pitched his camp within three miles of the north side of the rock, the quarter from which the chief engineer had proposed to carry on the attack. His force consisted of the 52d and 72d regiments, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Nesbitt, three battalions of sepoys, and a detachment of artillery under major Montagu, with a park of four eighteen-pounders, four twelves, two howitzers, and the field pieces of the corps.

To cut a gun-road from the encampment, and transport the artillery to the foot of the mountain, over rocky hills, and through a thick forest of bamboos, required incredible exertion: but to patient zeal and persevering ardour what is impracticable? By the 17th the work was accomplished, and two batteries were opened; one at a thousand, the other at seven hundred yards distance. The defences of the wall were much damaged, and the fire of the enemy was in great measure silenced by these: but the difficulty of making a breach was greater than was expected, the wall being built of immense stones, of which the lower tier was bound to the rock by clamps of iron.

On the 19th opened an advanced battery, which it had been found necessary to erect within two hundred and fifty yards of the wall; and before the lapse of the succeeding day a practicable breach was effected. The forest, through which the troops had cut their way with such labour, now became an advantage; as under cover of it, and of crevices and projections in the rock, a lodgment was made within twenty yards of the breach.

The flank companies of the 71st and 76th regiments having been sent from camp to join the detachment, and every thing being in readiness, the morning of the 21st of december was fixed for the assault. Lord Cornwallis came, accompanied by general Medows, to witness the success.

Lieutenant-colonel Nesbitt commanded the storming party, which was directed to four different attacks. Captain Gage, with the grenadiers of the 52d, and the flank companies of the 76th, to gain the eastern hill to the left: the honourable captain Monson, with the light company of the 52d, to scour the works towards the western hill, on the right: the honourable captain Lindsay, and captain Robertson, with the flank companies of the 71st regiment, to separate, and attack the works or parties they might discover in the chasm or hollow between the hills: the 52d and 72d regiments were to follow the flank companies. At the same time parties were detached round the mountain, under lieutenant-colonel Baird, and major Petrie, to draw the attention of the enemy from the main object, and to endeavour to prevent their escape.

At eleven o'clock, a signal of two guns being fired from the batteries, the troops advanced to the assault; the band of the 52d regiment playing 'Britons, strike home!' while the grenadiers and light infantry mounted the breach.

A large body of the enemy had been observed, in the morning, to come down from the western hill, for the defence of the breach: but on the appearance of the british soldiery advancing to the storm, they were seized with a panic, and fled. Our troops advanced as rapidly as the ruggedness of the rock, and the steepness of the ascent would permit; and the eastern hill, immediately above the breach, was carried by captain Gage, without meeting, or even overtaking the enemy.

The other division and main body of the enemy endeavoured to gain the western hill. Had this been effected, the siege must have recommenced; that part of the mountain being defended by several walls and barriers, whilst in most places it is of a precipitous steepness. On these accounts it was impossible to entertain any very sanguine hopes of getting possession of it immediately: captain Monson was left to his discretion, therefore, either to advance, if he found it adviseable, or to take post where the ground might favour a lodgment for attacking the works.

The pathway from the breach to the western hill being not only extremely steep, but narrow, the fugitives impeded each other; and a few well directed shots from the batteries, at that juncture, did execution, and increased their confusion. Captain Monson, with his own light company of the 52d regiment, and a serjeant and twelve grenadiers of the 71st, pressed so hard, that they entered the different barriers along with the enemy, killing a number of them, among whom was the second killahdar; and gained possession of the top of the mountain, where the head killahdar was made prisoner. So close and critical was the pursuit, that the serjeant of the 71st, when at some distance, shot the man who was shutting the first gate.

Above a hundred of the enemy were killed on the western hill, and several fell down the precipices in their endeavours to escape from the assailants. The prisoners were few. According to their report, the garrison had consisted of fifteen hundred, but many deserted during the siege.

Thus, in less than an hour, in open day, the stupendous and hitherto deemed impregnable fortress of Savendroog was taken by storm, without the loss of a single man killed, and only one private soldier wounded; and his arm was carried away by a cannon ball from one of our own batteries, rebounding from the rock, as he ascended to the assault.



VIEW of MAUGREE PAGODAS.

بتخانه ماکري

اين بتخانهها در ميان ساوندروک و اوترادروک ميباشند عمارات عالي و خوب سورت ليکن از مدتي ويرانه در حال شکست ربخت ميشوند شهر ماکري کلان بود و در کردش دهات در سال يک هزار هفت صد و سي راجه ديو راوز اين شهررا به چنک اوردند صاحب کلان ارل کارنوالس دو بار در اين مکان خيمه زدند در جنک تيپو سلطان

MAUGREE PAGODAS.

These Pagodas are situated in latitude 12° 57′ 25″ south; twenty-four miles west from Bangalore; about five miles and half, north west by west half west, from Savendroog; and nearly the same distance east from Outradroog. The fort lies a mile and a quarter from them east south east.

Lofty, and of elegant structure, they are built on an eminence, commanding a fine prospect of the country around: but they have long been abandoned, and are falling into decay. Within the square which encloses them are several choultries, the walls and cielings of which are adorned with curious paintings and sculptures. In them are depicted under a variety of allegorical forms the hindu deities; particularly the god Vishnu, whose numerous actions, and several incarnations, are minutely displayed: and these monuments of their worship are still held in veneration by the remaining brahmins, and people of the hindu religion.

The town of Maugree was large and surrounded with villages: and these superb pagodas, the smaller ones in every village, the swamey houses, or hindu temples, on every eminence, even on the pinnacles of the droog, and the numerous large tanks that water the adjoining country, testify it's having been once a rajahship of great note. But war and conquest have altered it's features.

Of it's history we know nothing previous to the year 1730, when Deo Rauze, the rajah of Mysore, took it by assault, and annexed this territory to his dominions, as he did many others.

On the 28th of june, 1791, lord Cornwallis pitched his camp here, whilst he reconnoitered Savendroog. On the 24th of december he encamped here again, and waited for the detachments by which Outradroog, Ramgurry, and Shevagurry, were attacked and taken. And in this neighbourhood his lordship was joined by the forces of the soubah, or nizam, on the 25th of january, 1792.

SOUTH VIEW OF THE WORKS AND PETTAH OF OOTRADROOG.



اوترادروک

اوترادروک یکي از قلعجات حصین ملک میسور است فرقه از لشکر کرنل ستوارت بزیر حکم کپتان سکات اوترادروک‌را بحمله برد سه روز بعد کرفتن ساوندروک و در این کارزار سیواي و کسن دیکري زخمي نشد

OUTRADROOG.

Outradroog, one of the many strong fortresses of the Mysore country, in which a small intrepid band might long keep a large army at bay, is about eleven miles distant from Savendroog, towards the west north west, and thirty west from Bangalore.

Hither were sent at the commencement of the late hostilities twelve of the crew of the Hannibal, whom admiral Suffrein basely delivered into the hands of Hyder Ali, during that war, in which Britain had alone to contend with the forces of the east and west, aided by the arms of her neighbours in Europe. From this place they contrived to escape, one dark and rainy night, down the precipices on the north side of the rock, at the expence of a few bruises, and one broken arm. But they were unfortunately discovered the next day, by a boy keeping cattle, who conveyed information of their track to the garrison. Finding themselves pursued, they separated: seven were retaken; two arrived safe in the british territories; of the other three no tidings have ever been heard.

The recaptured fugitives could expect nothing but the severest treatment; and indeed of six of them famine soon put a period to the existence. The seventh, Mr. Cadman, a midshipman, must soon likewise have perished from inanition, had not the army of lord Cornwallis passed this way; when fear probably induced the killahdar to

supply him with a sufficiency of wholesome nourishment. This soon recruited his strength, and enabled him to be removed to Seringapatam, where he was liberated about six months after by his victorious countrymen.

On the march of the army from Seringapatam to Bangalore, in june 1791, this fortress was summoned to surrender. The killahdar tauntingly answered: " I have eaten Tippoo's salt for twenty years, and will not give up my post till you have taken Seringapatam."

He was unable however to keep his word; for though lord Cornwallis judged it not adviseable to attack the fortress at this time, he sent against it, on the 23d of december following, lieutenant-colonel Stuart's detachment, flushed with the capture of Savendroog.

The killahdar, being again summoned, appeared to persist in his resolution; and to avoid any communication, fired on the flag of truce. Colonel Stuart in consequence made his disposition to attack the lower fort and pettah* next morning. Captain Scott, of the bengal establishment, with four battalion companies of the 52d and 72d regiments, and his own battalion of sepoys, was sent on this service, while another body made a feint, and opened some guns on the opposite side of the fort.

So rapidly did captain Scott carry the lower fort by escalade, that the killahdar sent to request a parley. While this took place, an appearance of treachery was observed in the upper fort, the garrison being busily employed in moving guns, and bringing them to bear on the assailants.

* For a plan of the fort and pettah, see the end of the work.

Exasperated at this sight, and impatient of the delay, the troops again rushed on to the assault. Lieutenant McInnes, of the 72d regiment, led the storm, with part of the europeans, and the pioneers, commanded by lieutenants Dowse and Macpherson; supported by captain Scott, who followed in more regular order with the rest of his force.

Some of the gates were burst open, others escaladed; till, having passed five or six different walls, which defended this steep and difficult rock, the troops at length gained the summit. So infatuated were the enemy, that whenever they saw a single european above the walls they fled: and although, from the steepness and narrowness of the road in the ascent, a few men of determined courage might with ease have stopped the progress of the assailants, they attempted not to make the least resistance; except at the last gateway, where a few muskets were discharged, by which two soldiers were wounded. The killahdar was made prisoner; many of the garrison were killed; and many, terrified at the approach of the british soldiers with their bayonets, are said to have rushed headlong from the rock.

When in our possession, this place was fitted up as a general hospital, and a magazine for the grain and stores, that could not be carried on immediately with the army. For these purposes it was extremely well adapted, as the lower fort was strong, spacious, and contained a number of good houses. It's situation, too, was convenient, being between forty and fifty miles from Seringapatam.



Home del.t

Pettie sculp.t

NORTH VIEW of RAMGAREE.

Published as the Act directs by G. Bowyer, Historic Gallery, Pall Mall, London, & W. Sharp, Madras, Feb.y 1791.

رامکری

رامکری قلع عمده است در میان راه بنکالور و سرنکه پاتام و کویاکه مرکز ان بیشه کلان که از شیوه کنکه تا بدریای کاوری مبسوط است میباشد

کپتان ولش روز بیست و دویم ماه دسمبر سال یک هزار هفت صد نود و یک انگریزی بر قلع پسترین و پتمرا حمله اورده هر دو جارا گرفت و در حال قلع دار حواله خود سپرد

RAMGURRY.

Ramgurry is situated twenty-six miles south west from Bangalore, and fifty-one east north east from Seringapatam, on the middle road between those two places. The fortifications occupy a considerable extent, and are very respectable in point of strength; though the place is by no means capable of making such a resistance as Savendroog, or even Outradroog.

The country around has a wild and savage aspect, it abounding with barren rocks, and extensive thickets, the abode of tigers and other beasts of prey. Iron, however, the common product of the sterile soil, that denies man the more genial fruits of nature, is found here in considerable quantities, and applied to that worst of purposes, the fabrication of implements of war. Surely this was not the design of the benevolent creator of the universe! He gave it as an instrument to contribute to the support of life, not to spread destruction around. Where the prolific bosom of the earth spontaneously yields the nutritious and delightful produce of vegetation, the spade and the ploughshare are unnecessary, and iron is not to be found. But where every exertion of art must be employed, to force the barren glebe to fertility, there supreme beneficence has placed the friendly ore at hand, to furnish industry with the implements requisite to render it's toil efficacious.

Like most of the hill forts in the forest between Seringapatam and Bangalore, Ramgurry is much infested with the mischievous tribe of monkeys. They frequently plunder the houses of the inhabitants, devouring their grain and other provision; and their sagacity on these predatory expeditions is astonishing: for, commonly entering through the roof by removing a tile, they first lift it up a little way, and peep in to see the coast clear, before they venture to descend in quest of prey.

Immediately on the taking of Savendroog, captain Welch, who, as we have before observed, commanded the detachment stationed on this road, was ordered to advance and summon the forts of Ramgurry and Shevagurry, by which the road was commanded.

Accordingly, on the 22d of december, 1791, he appeared before this fortress; and, the killahdar refusing to surrender it, he instantly attacked the lower fort and pettah, and carried them by assault. Terrified by the rapidity of the attack, and the facility with which the troops under captain Welch accomplished their purpose, the killahdar at once gave up the place, without farther resistance.

This fortress had but lately been strengthened by new works; and it was found to be well provided with guns, provision, and stores, the chief part of which had been removed from Chenepatam, when that fort was dismantled the preceding year.



EAST VIEW of CHENAPATAM.

حینیپاتام

این قلع در میان راه بنکالور و سرنکایاتام است این
جارا تیپو لیق حفاظت ندانستند

CHENEPATAM.

The fort of Chenepatam is situated on the middle or direct road from Bangalore to Seringapatam; from the former of which places it is distant somewhat more than thirty miles, south west half west; from the latter, near forty, east north east.

It not being very conspicuous for it's strength, Tippoo Sultan thought proper to dismantle it, in 1790, and remove it's guns and stores to Ramgurry, which was supposed to be much more capable of defence.

Home del.t Sutter sculp.t

NORTH EAST VIEW OF OLIAHDROOG.

Published as the Act directs by R. Bowyer Historic Gallery Pall Mall London & W. Harp Madrass Feb.y 1794

Home del.t Sutter direx.t

SOUTH EAST VIEW of OLLAHDROOG.

[illegible] Pall Mall [illegible] Wetherby [illegible]

اولیادروک

قلع اولیادروک کوچک است لیکن بر سنک بلند نهاده
روز ۱۹ ماد جون سال ۱۷۹۱ بتصرف انکریزان بیجنک
امد حصارهای قلع شکسته وا کردند تیپو باز مرمت
قلع فرمودند و دران سپاه کذاشت روز ۲۷ ماه جانواري
سال ۱۷۹۲ باز بدست انکریزان و مهرتیها در امد

OOLEADROOG.

THE fortress of Ooleadroog is small, but situated on an inaccessible rock, so that it may securely bid defiance to any weapons but those of famine.

Notwithstanding it's natural advantages, however, it changed it's master three times in the course of the late war.

On the 19th of june, 1791, the allied armies having crossed the Madoor, and encamped on it's eastern bank, the chief engineer, lieutenant-colonel Ross, was sent forward with the 22d battalion of coast sepoys, commanded by captain Oram, to reconnoitre and summon Ooleadroog; and the day following the 6th brigade was sent to invest the place, and make an appearance of attacking it. Fortunately the garrison thought their enemies too formidable to be resisted, and agreed to yield up the place, on condition of having their private property secured to them, and being safely escorted clear of our camp.

In the neighbourhood of this place were collected above six thousand head of cattle, and two thousand sheep; which, with a quantity of grain in the fort and pettah, afforded a seasonable supply to the army. At the same time were liberated thirty people from the Carnatic, one of whom had been kept in irons in the fort seven years, another

fourteen; probably forgotten by the tyrant of the day, as what motive can be assigned for the perpetual imprisonment of a few obscure peasants brought from a distant country?

Lord Cornwallis, deeming it too inconsiderable to be kept by our army, it was offered to the Mahrattas, as an useful halting place for their convoys: but they also declining it's possession, orders were issued to destroy it, so as to prevent it's being again occupied by the enemy.

After we had thus quitted it, Tippoo thought proper to repair it's dismantled works, and garrison it afresh. This we found, when our army encamped near it, on the 27th of january, 1792, on the march to Seringapatam. A reconnoitering party being sent on from the left wing, the garrison fired upon it, as it approached: but when the killahdar was summoned by lieutenant-colonel Maxwell, who told him, that there was no time to deliberate, for, if he delayed, he should instantly commence the attack, he was so intimidated as to surrender without farther resistance.

Ooleadroog was now garrisoned, and established as an advanced post, being ten miles nearer the grand object than Outradroog: and from this place the allied armies, being finally assembled, commenced their march on the 1st of february for the second attempt on Tippoo's capital.

VIEW of SHEVAGUERRY from the top of RAMGAREE.

شیواکری

شیوکری سنک عظیم محفوظ است اندک دور از رامکری
کپتان ولش زوزیکه رامکری کرفته بود هیمنچارا نیز
بیجنک و جدل در تصرف خود اورد

SHEVAGURRY.

SHEVAGURRY is a large fortified rock, situated nearly in the centre of that extensive forest, which reaches from Shevagunga to the banks of the Cauvery.

This fort, as well as Ramgurry, from which it is not far distant, was one of those, which, in 1730, were taken from Kempy Gowr, by Deo Rauze.

It surrendered, at the first summons, to captain Welch, on the 22d of december, 1791, immediately after the fall of it's neighbour.

Home del.t Byrne sculp.t

VIEW of SHEVAGUNGA from the road to SERINGAPATAM.

Published as the Act directs by R. Bowyer Historic Gallery, Pall Mall London & W. Sharp Aldersgate Feb.y 1794

شیواکنکا

در اطراف شیمالي ان بیشه کدان است که تا بکناره دریاي کاوري مبسوط باشد و سرحد حافظ میان بنکالور و سرنکاپاتام میشود

SHEVAGUNGA.

Shevagunga is situated on the northern border of that ample forest, which, covering a country near seventy miles in length and forty in breadth, extending to the banks of the Cauvery on the south, skirted by the Madoor on the west, and reaching nearly to Bangalore and the ghauts from which the Paneaur descends on the east, opposes a strong barrier to an enemy marching against Seringapatam from the side of Madras.

Through this forest there appear to be but four roads, or defiles, by which an army can pass: and on each of these, as well as throughout the whole extent of this difficult country, are many fortified hills, formerly the castles and possessions of rajahs and poligars, the petty princes and chiefs of the gentoos, but all of them previous to the late war subject to Tippoo, and garrisoned by his troops.

Home del.t Cyrus sculp.t

NORTH VIEW of PEDDI NAIG DROOGUM

Published as the Act directs by R. Cooper, Western Gallery, Gallery Hall, London & Westbury st. Andrews [illegible]



Home del.t Fittler sculp.t

WEST VIEW of PEDDI-NAIG DROOGUM.

Published as the Act directs, by R. Bowyer, Historic Gallery, Pall Mall, London, & W. Sharp, at Madras, Feb.y 1794

پدینایکدرکم

نام خود میدهد بکذاري در کوههاي مشرقي میان امبور و ونکاتکیري که بان راه کرنل اولدام در ماه اپرل سال ۱۷۹۱ لشکر بامداد امیر ال امرا لارد کارنوالس کشیدند

PEDDINAIGDURGUM.

PEDDINAIGDURGUM is situated at the head of a pass through the eastern ghauts, between Amboor and Vencatighery, in the midst of a forest, in a wild and rugged country.

Through this pass, after it had been cleared by the exertions of captain Read, colonel Oldham conducted a reinforcement for lord Cornwallis, with supplies of provision and stores. On the 22d of march, 1791, the colonel arrived at Amboor, where he remained till the approach of the grand army; when he advanced through the pass, encamped at Peddinaigdurgum, and the army having arrived, on the 18th of april, at Vencatighery, of which captain Read had previously taken possession, he joined it there, with about 700 europeans, and 4500 native troops, of whom 450 were cavalry, on the following day.



Home del. Fittler Sculp.

WEST VIEW of SERINGAPATAM from the middle of the RIVER.

Published as the Act directs by R. Cooper Historic Gallery, Pall Mall, London & W. Sharp, Madrass Feb.y 1791.



Home del.t Fittler direx.t

DISTANT VIEW of SERINGAPATAM from MEADOW'S REDOUBT.

Published as the Act directs by R. Bowyer Historic Gallery Pall Mall London, & W. Sharp at Madrass Feb.y 1794

Home del. Fittler direx.

EAST VIEW of SERINGAPATAM.

Published as the Act directs by R. Bowyer, Historic Gallery, Pall Mall, London & W. Sharp, Mastrafs, Feb. 1794

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NORTH VIEW of SERINGAPATAM.

Published as the Act directs by R. Bowyer, Historic Gallery, Pall Mall, London & W. Sharp, Madras, Feb.y 1792.

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N. N. E. VIEW of SERINGAPATAM from CAPT. SIBBALD'S REDOUBT.

Published as the Act directs by R. Bowyer, Historic Gallery, Pall Mall, London, & W. Sharp, Madrass, Feb.y 1794



Home del. Sutter Sculp.

VIEW of the NORTH EAST ANGLE of SERINGAPATAM.

Published as the Act directs by R. Bowyer, Historic Gallery, Pall Mall, London & W. Sharp, Madras Feb. 1794.

سرنگاپاتام

تخت سلطنت تیپو سلطان در جزیره میان دریاي کاوري
است بر حد مغربي ان جزیره قلع و برجها در اطراف
مشرقي باغي کدان و در ان میان دولت خانه وسط
مکر باغي خورد بطرف شیال هکي معمور بود پیش
از جنک گذشته سال ۱۷۹۷ مهرمتها و نظام دکن با
باضی انکریزان محاصره سرنگاپاتام کردند لیکن حیدر
علي صلح با مهرهتها بوسیله مبلغ کران نمودند سال
۱۷۹۹ رفیقان مذکور با لشکر قاهر تابع حکم ارل کارنوالس
باز بر شهر مذکور هجوم اوردند و شهر خلاصي نیافتي
اکر تیپو سلطان سپردن نصف ممالک خود و ادا کردن
سه کرور و سي لک روپیه قبول ننمودي

SERINGAPATAM.

SERINGAPATAM, the capital of the kingdom of Mysore, and of Tippoo Sultan's dominions, derives it's name from the god Serung, or Seryrung, to whom one of it's pagodas is dedicated. It is situated in an island, formed by the river Cauvery, in latitude 12° 25′ 40″ south, and longitude 76° 34′ 30″ east from Greenwich. This island extends about four miles in length, from east to west, and is about a mile and half over, in it's middle or broadest part. The ground in the central part is somewhat more elevated than the rest, and slopes with a gentle declivity towards each end.

The fort and outworks occupy about a mile of the western end of the island; and the laul baug, or great garden, about an equal portion of the eastern. This garden was laid out in regular walks of shady cypress; and abounded with fruit trees, flowers, and vegetables of every kind. But the axe of the enemy soon despoiled it of it's beauties; and those trees, which once administered to the pleasures of their master, were compelled to furnish materials for the reduction of his capital. At the same time the dowlat baug, or rajah's garden, which was situated on the north side of the island, nearer the fort, was undergoing a similar devastation by order of Tippoo, lest that also should be applied to the same purpose.

The whole space between the fort and the laul baug, except the small enclosure, called the dowlat baug, just mentioned, was filled with houses, forming an extensive suburb, of which the pettah of Shaher Ganjam alone remains; the rest having been destroyed by Tippoo to make room for batteries to defend the island, and to form an esplanade to the fort.

This pettah, of modern structure, built in the centre of the island, is about half a mile square. The streets, regularly crossing each other, are all wide, shaded on each side by trees, and full of good houses; and a strong mud wall surrounds it. In all probability this town was preserved for the accommodation of the bazar people and merchants, and for the convenience of the troops stationed in that part of the island for it's defence.

Within the laul baug Tippoo had erected for himself a superb palace, and in the eastern corner of the garden a pleasant bungulo, or summerhouse, looking down the Cauvery, where a junction of those two arms that surround the island is formed. This bungulo and the upper part of the palace afforded excellent accommodations for our sick and wounded officers; as did the lower part of the palace, and the square of faquier's choultries round Hyder's tomb, for the private soldiers.

The fort itself, constructed on the west end of the island, is of a triangular figure. The two branches of the river embrace it on it's longest sides. The base of the triangle, towards the island, being the face most liable to attack, is covered by strong outworks, and defended by two broad and massy ramparts, the second a considerable distance within the first. Each of these ramparts has good flank defences, a deep ditch, with drawbridges, and every advantage of modern fortification. The white walls of the fort, it's regular outworks, magnificent

buildings, and ancient hindu pagodas, contrasted with the more lofty and splendid mosques lately raised in honour of the mohammedan faith, of which Tippoo was the zealous apostle, render it a conspicuous object.*

Seringapatam formerly belonged to a pious poligar rajah, who, going on a pilgrimage to Ramisseram, had confidence enough in his neighbour, the prince of Mysore, to leave it in his charge. Having duly atoned, as he imagined, for his sins, he returned to his capital: but the mysorean refused to deliver it up; asserting, that the god Serung had commanded him to retain the government. The new sovereign, backed by the authority of the god, being too hard for the poor pilgrim, he was obliged to relinquish his sceptre, which continued in the family of the usurper for three centuries.

His descendants enlarging their dominions by conquest, Seringapatam ultimately became the metropolis of an extensive kingdom, now known by the general name of Mysore. One of these, marrying into the family of the Cullala poligar, promoted him to the office of delwy, or prime minister; and custom gradually rendered this office, as it has many others, hereditary. In the year 1747, Nundy Rauze, at that time delwy, deposed the rajah Shumca Rauze; sent him prisoner to Kuppaldroog, where he died in confinement; and placed on the throne Kishen Rauze, an infant of the royal family. Under this nominal rajah the reins of government remained entirely in his own hands; and, to render his authority more securely permanent, he gave him his daughter in marriage.

Among other expeditions Nundy Rauze engaged in the dispute between Mohammed Ali and Chunda Sahib; and it was in this service,

* For a plan of the fort and island, and the operations of the siege in february, 1792, see the end of the book.

that Hyder Ali exhibited the first tokens of that courage, skill, and activity, in the command of a body of horse, which were the instruments of his subsequent aggrandizement; enabling him finally to supplant Nundy Rauze, and assume the sovereignty.

Gopaul Row and Bulwant Row, mahratta generals, under Hana, entered Balaghaut in 1756, and gave Hyder an opportunity of displaying his abilities afresh. On this occasion he grew into very high favour with the rajah and Nundy Rauze, who bestowed on him the title of bahauder, and the post of generalissimo. Finally, however, the mahrattas acquired such a superiority, that Nundy Rauze began to despair of an accommodation; when Hyder confidently engaged to procure a peace. Being in consequence invested with full power to treat, and act according to the exigence of the case, he assumed the entire management of public affairs, appointed for his peishkar Kundy Row, originally his slave, mortgaged a great part of the lands for ready money, to buy peace from the mahrattas, gave jagheers to the rajah and Nundy Rauze for their maintenance, and supported the army on the remainder of the revenues.

The mahrattas, having returned to their own country, were not long before they engaged in a war with Sujah Dowlah and other mohammedan powers in the north, and sent the greater part of their forces to Hindustan. An opportunity so favourable was not to be neglected by the politic and active Hyder, who soon reconquered from them all the provinces they had forcibly ravished from the mysorean dominions. This event took place in the year 1760. It completely established his authority, and obtained him fresh honours from his nominal masters.

It was about this period, that Burry Amma, an old woman of the rajah's family, formed the design of depriving Hyder of his power, and

restoring the rajah, or rather his minister, to his authority. In this plot she engaged Kundy Row.

Hyder had just returned from an expedition, and encamped on the island, when a cannonade from the fort gave him the first intimation of the plot. Unacquainted with the extent of the danger that menaced him, he fled with a small party to Bangalore, where he collected his troops. Thence returning in full force to Seringapatam, he threatened the place with destruction, unless Burry Amma would deliver up the traitor Kundy Row, that his perfidy might receive it's due punishment. Terrified into compliance, she gave up her wretched tool, who was immediately sent to Bangalore; where, after having been confined a month in an iron cage, the bowstring put an end to his life. Hyder now entered the fort without opposition, and reassumed the reins of government, but made a specious offer of resigning them to Nundy Rauze. He, confiding in his false professions, was weak enough to put himself into Hyder's power; but he soon perceived his errour, when, instead of a palace, he found prepared for him a prison. Thus Hyder attained the summit of authority, and exercised it with despotic sway: though he still affected to rule in the name of the rajah, whom he annually exhibited to the public at the dussarah festival; when, in the true style of oriental hypocrisy, he presented to him a nuzzer, and professed himself his slave.

In 1767 a confederacy was formed against Hyder, to which in all appearance he must inevitably have fallen a victim. After having rapidly recovered all the northern provinces, which Hyder had formerly conceded and afterwards taken from them, a great army of mahrattas, under Mahdoo Row, and another of the soubah's forces, commanded by the nizam in person, and his brother Bazalet Jung, joined by a detachment of british

troops, which the government of Madras had agreed to furnish for the expedition, proceeded to attack Seringapatam.

Hyder determined to risk every thing in it's defence, and intrenched himself under the walls, having first laid waste the adjacent country. The plain of Seringapatam was covered with above a hundred thousand cavalry, and more than two hundred elephants, followed by a body of infantry, with about fifty large cannons. They drew off however, on receiving the first discharge of artillery from Hyder's lines; and deeming it impracticable to force a position of such strength, they differed on the measures to be pursued for the farther prosecution of the war. In want both of grain and forage, the mahrattas were bought off by Hyder, and withdrew from the siege. The nizam, too, apprehensive for his safety, agreed to a separate negotiation; which not only terminated hostilities on his part, but ended in his uniting with Hyder, to exterminate the british power in the Carnatic. To this alliance the nizam did not continue true; but it's consequence was a ruinous invasion of our territories, which, though ably opposed by general Joseph Smith, concluded in a disgraceful peace, dictated by Hyder at the gates of Madras, in 1769.

In 1771 the mahrattas again invaded Mysore under Mahdoo Row: but that chief, after various successes, returned to Poonah, and left Trimmuck Row to carry on the war. In this war, Hyder's army was overtaken at Chilcahoorly hill, near the lake of Mooty Tallaow, as he was retreating to his capital, and was totally defeated, with a dreadful slaughter; Hyder himself escaping to Seringapatam, without a single attendant. The total subversion of Hyder's empire must in all probability have followed, but for the friendly interposition of Mara Row, who had considerable influence with the mahratta chiefs. Through

his means he was enabled to purchase a peace, at the expence of sixty lacs of rupees; and his own extraordinary abilities enabled him soon to retrieve his affairs.

In 1774 Hyder obtained from Ragobah, who had succeeded to the government of the mahratta country, a grant of all the provinces he had ceded. The chiefs, who governed them, however, refused to give them up: but he expelled them by force, and amongst them even his friend Mara Row. He then turned his arms against the rajahs of Chittledroog and Harponelly, and other poligars, all of whose possessions and treasures he seized.

In 1780 he invaded the Carnatic, with an army of near a hundred thousand men, and threatened utterly to crush the british power on the Coromandel coast; when he was defeated in a pitched battle by sir Eyre Coote, at the head of the remains of our forces, who thus checked his ambitious career.

Hyder Ali Khan died in 1782, and was succeeded by his son Tippoo Sahib, under the appellation of Tippoo Sultan.

In 1790 the mahrattas and the nizam once more united with the british government, to repress the growing power, and curb the restless ambition of the sovereign of Mysore. To enter at large into a detail of every minute circumstance of the war would take up too much room, and we have already recorded some of it's principal events:* we must content ourselves, therefore, with a brief abstract of what more immediately relates to our subject.

* The several occurrences of the war are marked in the general map of the Mysore and Carnatic, at the end of the work.

The british forces were divided into three bodies. One, named from it's position the centre army, commanded by colonel Kelly, was to protect the Carnatic: a second, the bombay army, under general Abercromby, was to reduce the country lying on the west of the ghauts, and then to form a junction with the grand army: the third, under general Medows, was to reduce the Coimbettore country, and then ascend the eastern ghauts. Of the latter army earl Cornwallis in 1791 took the command. The mahrattas and the nizam were to attack the enemy's dominions in the quarters bordering on their's, and proceed on to Seringapatam; where all the forces were to unite, as in one common centre.

It was on the 13th of may, that lord Cornwallis, who had been joined at Cottapilly on the 13th of april by 14 or 15000 of the nizam's troops, pitched his camp at Arakeery, about nine miles east of Seringapatam. Tippoo immediately crossed over from the island, to the north side of the river, and took a position directly in his front, about six miles distant. The ground chosen by Tippoo was such, that he could not be attacked in front but under great disadvantages. To avoid these, lord Cornwallis, who ardently desired to bring him to a general action, marched round some hills on his right, by a circuitous course, on the night of the fourteenth, and came in view of his left wing at eight in the morning of the 15th. This obliged Tippoo to change his ground; though it would still have been sufficiently advantageous, had he not to have contended with troops far superiour to his own; particularly as our army had marched the whole of a wet and stormy night, over bad ground, and the draft cattle were already jaded.

The action was begun by colonel Maxwell, who stormed and carried a height, where an advanced party, commanded by Kummur ul Deen, was posted. On this the main body moved forward, and the

action soon became general. Colonel Maxwell, leaving a sufficient force to keep possession of the height, advanced rapidly to gain the ascent of the Carigat ridge, close to the enemy's left flank; and colonel Floyd immediately advanced with the cavalry towards the right. On this the enemy gave way; and our army pursued, till the batteries on the island opened, and checked it's progress. One gun was captured in the field, and three on the height, several colours were taken, and three thousand stands of arms were found on the field after the battle.

Notwithstanding this victory, and though general Abercromby with his army was at hand, provision falling short, and the rainy season, and consequent swelling of the Cauvery, approaching, it was impossible to remain before Seringapatam for the present with any prospect of success. Nay, so exhausted were the draft bullocks, that it was found necessary to destroy the train of battering artillery, previous to retreating towards Bangalore. On the 6th of june, the combined armies, for the mahrattas had joined on the 28th of may, quitted the vicinity of Tippoo's capital.

The intermediate time having been employed in taking such measures as tended to further the grand object of the campaign, on the 5th of february, 1792, the army once more encamped in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam. Tippoo was also encamped under it's walls, on the north side of the Cauvery, within the bound hedge.

On the night of the 6th lord Cornwallis planned a bold attack on Tippoo's fortified camp, which was executed with complete success. It was conducted in three divisions: the right commanded by major-general Medows; the centre under the immediate orders of lord Cornwallis, with lieutenant-colonel Stuart as second in command; the left

led on by lieutenant-colonel Maxwell. In this action lord Cornwallis had his left hand grazed by a musket shot.

Though our loss was considerable, it was nothing in proportion to the advantages of the victory; and that of the enemy was of course much greater. It is said, that some days after the battle the sultan's killed, wounded, and missing amounted to twenty thousand; great numbers having deserted in consequence of his defeat. He lost also his camp, and eighty pieces of cannon.

Immediately on gaining this victory colonel Stuart took post on the east end of the island, with a strong detachment, and our grand camp was removed nearer the walls. The island afforded abundance of materials for the siege, and our people began to prepare them with the utmost alacrity. On the night of the 18th the trenches were opened, on the north side of the fort; and in the mean time major Dalrymple beat up the enemy's horse camp, on the south side of the river, in order to draw their attention to that quarter. On the 19th general Abercromby crossed to the south side of the Cauvery.

Tippoo now used every exertion to strengthen his defences; yet, despairing of being able to make any effectual resistance, he seriously turned his thoughts to peace, and lord Cornwallis agreed to receive vakeels with his proposals. The first meeting was on the 15th; a second took place on the 16th; a third, on the 19th; and a fourth, on the 21st. Still the military operations on neither side were suspended; and on the 22d Tippoo made an attack on an advanced party of the bombay army, but was repulsed.

By the 1st of march the two breaching batteries, one of twenty

guns, the other of twelve, would have been ready to open; as well as an enfilading battery of at least ten on the south west side of the fort. Adding to these the cross fire that was to be directed from the island and Sibbald's redoubt, with the mortars and howitzers of the train, there would have been a fire of fifty pieces of heavy ordnance against the place; not to reckon any number of smaller guns, that it might have been deemed necessary to employ. Furnaces for heating shot, too, were prepared: so that this extensive fortress, filled with houses constructed of combustible materials, must almost inevitably have been soon in flames.

But in the general orders issued on the 24th of february, the preliminaries of peace were announced, and hostilities were directed to cease.

As hostages for the fulfilment of the treaty Tippoo agreed to give his second and third sons. The elder, Abdul Kalik, was about ten years of age; dark complexioned, with thick lips, a small flattish nose, and a long pensive countenance, yet graceful in his manner, and, when the novelty of his situation wore off, animated in his appearance. The younger, Mooza ud Deen, was about eight; remarkably fair, with regular features, a small round face, large full eyes, and a lively countenance. His mother, a sister of Burham ud Deen, who was killed at Sattimungalum, a beautiful, delicate woman, died absolutely of fear, a few days after the attack of the lines.

On the 26th, about noon, the princes left the fort, mounted on elephants richly caparisoned, seated in silver houders, and attended by their father's vakeels. At the tents sent from the fort for their accommodation, and pitched near the mosque redoubt, they were met by sir John Kennaway, and the vakeels of the nizam and the mahratta chief,

also on elephants, who accompanied them to head quarters. The procession was led by several camel hircarrahs, and seven standard bearers, carrying small green flags suspended from rockets, followed by a hundred pikemen, whose weapons were inlaid with silver. Their guard of two hundred sepoys, and a party of horse, brought up the rear. As they approached head quarters, the battalion of bengal sepoys, commanded by captain Welch, appointed for their guard, formed a street to receive them.

Lord Cornwallis, attended by his staff, and some of the principal officers of the army, met the princes at the door of his large tent, as they dismounted from their elephants; and, after embracing them, led them, one in each hand, into the tent. When they were seated on each side of his lordship, Gullam Ali, the principal vakeel, addressed him thus: These children were this morning the sons of the sultan my master; their situation is now changed, and they must look up to your lordship as their father.

Lord Cornwallis, who had received the boys with the tenderness of a parent, anxiously assured the vakeel, and the princes themselves, that every possible attention should be shown them, every possible care taken of their persons.

At this interesting scene the princes appeared in long white muslin gowns, and red turbans. Each had several rows of large pearls round his neck, from which hung an ornament consisting of a ruby and an emerald, of considerable size, surrounded by large brilliants, and in his turban a sprig of valuable pearls. The correctness and propriety of their conduct evinced, that they had been bred up with infinite care, and taught in their youth to imitate the reserve and politeness of age.

The day following lord Cornwallis, attended as before, visited the princes at their tent. Each of them presented his lordship with a fine persian sword; and in return he gave the elder a fusee; the younger, a pair of pistols, of curious workmanship.

Still, however, such difficulties and delays arose on the part of Tippoo, respecting the final adjustment of the definitive treaty, that preparations were made for recommencing the siege, and hostilities were on the point of being renewed. Probably our demand of the Coorga country was the article to which he was most averse; as it prevented him from wreaking his vengeance on the rajah, whom he considered as the chief instrument of the war. To this, however, he found himself obliged to submit; and on the 19th of march the treaty was delivered to the confederate powers, having been signed on the 17th of that month, or the 23d of the month rejeb, in the year of the hejra 1206.

By this treaty half of Tippoo's dominions, affording an annual revenue of one hundred and eighteen lacs and half of rupees, were parcelled out amongst the confederate powers; all the prisoners of the four powers, from the time of Hyder Ali, were to be unequivocally restored; and three crores, and thirty lacs of rupees were to be paid by Tippoo to the allies, half immediately, the remainder by three instalments, of four months each. A perpetual friendship and alliance was also of course agreed upon between the parties.



HYDER'S TOMB in the LOLL BAUG GARDENS.

Published as the Act directs by R. Bowyer Historic Gallery Pall Mall London 1 March 1794

قبر حيدر علي خان

نزديک بان باغي کدان در جزيره سرنکاپاتام است در احاطه مقبر علي و در پيشاني ان صفات برگذيده بهشت نشين نويسانيده اند در چهار طرف چولتريان فقرا مبني و دز مقابل مقبر مسجدي خورد باداي نهاز است

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THE TOMB

OF

HYDER ALI KHAN.

We cannot better terminate our work than with the proud mausoleum of Hyder Ali: a man whose grandfather is unknown, and whose father, the obscure killahdar of a paltry fort, but for him would have never been remembered.

In the preceding article we have noticed the principal steps by which he rose from his original insignificance to the summit of despotic power: and if talents for governing could confer a title to sovereignty, his claim would be unquestionably strong. Practically, indeed, this title appears in general to have been held good: for, if we examine the various dynasties the pages of history record, we shall find, that, throughout the globe, far the greater part have originated with some man of talents superiour to his fellows, which have enabled him to sway with ability the sceptre he had seized by force. When at length this sceptre has descended by hereditary succession to men, who have supposed that succession a sufficient title, and have neglected therefore to qualify themselves for the office they held, some other, with no claim perhaps but talents of a higher order, struck out from the multitude by the collision of circumstances, or brought near to the throne by accidental causes, has stept into his place; by force ejecting the feeble descendant of kings, or by fraud circumventing the degenerate offspring of a man like himself. Thus did Hyder Ali: and the talents of his son have legitimated his claim of succession to an usurper.

When Hyder died in 1782, his remains were deposited in a tomb at the west end of the extensive garden at Seringapatam; and in honour of this founder of a new race of princes, over it his son and successor erected a superb and magnificent mausoleum. It is surrounded by a square of faquiers choultries, which formed a convenient hospital for the sick and wounded of the british troops, during the siege of Seringapatam, in 1792. Opposite to the front of the mausoleum is a mosque; and in the centre of the front, facing the mosque, is a black marble slab, on which is a persian inscription, in memory of the deceased, couched in terms of extreme hyperbole, whilst the pomp of it's turgid diction is disgraced by a play on words, that to an european must appear highly ridiculous, though a native of Mysore seems to hold it not beneath the dignity of the most serious subjects.

Near the tomb of Hyder Ali another has been more recently erected in memory of Burham ud Deen, the brother of one of Tippoo's wives, who fell at Sattimungalum, when that fortress was taken by colonel Floyd, on the 26th of august, 1790.

Plan of BANGALORE,

(with the Attacks.)

Taken by the ENGLISH ARMY,

Under the Command of the

Rt Hon.ble EARL CORNWALLIS, K.G. &c. &c. &c.

March 22nd 1791.

A. *Battery of 10 Guns, for taking off the Defences*

B.C. *Enfilading Batteries.*

D.E. *Breaching Batteries.*

F.F.F. *The Approaches.*

G. *The Pettah Gate Stormed 7th March 1791.*

H.H. *The Mortar Batteries.*



PLAN

of the Position of the Confederate ARMIES, under the Direction of

EARL CORNWALLIS,

before SERINGAPATAM, from the 5th to the 24th February, 1792

when the Capitulation of Hostilities took place

including the Position of

TIPPOO SULTAN'S ARMY,

previous to the Action of the Night of the 6th and the Subsequent Operations of the SIEGE.

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

PLAN OF OOTRADROOG TAKEN BY THE ENGLISH ARMY

UNDER THE COMMAND *OF THE* RT. HON.BLE EARL CORNWALLIS K.G. &c.&c.&c.

DECEMBER 21th 1792.

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



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A

SKETCH OF THE WAR

WITH

TIPPOO SULTAUN;

OR,

A DETAIL OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES AT THE LINES OF TRAVANCORE IN DECEMBER 1789, UNTIL THE PEACE CONCLUDED BEFORE SERINGAPATAM IN FEBRUARY 1792.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

BY

RODERICK MACKENZIE,

LIEUT. 52d REGIMENT.

Sic vos ——————— *non vobis.*

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1799.

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CALCUTTA:

PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR.

M.DCC.XCIII.

681

TO COLONEL JOHN MURRAY,

Military Auditor General.

Bengal.

DEAR COLONEL,

ALTHOUGH powers of mind ſuch as you poſſeſs muſt ever command reſpect from men of ſenſe, they are not at all times equally ſucceſsful in procuring univerſal eſteem. In what degree you are an exception to this rule, however little known to yourſelf, it might be deemed flattery in me to proclaim. All that inclination dictates, or that candour requires, is to declare, that it is not to thoſe this addreſs muſt be chiefly attributed; neither

is

is it to the exalted ſtation you conſequently fill; nor to your claims on a Highlander from being at the head of a Clan; nor to the anxiety of an author for the reception of his work; far leſs to any ſelfiſh views of future advantage: This dedication is a juſt tribute to the grateful remembrance of many kindneſſes already beſtowed on

DEAR COLONEL,

Your very faithful, much obliged,
and moſt obedient ſervant,
RODERICK MACKENZIE.
Lieut. 52d Regt.

Camp, on the iſland of Seringapatam,
February 25, 1792.

PREFACE.

THE toil that a Soldier, intent upon his duty, muſt undergo in the courſe of an arduous war, where the climate is highly unfavorable to exertions of body and mind, will, of itſelf, apologiſe for many imperfections in a deſcription of momentous campaigns written chiefly in the field.

Anxious only that his facts may prove incontrovertible, and but little ſolicitous of literary fame, the Author ſubmits to a well-informed community, a plain, impartial, and, he truſts, a diſtinct ſketch of the late war, without any attempt whatſoever at cloathing it in a pompous garb, or of obtaining commendation beyond what is due to a candid narrative of recent and important events.

He is highly ſenſible that the utmoſt delicacy ought to be obſerved where the conduct of Military men is handed down to poſterity, he therefore carefully avoids every reflection that can unneceſſarily tend to affect the reputation of any individual; but, whilſt he holds truth

and juſtice for his conſtant and only guides, whilſt he employs his beſt abilities faithfully to connect and detail momentous Military operations, no influence whatſoever can check the rein of free expoſition or divert his attention from his original purſuit.

A witneſs to moſt of the tranſactions that he is now about to relate, before he committed his remarks, he conſtantly compared them with thoſe of ſenſible men upon the ſpot. He ſpared no pains to obtain correct information on every occurrence at which he was not preſent, he has been ſcrupulouſly careful not to admit any authorities on matters that were at all in doubt, until he was perſuaded they could bear the teſt of ſevere ſcrutiny, he has anxiouſly avoided being miſled by partiality, or influenced by any improper intent, conſequently he truſts that none of his cotemporaries have juſt grounds to take offence.

Inſtead of forcible epithets or nervous deſcriptions that might amuſe the imagination or dignify his work, he corroborates the train of reaſoning that he originally laid down by the unadulterated obſervations of judicious men without any alteration of their language.

Aware,

Aware, however, that narrations of every deſcription are liable to error, he will always lend an attentive ear to candid criticiſm, and for information or aſſiſtance he will ever entertain the moſt grateful ſenſe; but as he holds time in too high eſtimation to waſte it in refuting what is of itſelf abſurd, illiberality under whatever ſhape will be treated with ſilent contempt.

Until human nature ſhall have undergone a compleat change, the man that records the tranſactions of his own times, and that dares to adhere to truth, cannot meet the approbation of all. Should this work, which attempts not at that, ſucceed ſo far as to give general ſatisfaction, the expectation of the author will be fully accompliſhed. If it fails, and that another with more information on the ſubject, with more activity of mind, and with more adequate talents ſhould be induced to undertake the taſk, he will ſtill reſt ſatisfyed on account of the aſſiſtance that his labours muſt afford.

In

In ſhort, the reader is entreated to keep in conſtant remembrance, that this work inſtead of being the reſult of ſtudy in retirement, had its origin and progreſs amidſt the din of arms, the toils and troubles of war, in the centre of a camp, where there was but little acceſs to books, and ſubject, beſides, to ſome very, very unuſual diſadvantages. Whilſt theſe reflections are alive on his imagination they will preſerve the mildneſs of his temper, or when the work does not in his opinion riſe to the juſt ſtandard of true criticiſm, they will at leaſt aſſiſt to ſoften the aſperity of his remarks.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

TRANSPOSITION of letters may occaſionally be obſerved in the peruſal of this volume, but as it nowhere endangers the meaning there does not appear a neceſſity to point out the ſeveral inſtances. The indulgent reader, recollecting that the workmen, chiefly, are ſtrangers to the language they print, will withhold the blame that might otherwiſe be imputed to the Author on this account.

ERRATA.

Page 6, for Moodagee, *read* Ragojee.
147, for 13th *read* 14th.

GLOSSARY.

Aumils or Aumildars—*Collectors of the Revenue.*

Chela—*Literally an adopted ſon, the Sultaun and his father during former wars were accuſtomed to make captives of all the boys in the Carnatic and other countries through which they paſſed, and having made Muſſulmans of them they formed them into Corps, to which they gave the name of Chela.*

Cooly—*A common labourer.*

Coule—*Quarter, protection, or agreement.*

Cuſhoon—*A legion or brigade conſiſting of a certain eſtabliſhment of Cavalry, Artillery, and Infantry, amounting in general to about* 3000 *fighting men.*

Dooly—*A litter for carrying the ſick and wounded.*

Duffadar—*A Native Officer of Cavalry nearly equal in rank to a Serjeant.*

Ghaut—*A paſs, defile or ford.*

Haram—*Literally any thing forbidden*—*the place where the Muſſulmans keep their women, commonly called the Zenana.*

Hircarrah—*A guide, footman, or courier.*

Huzzoor—*The Royal preſence.*

Jungle—*Underwood, thickets, uncultivated land.*

Laſcars

Laſcars—*A Corps of Natives attached to the Artillery to aſſiſt in working the guns, there are alſo Laſcars attached to Corps for pitching tents and other duties.*

Looties—*Irregular horſemen that plunder and lay waſte the country.*

Killedar—*The Governor of a Fort.*

Muſnud—*A throne.*

Nagger—*The principal drum in an Aſiatic Army commonly allowed to perſons of high dignity.*

Padre—*A prieſt.*

Peons—*Irregular Infantry for aſſiſting to collect the revenue.*

Phouzdar—*A commander of Troops.*

Polygar—*A ſort of independent chieftain whoſe homage is in general from compulſion.*

Ryut—*A huſbandman.*

Sirdar—*A man at the head of a body of Troops.*

Stable-horſe—*That part of the Sultaun's Cavalry which is beſt armed, accoutred, and moſt regularly diſciplined.*

Vakeel—*An Agent in common, alſo the name given to an Ambaſſador.*

Zemindar—*A Landholder.*

A SKETCH

OF THE WAR WITH

TIPPOO SULTAUN.

CHAPTER THE FIRST.

TOWARDS the cloſe of 1789, after a peace of nearly ſix years(1) with Great Britain and her Allies, TIPPOO SULTAUN, ſon and heir to that bold uſurper HYDER-ALLY CAWN, again appeared in arms, determined, in defiance of all treaties, that the general tranquillity ſhould ceaſe.—This ambitious Prince inherited ſovereign authority, over a tract of country, comprehending a ſpace of not leſs than eighty thouſand ſquare

(1) The treaty that terminated the former war was ſigned in March 1784 at Mangalore.

Geopraphical miles (1); yeilding a clear annual revenue of about three million ſterling (2), after deducting all expences of collection; and, peopled by upwards of ſix millions of inhabitants, including for the defence of the whole, about one hundred and thirty-five thouſand regular and well diſciplined troops, together with a ſtanding militia, not ſhort of one hundred and eighty thouſand men under various denominations (3).

Without entering into any hiſtorical diſquiſition concerning the conqueſt of that country by the Mahome-

(1) In a late ingenious work, the ſeat of the war which gave riſe to the preſent publication is thus diſtinctly deſcribed "That part of the Decan, or Peninſula of India, ſouth of the river "Kiſtnah, in latitude 16½ Degrees North, and extending in a triangular form to Cape Como-"rin, between the two coaſts of Malabar and Coromandel, comprehends in all an area of one "hundred and forty thouſand ſquare Geographical miles; of which the Britiſh dominions, "including the Circar of Guntour, the Carnatic Payengaut, and its dependencies of Tanjore, "Trichinopoly, Tinevelly, Travancore, &c. may comprize about 50,000; the diſtricts of "Carnoul, Raichore, &c. under the protection of the NIZAM, 4000; and the Nabobſhip of "Sanore, with the independent Rajahſhips of Bari, or Bounſclo, of Koork and others in the "Balagaut hills of Malabar, at leaſt 6000 more; leaving 80,000 for the ſquare dimenſions of "all the actual poſſeſſions of TIPPOO."—Hiſt: and Pol. view of Decan—p. 1.———As this calculation is confirmed by Major RENNELL, whoſe abilities as a Geographer are univerſally known, it is fair to admit that no truth can be better eſtabliſhed.

(2) On the revenue of the Myſorean empire, no two authors, that have come to my hands, agree—Major RENNELL ſays, "The groſs revenue of TIPPOO, has been ſtated at four krores of Rupees, or as many millions Sterling"—Memoirs, P. CXXXIX—and, Mr. GRANT tells us, that from his ſtatement "it appears, that the whole of TIPPOO's preſent "effective revenue is under two krore of Rupees"—Hiſt. and Pol. view of Decan, p. 15.—"The adage comes neareſt the truth—*In medio tutiſſimus ibis.*"

(3) With reſpect to the population and force of the Myſorean Empire I have fought for guides in vain. But, on the principles, laid down by General LLOYD, [ſee his Rhapſody page 18] aſſiſted by careful obſervation upon the ſpot, I have made uſe of my beſt endeavours to come at the truth.—Major RENNELL and Mr. GRANT, the two beſt authorities that I am enabled to conſult are totally ſilent on the population of TIPPOO's dominions: and, as they, not only, widely differ from each other, but evidently under-rate the number of men that bore arms throughout the Myſorean dominions, I am the leſs diffident with reſpect to the correctneſs of my ſtatement. Colonel FULLARTON ſays, that the Myſorean had "With a population "of many millions, an army of 300,000 men, and 5,000,000l. of annual revenue."—Eng. Int. in India, page 16.

dans,

dans, and reſigning to the learned in Eaſtern languages(4) the laborious and complicated revolutions that the ſeveral States have alternately undergone, it is intended throughout this work, to convey all ideas, of the dominions over which the Sultaun ruled, in terms familiar to the Britiſh ear.—Excluſive, then, of the ſubſtantial acquirements of his own arms, which will be hereafter mentioned, uncontеſted and abſolute ſway, devolved upon TIPPOO SULTAUN, by the death of his father, over the extenſive table land of Myſore: over the rich and powerful vallies of Barahmahl, Selim, Namcul and Dindigul; over the wide and fertile diſtricts of Sankerry-Dirgum, Erroad, Carore, Daraporam, Coimbatore, Paligautcherry, Callicut, Cotiote, Cartenaud, Cherica, Bednore, Soonda, Harponelly, Darwar, Sanore, Gootie, Cuddapah, Ry-Droog and Chittle-Droog, and over many other valuable, though leſs known tracts which had been lately wreſted by his father, from his Highneſs NIZAM-ALLY-CAWN, from the Maratta empire, and from the other neighbouring ſtates.

(4) According to Mr. GRANT, Myſore fell into the hands of HYDER-ALLY-CAWN about the year 1763; Bednore between 1763-5; Soonda about the latter period; Malabar in 1765-6; Barah Mhal amongſt the former periods; Petty States of Hindoo Rajahs and of PURSERAM BHOW in 1774-7; Carnatic Balagaut Bejapoory in 1776; Carnatic Balagaut Hydrabady in 1776-9; Adoni, Sanore, Koork and Anagoondy ſince the acceſſion of TIPPOO to the throne. —Hiſt. & Pol. view of Decan, page 7 to 14.

Territories of ſuch vaſt extent, and ſo abundant in reſources, as to have lately ſupported ſeveral independent principalities in ſplendour and magnificence, being united into one mighty empire, under a prince of a warlike diſpoſition, and poſſeſſed of conſiderable abilities, enabled him to effect the complete deſtruction of all political balance amongſt the native powers of Hindoſtan. The Maratta ſtates, diſtracted in general by inteſtine broils, ſeldom eſpouſe collectively the intereſts of any individual member of their empire (1). Although eſteemed the moſt formidable power in India at no very diſtant period, they had now forfeited every title to that diſtinction(2). The different intereſts, of their ſeveral chiefs, had of late, induced them to embrace ſuch a variety of purſuits, that their exertions could not be directed to one object; nor were their ungo-

(1) Mr. MALLET to Earl CORNWALLIS—I obſerved to BEHROW PUNT that the predicament of the Maratta State "With reſpect to TIPPOO, was widely different from ours, that it "had injuries to revenge, territories to recover, and infringements to puniſh. We have none. "That after having been enabled, by a co-operation with us, to effect at leaſt a part of theſe "great objects, and ſtrengthened itſelf by an extenſion of its frontier. Such advantages afford-"ing additional means of preventing future encroachments, certainly gave no reaſonable found-"ation, for their expecting a ſtipulation, which we did not now, think proper to enter into." July 6, 1788——To the injuries and inſults that the Marattas were neceſſitated to ſubmit from TIPPOO SULTAUN, PURSERAM BHOW could bear the moſt ample teſtimony; and, ſome of his neareſt female relations, ſtill in the haram of the Sultaun, furniſh woful proofs in addition.

(2) "It is not likely that either of the Maratta States will ſoon become formidable to the other "provinces of Hindoſtan. The Eaſtern State, has not reſources for it, and as for the Weſtern, it "cannot well happen there, until ſome one of its chiefs has gained ſuch an aſcendency over the reſt, "as to reunite that divided power, to which the late confuſions in their government gave birth. "It requires ſome length of time to reduce a feudal government to a ſimple monarchical one: and "till then, the Weſtern Maratta State cannot be formidable, to the Britiſh power at leaſt." Rennell, p. LXXXIX.

governable ſwarms of irregular troops, at all competent to encounter the well-diſciplined army of the Sultaun, had they been hazardous enough to have adopted a different ſyſtem. Neither is it to be ſuppoſed that NIZAM-ALLY-CAWN, a Prince ſtricken in years; at no time famous for his valour; and with a force much inferior to the former, was capable of reſiſting the arms of the Myſorean Prince, or of giving any effectual check to his ambitious career.(3) Far leſs was this to be expected from the other Princes of the country, whoſe forces, if united, would appear contemptible in competition even with the troops of NIZAM-ALLY.

Although the diſtricts that appertained to the Maratta confederacy, actually comprehended five times the extent of TIPPOO SULTAUN's dominions at the commencement of the late war, ſtill, as the original manners, and unalterable cuſtoms of that people diſcouraged agriculture, and, in its ſtead, cheriſhed the more hardy, though leſs advantageous habits of the field, their nett annual income, ſcarcely doubled the amount of

(3) "NIZAM-ALLY-CAWN, the Subadar of Decan is more reſpectable from his rank and "deſcent than from any other cauſe, his dominions are of ſmall extent and ſcanty revenue: his "military ſtrength is repreſented to be moſt contemptible, nor was he at any period of his life "diſtinguiſhed for perſonal courage or the ſpirit of enterprize." War. Haſt.

his

his rents (1); conſequently their means to ſupport a ſtanding force, bore no proportion to the extent of their territories, nor to the eſtabliſhment that was neceſſary for the quiet of the empire; their trade and manufactures too being principally carried on in their camps might occaſionally enrich the leaders of their armies, but they could not, in any material degree, contribute to aggrandize the ſtate. Beſides, it is well known, that SCINDIA, HOLCAR, NANA FURNEESE, MOODAGEE BOONSLLA, HURRY PUNT, PURSERAM BHOW, with all their princes of note, found conſtant employment, either, in extending their dominions to the North, in endeavouring to protect them from the encroachments of the Myſoreans on the South; or in checking refractory Zemindars, who, as they could not patiently brook their yoke, ſtill withheld the collections, refuſed allegiance, and ultimately fled to an appeal at arms.

No ſooner had his countries recovered from the ſhocks which they ſuſtained during four years conteſt with Great Britain, than the SULTAUN began to look round

(1) The Maratta empire comprehends "at leaſt an area of 400,000 ſquare geographic "miles, being conſiderably more than a third part of Hindoſtan, including the Decan; and "equal, perhaps, in dimenſions to all the Britiſh and allied ſtates in India, with thoſe of Gol-"conda and Myſore taken together. The preſent nett revenue, however of this immenſe terri-"tory, calculated at ſix crore of rupees, is in no reſpect proportionate to its magnitude." Hiſ. and Pol. view of Decan.

round for freſh objects that might encreaſe his revenue, extend his dominion, and aggrandize his fame (2). The wealthy kingdom of Travancore appeared well calculated to promote thoſe purpoſes. Thither the baleful blaſts that accompanied the inundations of TAMERLANE, AURENGZEBE, and NADIR-SHAW never extended. Indeed, as the whole kingdom with a mere trifle of exception, is ſeparated from the adjacent diſtricts, either by deep moraſſes, or by lofty mountains, covered with impenetrable jungle, it ſeems protected by a peculiar indulgence of nature from ſuch diſaſters. Happy, too, under a ſucceſſion of Princes, mildly reigning in uninterrupted peace, time immemorial; and, rendered opulent by the great variety of ſpice, and timber, with which their country abounded: that peaceful people did not interfere in the politics of neighbouring Princes, much leſs did they provoke the impending ſtorm.

(2) The Rajah of Travancore to Sir ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL, "Should TIPPOO take "offence with me, who am the Company's firm friend and dependant, for writing ſuch an an-"ſwer, and raiſe hoſtilities againſt me on that account, I muſt look up to the Company for pro-"tection and aſſiſtance, as my only reſource. From all circumſtances of the conduct of TIPPOO, "and what has paſſed between him and the Rajah of Cochin, I am led to ſuſpect, he will raiſe "ſome troubles. I take the Almighty to witneſs, that, as long as I breathe, I ſhall never "depart from my friendſhip to the Company, and I hope your Excellency will take care of me." 8th June, 1788.——The ſame to the ſame—"Your Excellency will obſerve, that TIPPOO SUL-"TAUN ſays in his letter to me, that he underſtands from the Rajah of Cochin, that it is my "wiſh to cultivate a friendſhip with him, TIPPOO SULTAUN. Gracious Sir! The Almighty "God knows the truth of this, and that I never mentioned a ſyllable of this to the Rajah of Co-"chin, which leads me to believe, that either TIPPOO has had ſome inſidious motive in writing "this, or that the Rajah of Cochin is the author of this falſehood.—I ſolemnly call God to wit-"neſs, that as long as I have breath of life, I ſhall place my entire dependence and reliance on "the Company's friendſhip, and ſhall not look to that of others"—12th June, 1788.

Amongſt

Amongſt other preſſing incentives, avarice, ambition, a rooted averſion to the Britiſh nation(1), an early and determined reſolution to expel them from the Decan, and to ſubjugate their allies to the Myſorean yoke, alternately preſented themſelves to the Sultaun, and powerfully urged him to arms(2). Grounds ſtill more ſpecious offered. Contrary opinions on religious tenets, which have in all ages been attended with a wanton and afflictive effuſion of human blood, contributed alſo, in a conſiderable degree to bring about the late rupture. The adherents to the doctrines of Brama, and of Mahomet, have conſtantly diſcovered antipathies to each

(1) WILLIAM LEWIS to Sir ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL—" A demand by the Rajah of " Cherica made at this juncture, I think carries the appearance of a deſign to pick a quarrel, in " which I make no doubt, he is well aſſured of aſſiſtance from the Nabob, though by no means " openly"—20th May, 1788.

Meſſrs. LEWIS, PATTERSON and SHAW to Sir ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL—" We only " think it neceſſary to obſerve, as our opinion, that by the Prince of Cherica's laſt letter, as " well as by the Biby's meſſage, that it ſeems to be his intention to give us trouble, and that " at the inſtigation of the Nabob, TIPPOO SULTAUN; whither it is the Nabob's deſign, clan- " deſtinely to aſſiſt the Prince, or not, we cannot pretend to judge. The orders we have from " time to time, received from our ſuperiors at Bombay, direct us by no means to interfere " with the country powers, ſo as to give umbrage to the Nabob."—26th May, 1788.

JOHN HOLLAND to theſe Gentlemen—" You are on no account, except on the moſt obvious " grounds of neceſſity, to ſuffer yourſelves to be drawn into any engagements with the tribu- " taries and dependants of TIPPOO, that may afford him cauſe to charge the Company with " having violated the peace now ſubſiſting."—10th June 1788.

(2) Sir ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL to Major BANNERMAN—" The meaſure I wiſh you to " propoſe to the Rajah is this, that a body of the Engliſh troops from Bombay ſhould be can- " toned on the coaſt of the Travancore country within his lines, in a ſituation which may be " judged eligible for the defence of his dominions; and alſo to annoy the enemy, in caſe of his " commencing hoſtilities againſt the Rajah or the Carnatic. The advantages reſulting from " ſuch a poſition, are ſo obvious and ſelf-apparent, that I ſuppoſe they would preſent them- " ſelves at firſt view to the Rajah. Although ſuch a diſpoſition of part of our force may even- " tually prove of advantage to our affairs, yet the immediate ſecurity and benefit will be all " on the part of his Excellency. In the preſent diſpoſition of our army, and the remoteneſs of

other,

other, that few of them appear to have harboured againſt the followers of Chriſt (3). Thence the inceſſant perſecution of the Rajahs, the original, genuine and true princes of Hindoſtan, by HYDER and his ſucceſſor; thence the annihilation of their undiſputed chief, on the Malabar coaſt, the late ZAMORIN (4); and thence the preſent importance of the Prince of Travancore, who, from the antiquity of his family,

" his dominions from any material part of our force, the enemy may gain eſſential advantages " over him before our troops can march to his aſſiſtance. The recent communications from the " Cochin Rajah, whether they are conſidered as genuine, or to conceal ſome ſecret arrange- " ments between him and TIPPOO, which are inimical to Travancore, afford a ſtrong argu- " ment in favour of this meaſure, for in either caſe the information ſhews, that TIPPOO has " hoſtile intentions againſt thoſe parts of the Rajah's dominions, which our force would imme- " diately protect."—20th June, 1788.———The ſame to Earl CORNWALLIS—" This day's " poſt brought me other letters from the Rajah and BANNERMAN, dated 12th June, with a " tranſcript of TIPPOO's addreſs to the Rajah, copies of which I have alſo the honour to ſend " you herewith incloſed, theſe papers ſerve to throw further lights upon the artful deſigns of " that aſpiring Prince, and ſhew how neceſſary it is to be extremely watchful of his conduct, " which evidently tends to uſurp the territories of every independent Rajah in his neighbour- " hood, and if poſſible to extirpate all the Europeans from the Peninſula."—24th June, 1788———The acquaintance of Sir ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL with this ſubject, in conſequence of the charge with which he was intruſted, can no more be doubted, than his capacity, or his impartial diſcharge of duty when the deareſt intereſt of his country was at ſtake.

(3) TIPPOO SULTAUN is an exception from this principle. In his orders to his Aumils are the following words " you ſhall ſeize all Padres and Culluſtauns (Chriſtians) that are to be " found within your diſtrict, and ſend them under a guard to the Huzzoor, and you ſhall en- " quire and aſcertain, what *Zindegie*, grain, cattle, lands, and plantations, &c. they poſſeſs; " and ſhall ſequeſter the whole thereof for Government. And you ſhall deliver over the " lands and plantations to other *Ryuts*, whom you ſhall encourage to cultivate them, as in " caſe they are not cultivated, you will be required to make good what they ſhould have " produced —In future, if any perſon of the caſt of Culluſtaun ſhall take up his abode in " your diſtrict, you ſhall according to the above directions, ſeize him with his family and chil- " dren, and ſend him and them to the Huzzoor."—Myſorean Revenue Regulations, p. 27—8.

" (4) Theſe two Princes [the ZAMORIN and HYDER] parted, apparently much ſatis- " fied with each other, but the world was highly aſtonished, the next day, to behold the " Palace of the ZAMORIN on fire "——and again—" The edifice being entirely wood, the " ZAMORIN with all his family, and as it is preſumed, much treaſure, periſhed in the flames." Hiſt of HYDER Tom 1—p. 111.

Whether conſidered as the panegyriſt of HYDER or as a partial Frenchman this author is, of all others, the moſt true to his charge; credit, however, may be given to him when his aſſertions reflect on his own country or on its Myſorean Ally.

from the wealth that he poſſeſſes, and from his cloſe connection with the Britiſh nation, is now reſorted to by all Gentoos, in that quarter, for protection againſt the oppreſſive power of the Myſorean Prince. The influence of fanaticiſm went ſtill further, prieſts forward here as in all other countries, whether Chriſtian or Mahomedan, to ſecond the projects of ambition, and to qualify by craft what they cannot juſtify by reaſon, in order that pretence might not be wanting now produced the Koran— "Thou ſhalt not take from the "Infidel his houſe, his field, &c. becauſe they were "given him from God; but thou ſhalt be content with "cauſing him to pay tribute."

When deep ſophiſtry is thus employed by an abſolute monarch to confound right with wrong, and to obſcure the true grounds of action, caſuiſts are ever at his elbow to point out a plauſible pretext. Cranganore and Jycottah, two diſtricts that had been wreſted from the Portugueſe by the Dutch upwards of one hundred and twenty years ago (1), and, which had been till

(1) VAN DE GRAAF and Council, to JOHN HOLLAND, "We can in the mean time inform "you regarding Cranganore, that the Company, as is well known to all India, conquered it "above one hundred years ago; and have been in lawful poſſeſſion of it ever ſince. We can "confidently declare, that ſo far from having made any acknowledgement to the kings of Cran-"ganore for that fort, or for any other, they have been under a ſtate of vaſſalage to us." 9th January, 1790.

now,

now, held in undiſputed ſubjection to that nation, were conſidered by the Sultaun as a ready inlet for the extirpation of their valuable commercial ſettlement at Cochin, at whatever period ambition or policy might prompt the attempt. That era appeared to be at hand. The RAM RAJAH, ſaid TIPPOO, in the pride of his ſtrength, is a pebble in my ſlipper which muſt be taken out. From a conſciouſneſs of their weakneſs in the Eaſt, the Dutch thought it adviſable to diſpoſe of Cranganore, on moderate terms to the Rajah of Travancore, as it would become attached to his dominions, and, of courſe, not remain liable to be entered by any body of troops, but at the riſk of his diſpleaſure accompanied by that of the Engliſh his avowed allies. TIPPOO was well aware that this might defeat his purpoſe of conquering Travancore; and, although no claim whatſoever had been hitherto preferred on thoſe diſtricts, which had been in poſſeſſion of European powers for

VAN ANGELBACK and Council, to JOHN HOLLAND, "TIPPOO pretends to ſay, that we "have paid rent or tribute for Jycottah and Cranganore: this is an invention of his own, "and a frivolous untruth. The Dutch Eaſt India Company in an open war became maſters of "thoſe places, have retained the ſovereignty over them, and have never paid for Jycotta or for "Cranganore a ſingle caſh either to the Zamorin, or the Aumildars of Callicut, or to the King of "Cochin, or to any other perſon; this is notorious, and the inhabitants in general of the Ma-"labar Coaſt can vouch for it. The King of Travancore told you the truth when he gave you "the aſſurances contained in your letter; he has only miſreckoned the number of years, as only "127 have expired ſince we became poſſeſſed of the ſaid places." 9th January, 1790.

upwards of two hundred and eighty years (1), without paying homage or tribute to any prince or people; for a period of time far beyond what conſtitutes right in all civiliſed countries; and, beyond the exiſtence of the houſe of HYDER ſeven times told; yet the SULTAUN, under the pretence that neither the Dutch had a right to ſell, nor the Rajah to purchaſe Cranganore, without his conſent, not only threatened to invade Travancore, but actually aſſembled fifteen thouſand choſen men to put that threat in execution.

Headed by their prince, this veteran force could not be ſuppoſed to abandon, without the moſt bloody conflict, an object of which ambition had rendered their leader, in his own mind ſecure. On the other hand, multitudes of free and independent men, ſpurred on by an indulgent Sovereign, to defend their religion,

(1) "FRANCIS ALBUQUERQUE, who had ſailed from Portugal in 1503, with a fleet of "ten ſhips, cut to pieces, or put to flight, the garriſons which the ZAMORIN had thrown into "the iſle of Cochin, and brought back the King, whom a complete defeat had forced to retire "elſewhere. Not contented with this firſt ſucceſs, the conqueror ſent ſix hundred of his ſeamen, "to attack two neighbouring iſlands, which the Rajahs, that is to ſay, the noblemen of the "country, had ſeized upon. He defeated their troops, left one of them upon the field of bat-"tle, burned their palaces, ravaged their lands, beat a fleet of fifty gallies which belonged to "ZAMORIN, made ſeveral incurſions always with the ſame ſucceſs, and returned to Cochin "covered with glory. As expert a politician, as he was a brave warrior, he failed not to take "advantage of the high reputation which he had acquired and of the ſignal ſervice he had done "the king of Cochin. He demanded leave to build a fortreſs in his city. That prince perhaps "did not penetrate into the deſigns of ALBUQUERQUE; or, if he ſuſpected them, thought he "could refuſe nothing, to the man who had replaced him on his throne. He not only conſented "to it, but furniſhed him with workmen and materials." Abbe De Guyon, Tom 1, p. 241.

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their liberties, and inheritance, againſt a SULTAUN whom they conſidered a notorious tyrant, were not to be driven, without ſerious and determined reſiſtance, from the ſtrong wall, by which all that they held dear was protected.

The partiality of providence to Travancore at its original formation, already noticed, had been ſo ſingular, that of its whole frontier, only one inconſiderable tract on the North-weſt extremity was at all expoſed to the inroads of an enemy (2). Here, nearly thirty years ago, the ſucceſsful progreſs of the ambitious HYDER, had rendered it neceſſary for the neighbouring powers to unite in effecting a peace, and induced them to throw up a ſtrong wall as a Northern barrier to the Travancorians and Dutch, which ſerved alſo to mark the extent of his uſurpations on the Malabar Coaſt to ſucceeding generations. It was by the intervention of the Chriſtians, and not from the exertions of native princes, that this boundary had been eſtabliſh-

(2) GEORGE POWNEY to JOHN HOLLAND—"The Miniſter of Travancore is of opinion "that he (TIPPOO) cannot come in conſiderable force by the Goodalore paſs, on account of the "obſtacles he will meet with from the natural ſtrength of the country in that quarter, which is "mountainous, and the roads interſected with rivers and nullahs, which renders the tranſporta-"tion of guns and carriages of all ſorts impracticable; he therefore concludes that the only "mode of defending the Travancore country will be oppoſing him at Jacottah"—26th June, 1789.

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ed(1), for although the uſurper had at that time ſeized upon the principalities of Myſore, Soonda, Bednore and Callicut, he had not added to his conqueſts Coimbatore, Barahmahl, or any tract of country beyond the Ghauts on the Eaſtern ſide (2); nor had he extended his dominions to the northward by ſeizures from NIZAM ALLY, and the Marattas; neither had he arrived at the pitch of preſumption neceſſary to wage war with any European ſtate; far leſs did he at any period of his life, notwithſtanding his diſregard of engagements, inſiſt on the demolition of thoſe lines, although it is notorious, that he had previouſly meditated the entire conqueſt of Travancore (3).

Towards the latter end of the year 1789, the Myſorean army, pitched their tents, within two miles of the Barrier, that originally bounded the conqueſt of

" (1) The French Commandant at Mahe, and the Dutch at Cochin; employed themſelves with " effect, to terminate the difference between HYDER and the Naire princes; and to their efforts " it is that the coaſt of Malabar is indebted for a peace."—Hiſt. of HYDER, Vol. 1. p. 241.

(2) Vide Note page 3—Of the Barahmhal it may be neceſſary to obſerve, that although it yielded to the Myſorean arms previous to this period; ſtill, its reſources had been ſo much reduced by frequent inroads of other powers, and its ſtrength ſo enfeebled by revolts, that it can ſcarcely be ſaid to have added weight to that realm.

" (3) As it could not be expected that the coaſt of Malabar would ever enjoy a ſtate of " tranquillity while the Naire princes were on the frontiers, and in the country of Tra- " vancore. HYDER reſolved to make the conqueſt of that kingdom, for which however he " could urge no better reaſon, than that the King of that country had aſſiſted his enemies." Hiſt. of HYDER Tom 1 p. 144——" HYDER long meditated the conqueſt of the Tra- " vancore territory ſituated at the extreme of the Peninſula, but was prevented by the Eng- " liſh. TIPPOO is ſaid to have intentions of the ſame kind."—Rennells Memoirs p. CXL.

HYDER

HYDER on the Weſtern coaſt. After a tedious march, through a narrow, circuitous, and unfrequented pathway, among the jungles, the Sultaun at the head of ten thouſand men, on the morning of the 29th December obtained Sharapootamally, a ſteep and rugged hill that terminated that barrier to the Eaſtward (4). From thence his encampment was diſtant about twelve miles; and as the ſpace that intervened, had always been reckoned impenetrable to any body of troops, the few Nairs that were ſtationed at Sharapootamally, were lulled into a ſecurity that proved fatal to themſelves, and deſtructive to their country. Unincumbered by their cannon, the Myſoreans clambered over the

(4) GEORGE POWNEY to Earl CORNWALLIS " The place he (TIPPOO SULTAUN) attacked was the weakeſt part of the lines; he was conducted to it by ſome of the inha- " bitants of the Cochin country; a very thick jungle, cloſe to it allowed him to bring his " troops to the attack almoſt as ſoon as they were diſcovered. The battery was immedi- " ately carried, and he introduced more than ſeven thouſand of his beſt troops; they at " one time were in poſſeſſion of near three miles in extent of the lines."—4th January 1790. ——The ſame to JOHN HOLLAND—" They (the lines) run from Weſt to Eaſt, com- " mencing at the ſea on the Iſland of Vipeen, and continue to a broad river called China- " mungulum, on the oppoſite bank of which they begin again, and extend to the Annimally " or Elephant mountains, where they terminate upon the top of one of them, from which " runs a chain of mountains to a high Northern latitude, and as low South as the extreme " point of the Peninſula, or Cape Comorin; ſo that the Eaſtern boundaries of the Travan- " core country are protected by them. From the ſea to the Chinamungulum river, as " the lines run, is an extent of four or five miles; and from the oppoſite bank, where they " take up again, to their extremity at the mountain, is about twenty-four or twenty-five " miles. The lines conſiſt of a ditch, about ſixteen feet broad, and twenty deep, with a " thick bamboo hedge in it, a ſlight parapet, a good rampart and baſtions on riſing " grounds, almoſt flanking each other. From one extreme of the lines to the other they " are only aſſailable by regular approaches from the North."—17th February 1790.——— That I do not religiouſly adhere to the authorities quoted muſt be attributed to information, from private friends, whoſe names I am not at liberty to mention, but who, in general, bore witneſs to the tranſactions, that I relate, or had acceſs to the beſt intelligence.

brow

brow of the mountain; they doubled the extreme end of the lines, and advancing from within, with rapidity towards the centre they bayoneted whomſoever offered to oppoſe (1). Some feeble reſiſtance ſerved only to enrage the Mahomedans, and to encreaſe the carnage during a purſuit of ſeveral miles. At length a reſolute party of Nairs, about eight hundred in number, formed acroſs an avenue, along which the aſſailants had to paſs; and, with the aſſiſtance of a ſix-pounder that was well ſerved with grape, they ſtaggered the troops in advance, and completely checked the purſuit. A Chela battalion that led the enemy, exhauſted by fatigue and want of water, could not be prevailed upon to charge this reſolute phalanx. Another battalion, and another, was ſtill ordered to advance; but the Nairs, by this time reinforced from Remiſeram, ſtood firm as a rock. The SULTAUN preſſed onward to the front with his beſt troops, whilſt the Gentoos attracted by the noiſe of the action haſtened to the ſupport of their friends.—

(1) GEORGE POWNEY to EARL CORNWALLIS—Accounts were brought in that TIPPOO's Troops attacked "a part of the lines near the Hills, which they ſtormed and carried; that "they poſſeſſed it but for a ſhort time; that the Rajah's troops returned to the attack, and "drove the enemy from it with great ſlaughter. The Rajah had about 200 men killed and "wounded; and it is ſaid, the enemy had more than a thouſand killed; ſome horſes and pri-"ſoners were taken. All this day only ſtraggling parties of horſes have been ſeen. TIPPOO has "withdrawn his troops which were oppoſite the lines; it is imagined he is meditating an attack "on another part of the country."—30th Dec. 1989.

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The conflict was dreadful. For ſome time the beam of ſucceſs ſtood horizontal. At length the Myſoreans gave way. A general panick enſued, which in proportion as it gave riſe to confuſion amongſt the fugitives, increaſed the courage of the now victorious Nairs. Exaſperated by the cruel and unremiting perſecution of HYDER and his ſucceſſor, theſe warriors continued the purſuit and ſlaughter for a conſiderable diſtance, making dreadful execution with their deſtructive hatchets (2). The Sultaun, mounted on a white horſe, witneſſing the diſcomfiture and diſgrace of his troops, exerted every nerve for the recovery of the day. But all was to no purpoſe, for, the Nairs preſſed ſo cloſely on his rear, that his horſe being ſhot (3), he had a narrow eſcape

(2) The Rajah of Travancore to General MEDOWS—"I had, agreeable to the directions "I had received from the Company's Government, given poſitive orders to thoſe who had "the care of the defence of the lines, to be careful not to begin hoſtilities; they at the "time of the attack, checked him for a time, but the enemy being in force and power were "not prevented from taking poſſeſſion of the lines. When report of this circumſtance "reached my Sirdars, who were at the diſtance of two Coſs, they collected a body of about "one thouſand men, advanced and ſtopped the enemy; the engagement laſted full two hours, "at laſt, as victory always aids the juſt, and as the good fortune of the Company, which "conſtantly overcomes their enemies was on my ſide; the enemy being no longer able to "bear the attack on them, turned their faces and fled, and about one thouſand men, or "poſſibly more, were either killed or wounded by the fire of the guns and muſketry; four "Sirdars of renown were ſlain by arrows at the time of their flight; four horſes, two ſtand "of colours, and two drums, fell into the hands of my people; and the accurſed foe, from "the ſhame and diſgrace of this defeat, to which he never yet experienced any thing ſi-"milar, continued quiet, and collected from different parts of his country a large army, and "flores and heavy guns, and remained ſtill, in expectation of a favourable opportunity."—1ſt May 1792.

(3) GEORGE POWNEY to Earl CORNWALLIS—"The Raiahs troops coming from the "right and left placed them between two fires. The conflict laſted four hours, when "the enemy were repulſed with great ſlaughter. TIPPOO himſelf was preſent, and had "a horſe ſhot under him. JAMAUL BEG, commander of a Coſſum, is among the killed, "and likewiſe another perſon of conſequence ſaid to be MEER COMMODEIN CAWN, a Son "of the late MEER SAHELE; as ſoon as he fell his own people cut off his head and carried "it with them."—4th January, 1790.

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for his life. The rout was now general and compleat.

Two paſſages, about twenty feet in width, that had been cut through the ramparts, on the advance of the aſſailants, on purpoſe to admit their guns, now ſerved eſſentially in favoring their retreat: ſtill, however, they had another enemy to encounter. The cotton with which the ditch had been filled by themſelves, and over which they muſt of neceſſity fall back, by ſome unaccountable accident took fire. This circumſtance rendered their ſituation truly deplorable, and, contributing to the reluctance with which they quitted the lines, they deſperately diſputed the ground they gave up inch by inch. Their obſtinacy availed them nothing. It greatly increaſed their loſs. The carnage continued without intermiſſion until noon (1). It is difficult to aſcertain the exact number ſlain, when an action is fought over ſuch an extent of ground. Of the enemy not leſs than fifteen hundred are ſaid to have

(1) The Rajah of Travancore to J. HOLLAND, "My friend, on that day (29th December, "1789), the Sultaun, with his Sirdars, and a large force, made an attack upon my lines, and "the engagement was very ſmart. As the aid of the Almighty, and the good fortune of the "Company, were on my ſide, the Detachment of the Sultaun were not able to ſtand the aſſault, "and were repulſed; near a thouſand were killed and wounded by the guns and ſmall arms: "Three of his Sirdars, men of renown, were ſlain. When they were repulſed, my people took "two ſtand of colours, four horſes, and a drum. I attributed this victory to the aſſiſtance of the "Almighty, and the good fortune of the Company, which ever vanquiſhes their enemies. The "Sultaun, hurt at this repulſe, is daily making ready to attack me, while I have not at this "time any protection, or look for any aſſiſtance whatever, but from the Company, and I am "now engaged with a powerful enemy." 1ſt January, 1790.

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From a thorough acquaintance with the haughtineſs of the Sultaun, from a conviction that a tame ſubmiſſion to the late diſgrace would be not leſs repugnant to his feelings, than ignominious in the eyes of his people; and, from a certainty that though diſpirited for the preſent, he would not relinquiſh the grand object

(2) GEORGE POWNEY to JOHN HOLLAND—"That he is wounded is corroborated by ſome "Hircarrahs, who came from his Camp the night before laſt: they ſay, that TIPPOO had "been obliged to leap from the ramparts of the lines. As he had filled the ditch with bales of "cotton at the place where his troops entered, and theſe had been ſet fire to. That in his "fall he had been very much bruiſed and torn by a Bamboo hedge which grows in the ditch. "This account I think probable; others mention that he is wounded in the ſhoulder by a "muſket ball. The Hircarrahs likewiſe add, that there was a general mourning in his camp "on account of the death of his Brother-in-law, MEER-O-DEIN-CAWN."—10th January, "1790——The ſame to the ſame—"Every account which has been brought in ſays, "that he was wounded, in the attack, to which cauſe it is reaſonable to aſcribe his preſent inac"tion; that he was there himſelf is without doubt, as his Palanquin was left in the ditch, in "which was a ſilver box, containing ſeveral valuable diamond rings and other jewels; his Large "ſeal, with his titles; his fuſee and piſtols, with his name upon them; and likewiſe his ſword." 13th January, 1790.

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of ſo conſiderable an armament, without hazarding another attack; the Rajah requeſted that the detachment which had been lent to him by Sir ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL, whilſt Governor of Fort-St.-George, ſhould occupy a ſpace of the ramparts (1). But, as the inſtructions of Captain KNOX did not extend to the protection of thoſe poſts and territories, it was, at a conſultation of the officers, determined, that a compliance with this requeſt would be highly imprudent.

Some political intercourſe attended with much mutual civility, but of no ſincerity on the part of the Sultaun, now took place, between him and the ſuperior power in Hindoſtan. The Britiſh Government, through their Reſident in Travancore, reaſoned with him, on the impropiety of his ſeizing by force what would be

(1) The Rajah of Travancore to GEORGE POWNEY—"TIPPOO has this morning, brought "his army cloſe to the lines, and has opened his batteries upon them; I therefore re- "queſt the aſſiſtance of the Honourable Company's troops in the defence of my country." 29th December 1789.——The ſame to the Governor of Fort St. George—"My friend, "ſince TIPPOO SULTAUN has now begun hoſtilities, depending on the aſſiſtance of the "Company, I take the liberty of troubling you to requeſt that the victorious army of the "Company may immediately move to my aſſiſtance in which any delay does not ſeem "neceſſary. As I have not any protection but what the Company affords me, the moving "of the army to my aſſiſtance is highly neceſſary."—29th December 1789——again—"TIPPOO has now formed ſtrong works in front of my lines, and is preparing for hoſtilities, "notwithſtanding he is acting this immediately before my eyes, I have done nothing "whatever, but remained quiet and carefully on the watch. In this ſituation I have no de- "pendance upon any one whatever for aſſiſtance except the Company, and which at this "time it is neceſſary to afford me without delay. If the Sultaun is thus permitted to "ſtrengthen his works we ſhall hereafter experience much trouble and difficulty, I requeſt, "that, as the conſideration of the means of preventing this occurrence is with my friend, "and, hope that you will immediately ſend poſitive orders on this ſubject to me and Mr. "POWNEY, and to the Commandants of the Battalions."—29th December 1789.

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granted by negociation, if it ſhould appear on a fair enquiry, that his demands were juſt. Their language though moderate was dignified, and became the repreſentatives of a great nation (2), happy, under the moſt rational conſtitution that has ever been deviſed, and under the mild ſway of the beſt of princes. They expreſſed concern at the injuries done to their Ally, the Ram Rajah, and propoſed that the grounds for commencement of hoſtilities ſhould be inveſtigated by commiſſioners from both parties on their reſpective frontiers (3). The anſwer was preconcerted, and of

(2) JOHN HOLLAND to TIPPOO SULTAUN, "You are not unacquainted with the circum- "ſtances of the Rajah being an ally of the Engliſh; and you are, no doubt, ſenſible, that "any hoſtility towards him would be contrary to the faith of the treaty ſubſiſting between us; "The forts in queſtion are of no value to us, but we think it neceſſary to inform you, that "we ſhall conſider any attempt to take them by force, on the preſent footing of affairs, "as an act inconſiſtent with the fair and liberal ſentiments of honour and friendſhip ſubſiſting "between us, and tending to create hoſtilities between the two Governments. It is our fixed "intention to do you juſtice on this occaſion, and it is ſcarcely neceſſary for us to ſay, that we "are equally determined to do juſtice to our own reputation and honor; and it will be wiſe "for you to wait the iſſue of a fair enquiry."—1ſt January, 1790.

(3) GEORGE POWNEY to TIPPOO SULTAUN—"I have the commands of the Govern- "ment at Madras to ſend a flag of truce to you, and to deſire you in the name of the "Honourable Engliſh Company, to deſiſt from proceeding in further acts of hoſtilities "againſt the Rajah of Travancore. I am likewiſe directed to inform you, that if you are "deſirous of ſettling the points in conteſt by the inveſtigation of commiſſaries, the Govern- "ment at Madras will appoint one or more to meet ſuch perſons as may be appointed by "you at any convenient place, on the borders of the reſpective countries belonging to you "and the Company."—14 January 1790.

JOHN HOLLAND to TIPPOO SULTAUN—"If you are deſirous of ſettling the point in "conteſt by an inveſtigation of Commiſſaries, we will appoint one or more, to meet ſuch "perſons as may be appointed by you, at any convenient place, on the borders of our reſ- "pective countries; and you will then judge whither our intentions are fair."—1ſt January 1790——"Again—Having communicated to you my ſentiments very fully on the "ſubject. I am of opinion it will be conſiſtent with the terms of the treaty ſubſiſting "between us, to ſettle all points of difference by negociation.—24th January 1790——"and again—If you continue to think, after the particular explanations, I have given "you, that there is ſtill cauſe of complaint, the matter my be inveſtigated in the manner "I have pointed out, by the appointment of Commiſſioners for the purpoſe, and ſtrict "juſtice ſhall be done."—*Ibid.*

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courſe delivered without delay. It is a maſterpiece in the Machiavelian art; the juggle of a deep politician to cozen Britain into a neutrality, and to cover with a thick miſt, the danger to that nation which lurked behind his miſchievous ſchemes. It proteſted that the Sultaun had not hitherto any cauſe of complaint againſt the Eaſt India Company; that the Travancore lines muſt be demoliſhed as they were built on the poſſeſſions of the Rajah of Cochin who was his tributary; that the fort of Cranganore, had been built on ground, which appertained to his government, and conſequently muſt be abandoned by the troops of the Rajah; that the Rajahs of the Malabar coaſt, ſhould not be protected in Travancore; and, that no objection was offered to inveſtigation, provided the Commiſſioners ſhould meet in his preſence (1).

(1) Tippoo Sultaun to George Powney—"Agreeably to the treaty of peace between this Circar, and the Engliſh Company, there has not, until this time, been on either part the ſmalleſt deviation therefrom, nor will there be any. The Rajah of Cochin, is a dependant on this Circar. The Ram Rajah has, in three circumſtances acted contrary to uſual cuſtom. The impropriety of theſe three points is this: He has built a boundary in the Cochin country and at Cranganore; theſe he ſhould remove, and whatever he is deſirous of doing in his own country, let him do it. The fort of Cranganore, which ſtands on ground belonging to this Circar, and which he has contrary to cuſtom poſſeſſed himſelf of, he ſhould give up. He ſhould deliver up to perſons belonging to the Circar, the Rajahs of Callicut, Chericoil, Ketgerey, &c. who are largely indebted to this Circar, and have taken refuge with him. Independent of theſe three neceſſary matters, I have no other demand upon Ram Rajah; nor have I any other intention than what regards theſe three ſubjects. I have written to the government of Madraſs, reſpecting the adjuſtment of theſe three points; and, if for their ſettlement, you with another confidential perſon ſhould come to the preſence, you may come without the ſmalleſt fear, and ſettle them, which will give tranquillity to the people inhabitants of this country."

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Here, contrary to every principle of right reaſoning, the Sultaun expects conviction to enſue from the ſolitary teſtimony of his own aſſertion, and not from any clear chain of arguments. Intereſted, beyond all others, in the event, his evidence, like that of a man in his own cauſe, muſt be received with diſtruſt; but, the fallacious veil with which he attempted to cover this tranſaction, is of too flimſy a texture to hide his drift, even from the moſt moderate perception. To effect a complete expoſure, it will be neceſſary to caſt a retroſpective eye on the conqueſt of the Malabar Rajahs by his father, who was the firſt that ſubjected them to the Mahomedan yoke.—Ere theſe unfortunate Princes had been at all viſited by the adherents of the prophet their happineſs was at the higheſt degree of perfection that is permitted to the lot of man (2).

It was in the year 1765, that the Moplahs, a ſet of uſurious Mahomedans from Arabia, who had, at a remote period (3), inſinuated themſelves into an eſtabliſh-

(2) "A Hindoo Rajah reſembles more a father preſiding in a numerous family of his own children, than a ſovereign ruling over inferiors, ſubject to his dominion. He endeavours to ſecure their happineſs with a vigilant ſolicitude. They are attached to him with a moſt tender affection, and inviolable fidelity. We can hardly conceive men to be placed in any ſtate, more favorable to their acquiring all the advantages derived from ſocial union". Rob. Anc. Ind. p. 268.

(3) Vasques de Gama "wrote to the Zamorin [in the year 1498], complaining of the unjuſt ſuſpicions he had conceived againſt him; of the violation of hoſpitability; and of the ſnares that had been laid for him and his friends, notwithſtanding their innocence. That he might not ſeem to charge the prince with it, he threw the blame on the jealouſy of the

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ment on the Malabar Coaſt, thought proper to preſer a formal complaint to HYDER againſt the Naire Princes (1), and, to claim his protection, as diſciples of that faith of which he was a ſtrong and well known pillar. Their embaſſy was treated with more than common reſpect (2); their imaginary grievances were readily perverted by fanaticiſm (3) into the moſt diabolical outrages againſt religion and nature; and, a mighty concourſe of the faithful, armed with enthuſiaſtic frenzy, deſcending into the plains, ſpread devaſtation and terror along the whole weſtern coaſt. In vain did the native princes and their ſubjects attempt to ſtem this rapid torrent, their aged and feeble chief, the ZAMO-

" Mahomedans; he let him to underſtand that he had more to expect from the king of Portugal, " than all the Mahomedans together. The ZAMORIN opened his eyes to theſe remonſtances." Abbe de Guyon, p. 236. vol 1ſt.

(1) " HYDER received a ſolemn deputation from a nation originally from Arabia, but " now diſperſed over the whole coaſt of Malabar, and known by the name of Moplahs—and " again—the inhabitants of the coaſt of Malabar having ſuffered the Moplahs to take poſſeſ- " ſion of all the commerce of their country, as well by ſea as by land, this nation has be- " come rich and numerous, and that with ſtill leſs difficulty, by reaſon that the princes and " nobles of the country, having frequent occaſion for money, have often had recourſe to the " Moplahs, who lent them large ſums of money at exorbitant intereſt, ſometimes upon pawns " and ſometimes in advance upon the harveſt of Pepper, Cardamons, and Rice, theſe repeat- " ed uſuries have increaſed the riches of the Moplahs, and impoveriſhed the princes or " nobles of the Malabar Coaſt, known by the name of Nairs. The Moplahs grew proud in " conſequence of their wealth, and attracted the envy and jealouſy of the Nairs."—Hiſt. of HYDER, p. 95.

(2) " The deputation of the Moplahs was honourably received by HYDER. He loaded " their deputies with magnificent preſents and aſſured them of his protection and goodwill." Ibid, p. 96.

(3) " The Moplahs being fanatic Mahomedans, their deputies repreſented to HYDER in " his harangue, that GOD, and the Prophet whoſe relation he was, had made him powerful " for no other reaſon, than that he might protect the true believers; and that the crimes of the " Infidels which ought to be puniſhed by their deſtruction would give him an opportunity of " forming new conqueſts."—Ibid, p. 102.

RIN

RIN was with all his women and younger children reduced to aſhes at Callicut (4), whilſt ſuch of his deſcendants as had arrived at maturity fled to the extremity of the land. Foſtered by the benevolent Prince of Travancore, they remained there in ſafe obſcurity (5), and, the diſpoſition that dictated the ready ſurrender of them at this period to a blood thirſty deſpot, however it may teſtify reluctance to war, muſt ſtill reflect but little credit on the humanity of the times—That the moſt ancient Princes of the age (6), ſhould not only be devoted to exile, but branded as thieves and robbers, (7)

(4) See Note 4, p. 9.

(5) The Rajah of Travancore to JOHN HOLLAND—" With reſpect to the Rajahs of Chir- " kul &c. from the time that HYDER-ALLY-CAWN, carrying terror and deſtruction into " their countries, ſubdued them; being filled with fear and dread, they took protection with " me here, as I ſtand in the relationſhip with them as a Brother."—24th December 1789.

(6) " The Nairs are the nobility of the Malabar coaſt. We may affirm that they are " the oldeſt nobility in the world; for the ancient writers mention them, and quote the " law that permits the Naire ladies to have many huſbands; every one being allowed—" Whilſt " the curious reader is referred on the latter part of this quotation to the Hiſt. of HYDER " p. 93; and to Captain LE COUTEUR's letters from India p. 122, the language of " Dr. ROBERTSON corroborates the text." Even with reſpect to thoſe parts of India which " the Greeks and Romans were accuſtomed to viſit; the Arabians had acquired more per- " fect information. They mention a great Empire eſtabliſhed on the Malabar coaſt, go- " verned by monarchs whoſe authority was paramount to that of every power in India. " Theſe monarchs were diſtinguiſhed by the appellation of Balchara, a name yet known in " India; and, it is probable, that the ZAMORIN, or Emperor of Callicut, ſo frequently " mentioned in the accounts of the firſt voyages of the Portugueſe to India poſſeſſed ſome " portion of their dominions."—Hiſt. Diſq. p. 96.

(7) TIPPOO SULTAUN to JOHN HOLLAND—" I had for a length of time been informed by " the accounts received from the Fouzdar, Aumildars, and others in the Callicut country, that " Ram Rajah, having given protection to the Rajahs of Calicut, Hotun-Gurry Kunut- " Naire &c. a ſet of thieves, who are indebted in large ſums to this Circar."—2d February 1790———The ſame to the Rajah of Travancore without a date—" For a length of time " it has been known to the preſence, from the repreſentation of the Phouſdar and Aumil- " dars, that you have given protection to the Rajahs of Chirkul &c. and to the thieves " belonging to that Calicut country."

by a chief unheard of by their fathers, and who only roſe even to a ſubaltern ſituation about forty years ago, affords a melancholly inſtance of the mutability of human affairs. With reſpect to the Hollanders, their proofs of right to Cranganore and Jycottah, were clear and deciſive (1); and, the ſingle circumſtance of his not having ſtipulated for the demolition of thoſe lines when he concluded the peace of 1784, would of itſelf be a ſufficient refutation of his ſubſequent pretenſions in 1789 (2). But, when conqueſt ſpreads her wings, and floats over any quarter of the globe, all proper-

(1) The Governor and Council at Cochin to JOHN HOLLAND—"It is well known to the "whole world that the Honourable Dutch East India Company's Forts and eſtabliſhments "on the Malabar coaſt were obtained by the ſword in a public ſcene of warfare againſt the "Portugueze; the fort of Cranganore was conquered on the 15th January 1662 and we "have been in lawful poſſeſſion of it for upwards of 100 years. Jycottah is an open piece of "land which fell into our hands at the ſame time with Cochin, but we can ſay nothing "further with certainty except it be that the Dutch Company have hitherto held the poſt "of Jycottah without the leaſt hindrance or moleſtation.—again—TIPPOO pretends to ſay, "that we have paid rent or tribute for Jycottah and Cranganore. This is an invention of his "own, and a frivolous untruth: the Dutch East India Company in an open war becam: "maſters of thoſe places, have retained the ſovereignty over them, and have never paid for "Jycottah, or for Cranganore a ſingle caſh, either to the ZAMORIN, or to the Aumildar "of Callicut, or to the King of Cochin, or to any other perſon: this is notorious, andthe "Inhabitants in General of the Malabar coaſt can vouch for it. The King of Travancore "told you the truth when he gave you the aſſurances contained in your letter, he has only "miſreckoned the number of years, as only 127 years have expired ſince we became poſ-"ſeſſed of thoſe places,—again—the Nabobs intentions are eaſily ſeen through, he ſtates "difficulties and miſconſtrues facts upon every occaſion; but ſuch ſinifter interpretations moſt "commonly defeat themſelves, and again—TIPPOO SULTAUN's flight and frivolous preten-"ſions are meant for no other purpoſe than to conceal his inimical deſigns towards the King "of Travancore."—9th January 1790.

(2) The Rajah of Travancore to JOHN HOLLAND—"My friend, if TIPPOO had the ſmal-"leſt right or claim to the land on which the wall was built by me he moſt certainly, "at the time he was treating for peace, and ſettling the terms of the treaty with the Com-"pany, would have agitated this matter. From the day that the wall was built there has "not been the ſmalleſt difficulty or exception made in any thing whatever regarding me, "whether the ſame be on ground belonging to TIPPOO, or on the diſtrict of the Cochin

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ty is in doubt. In Aſia, amongſt the native Princes, this flight is only limited by the diſtance to which capacity will admit it to extend. The more the Nairs darkened the ſky with miſſile weapons to ſtop the progreſs of HYDER, the higher he ſoared above all their efforts. Advancing with rapid ſtrides along the weſtern ſhore, they ſucceſſively fled at his approach. The inhabitants of Cherica, Cartanaud, Cottiote, and Calicut, rolling in amazement before the preſſure, threatened to bear away thoſe of Cochin.—The Dutch took alarm; and, to their ſkill and dexterity in negociation it was owing, as already noticed, that other powers united, (3), and obtained a peace which until the year 1789 had not been materially interrupted. From this ſhort review of HYDER's conqueſts on

"Rajah; and by keeping the wall in conſtant repair, and ſtrengthened; my own country is "free from any trouble from my enemies. Conſidering that it is now twenty-five years "ſince the wall was finiſhed, it is certain from the preſſing manner, in which TIPPOO has "written to have it deſtroyed, in the event of its being ſo, the whole dependence for the proſ-"perity, and welfare of my country will be deſtroyed. If you examine with particular "attention, and agreeable to juſtice and equity, this matter with which TIPPOO has not the "ſmalleſt connection, it will appear to you, that there is not even a plea for argument or "diſpute. This matter has cauſed me much loſs, and great diſtreſs of mind."—24th December 1789.

(3) "Upon the approach of HYDER, they (the Malabar Princes) ſaved themſelves by pre-"cipitately withdrawing their whole army; HYDER paſſed the river and attacked Paniani, "which made but very little reſiſtance though the beſt and almoſt the only fortreſs in the coun-"try, he continued to purſue his enemies till he arrived at the environs of Cochin, where by "the mediation of the Hollanders, he made peace with the king of that place, on his engaging "to pay tribute" Hiſt. of Hyder. Tom 1. page 112 13."

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the Malabar Coaſt it is proper to return to the operations of the powers that were in arms.

A temporary ceſſation of hoſtilities, was the only ſalutary conſequence that enſued from negociation, for, although apparently of a conciliatory nature, it produced neither a foundation for peace, nor any relaxation of military preparations. To aſſign the cauſes that produced an unproclaimed truce for upwards of two months, between inveterate enemies not five miles aſunder, would be to put truth too much to the hazard. It is probable, that the wounds or bruiſes which the Sultaun had received, his want of cannon, together with the inequality of the force now under his command to the taſk that he had undertaken, contributed to his apparent inactivity (1). During that period, however, he obtained from Myſore and Seringapatam, troops, battering guns and ſtores, without moleſtation; whilſt the Rajah, on the other hand, making the like uſe of this interval, through the influence of religion encouraged by a temporary ſucceſs, aſſembled about one hundred thouſand Gen-

(1) GEORGE POWNEY to JOHN HOLLAND "From the general tenor of the intelligence "which I have received from his army, I am of opinion that they came ill-provided both "with guns and ammunition, that he expected to have carried the lines without much oppoſition; "and that the preſent loſs has proceeded from his want of them, and perhaps likewiſe from his being wounded." 17th January 1790.

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toos(2), all of whom were carefully diſtributed on the lines.

The month of March had opened with a period to all interchange of civilities, and, with the movements of conſiderable bodies of troops, when a party conſiſting of about one thouſand men were ſent from the lines, as well to reconoitre, as to clear away the Bruſhwood in front of the Mellore gate (3). Ere they advanced four hundred yards, a body of the enemy, that had lain in ambuſh, attacked, and drove them back with conſiderable ſlaughter, notwithſtanding their being ſupported by a heavy fire from the ramparts. On the 4th of the month ſome timber cut down by the Sultaun diſcovered a work of great extent within the diſtance

(2) GEORGE POWNEY to EARL CORNWALLIS, "It is impoſſible yet to diſcover what "TIPPOO's deſigns are, his operations certainly indicate immediate hoſtility; and I cannot "but be of opinion that this country will be his firſt object. The Rajah of Travancore is "collecting his whole force, which amounts to (the Miniſter informs me) near one hundred "thouſand men, it is compoſed of the Militia of the country, Poligars, and about ſeven or "eight thouſand men cloathed and accoutered like our Sepoys, but under little or no diſcip-"line; and I fear their zeal would not make up for the want of it. The people of the "country are totally unaccuſtomed to war, but the natural ſtrength of the country is very "conſiderable."—9th December, 1789.

(3) GEORGE POWNEY to Major General MEDOWS—"Yeſterday, a body of the Rajah's "troops iſſued from the lines, for the purpoſe of clearing ſome thick jungle, which grew about "five hundred yards in front of them, where it was apprehended the enemy deſigned to erect a "battery. A party of the latter were concealed in the jungle, and upon the approach of the "Rajah's troops they fired, in conſequence a ſharp conflict enſued, which laſted above an hour, "the Rajah's people ſay, that the enemy were beat off; but upon the appearance of a con-"ſiderable reinforcement of TIPPOO's troops, they retreated into the lines. Between fifteen "and twenty of the Rajah's troops were killed and wounded. Thoſe of the enemy could not "be known. The above is the account of the affair, as related to me by the Rajah."—2d "March, 1790.

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of five hundred yards of the ramparts, and, two days afterwards a battery was erected to the weſtward of this work (1), on which ſeven eighteen pounders had been planted. From theſe a cannonade of ſhort duration ſerved to diſmount ſome guns and to ſilence the fort of Mellore; but it had no material effect on the walls. The beſiegers had by the 20th extended their lines to the weſtward ſo as to embrace a ſpace of nearly three miles; they had completed ſeveral conſiderable batteries; and, advancing by zigzags from four different directions, they approached within fourteen feet of the counterſcarp of the ditch. Such was the ſeverity of the cannonade, and ſo perpetual was the diſcharge of muſquetry, that by the 29th of the month, of all the guns on the lines two only remained ſerviceable; one of them in the fort of Millore, the other in a baſtion ſomewhat to the weſtward: and not a man durſt appear upon the ramparts (2). Approaches from ſo many diſ-

(1) George Powney to Major General Medows—"The enemy opened from four twelve "pounders this morning, and continued firing about an hour; they are viſibly employed in "conſtructing very extenſive batteries, and many Europeans are ſeen working in them. The "firing this morning appears to have been only to engage the attention of the Rajah's troops "until the whole of the enemy's batteries are compleated. From the accounts I have, his pre"parations are formidable."—6th March, 1790.

(2) Captain Knox to Major General Medows—"Yeſterday morning about eight o'clock, "three heavy guns were opened from the enemy's battery; in which nine embraſures were "diſtinctly to be ſeen, and in the courſe of the preceeding night another battery had been "raiſed about ſeven hundred yards to the weſtward of Mellore, and three hundred and thirty-"five from the lines. The enemy's fire was levelled at, and meant to ſilence, the Rajah's

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tinct quarters protected by a fire from about forty pieces of cannon diſtracted the attention of the Gentoos; and, that nothing might be neglected to complete their conſternation, another battery had been erected at Bagvady-Cottah, about ten miles to the weſtward of Mellore. To render theſe operations ſtill more ſucceſsful, the Sultaun, as at the memorable ſiege of Mangalore during the former war, had conſtructed mortars from which were thrown ſhowers of ſtones and large billets of wood. Having completed their works, the Mahomedans, inſtigated by ſuperſtition, or ſome other unknown motive, obſerved a liſtleſs inactivity for the ſpace of ten days. From whatever cauſe this extraordinary conduct took its riſe, it ſuggeſted to the beſieged the idea of an enterprize which was productive of ſerious conſequences.

At three o'clock in the afternoon on the 9th April two parties conſiſting of about one thouſand five hundred men each, ſallied from the lines. The one ad-

"guns which had annoyed them two days previous to this; and it pains me to add, that the "weight of metal and ſuperiority of fire diſplayed upon that occaſion compleatly effected the "intention. One of the Rajah's guns was diſmounted, one of the gunners was wounded; in "the ſame inſtant the baſtion was deſerted, and it was with the utmoſt difficulty that the artil"lery men were prevailed on to return to their poſt; the alarm ſpread among the Rajah's "people and they ſhewed the greateſt reluctance in ſtanding to their guns.—I have frequently "had occaſion to obſerve, that their want of ſubordination and tactical adroitneſs go hand in "hand; their rejection of every thing new and foreign to their ſyſtem is what I have re"gretted, without being able to amend."—7th March, 1792.

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vanced againſt the weſtern Zigzag, the other from the Mellore gate haſtened to attack in front of that quarter. The former diviſion advancing with a good countenance was diſcovered and fired upon by a ſmall party that the enemy had concealed in an advantageous poſt. This ſudden check, though not the ſole cauſe of immediate victory, contributed conſiderably to bring about the defeat that enſued. The aſſailants took poſt in one of the enemies lines; but, the batteries having by this time taken the alarm, opened with ſuch a heavy diſcharge of round and grape, that with the aſſiſtance of the troops on duty in the trenches, they were compelled to withdraw: not however until they felt the bayonets of their oponents. The eaſtern diviſion ſucceeded ſtill worſe. Charged from different directions by a reſolute body of Mahomedans who added diſcipline to other advantages the Nairs were happy to regain their lines. To warfare of this nature they had been but little accuſtomed. The reſult proved the temerity of the attempt; for, a loſs of one hundred and thirty men not only diſpirited the beſieged, but, in proportion to the terror with which they were ſtruck, it confirmed the confidence of the Myſoreans.

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All the batteries opened againſt the walls on the morning of the 12th. From this period a conſtant cannonade, night and day, attended by occaſional ſhowers of rain mouldered the walls, making a practicable breach of at leaſt three quarters of a mile in extent. By break of day on the 15th, the enemy had planted ſmall flags on their lines as a ſignal for attack, and, without loſs of time, three diſtinct columns advanced to the ſtorm. The reſiſtance at the breach was ſo inconſiderable as ſcarcely to merit mention. Fear appeared to have ſupplanted the courage that the beſieged had lately ſhewn; nay, amazement, diſtraction, and terror, ſeem to have made deep impreſſion on the whole defenſive hoſt. From a heavy fall of rain during the night, numbers of them had retired for ſhelter to the neighbouring cottages. Some were employed in collecting firewood, others in drying their cloathes, and the few that remained in the lines, flying for protection to the extremities of the breach, lurked where the ramparts were intire. The columns preſſing to the centre of the opening advanced in ſafety. Stimulated by the preſence of the SULTAUN, they ſurmounted obſtacles, which, if defended with valour, would have rendered this a

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deſperate ſervice. They cut down the bound-hedge; paſſed the ditch; aſcended the ſhattered walls; and, in ſhort, laid open a paſſage into the heart of Travancore. Gentoos of every deſcription, whether Nairs, Polygars, or Sepoys, fled indiſcriminately. Of the latter, two battalions that had been raiſed for the ſervice of the Travancore Rajah in the Carnatic, were prevailed upon to face about and give one fire; but, abandoned by their aſſociates, they could not be perſuaded to reload. The want of experience in warfare; the want of confidence in each other; and, above all, the want of diſcipline, rendered every attempt to rally ineffectual. The Sultaun conſequently took poſſeſſion of the lines, for a conſiderable extent, with all the cannon and ammunition without meeting any further reſiſtance. The Travancore miniſter, to whom the defence of the lines had been intruſted, in ſo ſuddenly abandoning works, where the whole force of the country was collected, and where he might have taken the advantage of ravines, nullahs, and rivers, gave no proofs of judgement or courage. Ground ſo capable of being maintained ought never to be yielded to an enemy but in the laſt extremity. Fortunately for the fugitives

fugitives, no part of this panic had communicated to the two Madras battalions that were then encamped at Shandamungulum, under the command of Captain KNOX. It was ſound judgement that dictated to them the propriety of removing from thence without loſs of time. After covering the runaways until they croſſed the river of that name, the detachment fell back, and took poſt on the Iſland of Nepean, within ten miles of Cochin, to which ſtation they could readily retire ſhould ſuch a meaſure become neceſſary. The conſternation that enſued the capture of the lines ſurpaſſed credibility. Inhabitants of all deſcriptions forſook their occupations and crowded to the ſouthward; and, the countenance of the detachment, alone, prevented that part of the country from being totally depopulated.

On the 18th, the enemy made their appearance within one mile of Cranganore. The garriſon fled inſtantly; and, as a great part of them approached the Madras battalions, the miniſter detached a party of his own troops with directions that the foremoſt of the runaways ſhould be cut to pieces. Such was the alacrity and ſteadineſs with which this order was put in force, that only four victims had fallen when all the reſt re-

turned to their works. Day after day added to the conſternation and diſtreſs of the Travancoreans, and rendered it the more neceſſary for the Carnatic troops to be on their guard. The arrival, however, of Lieut. Col. HARTLEY with a detachment from Bombay on the 23d, revived the deſponding ſpirits of the one, and ſtrengthened the confidence of the other. It was at a period materially intereſting to Great Britain, and critical with reſpect to the Rajah, that this junction took place, for, whilſt the detachment meditated on the propriety of retiring to Cochin, the Gentoo leaders had determined to ſeek for ſafety in precipitate flight. The Sultaun filling the ditches by overturning the ramparts as he advanced, had by the 26th, erected batteries againſt the fort of Cranganore. Protected by his cannon, he made rapid progreſs with his approaches; and, by the 7th of May, he had demoliſhed the defences and ſilenced all the guns in the fort.

No ſerious acts of hoſtility had by this time taken place between Great Britain and the Sultaun on the Coaſt of Malabar, although the uſual indignant treatment of Chriſtians marked all his actions and every ſtep of his march. Other motives, however, beſides policy, contributed

contributed to induce Lieutenant Colonel HARTLEY not to attempt the defence of Cranganore. An officer of Engineers, that had been ſent to examine the poſt, reported a total deficiency of cannon, of ammunition, and of proviſions; he reported alſo, that the enemy were not only well provided with artillery, but were far advanced in the ſiege, having erected batteries within three hundred yards of the ramparts. To theſe diſadvantages it may be added, that as the reſt of the lines had been completely demoliſhed, Cranganore, of itſelf, availed but little; nor would the parſimony of the Miniſter grant the uſual allowance of caſh to the workmen even if the defence had been undertaken: Under theſe circumſtances it was judged adviſeable to evacuate the poſt.

Jycotta, Paroor, Curiapilly, with various other inconſiderable forts, ſurrendered ſucceſſively to the Sultaun without oppoſition. The total demolition of the lines was completed by repeated exploſions that laid Cranganore in ruins; and, a general devaſtation, as well by fire as the ſword, deſolated the whole face of the country. The Nairs betook themſelves to their ſtrong holds in the mountains. The Travancorean troops

troops to the ſouthern extremity of their kingdom. All cultivation ceaſed. In ſhort, the inhabitants exchanged their homes for the innermoſt receſſes of the jungle, prefering the adventitious attack of the Wolf or the Tyger to the certain and mercileſs perſecution of the Mahomedan Conqueror. The approach, however, of a powerful army, already in the field, now portended, that nought to boaſt of this ſucceſs ſhould deſcend to the poſterity of the Sultaun.

CHAPTER

CHAPTER THE SECOND.

WHILST theſe things were carried on in the ſouthern extremity of the Decan, the inſulted dignity and injured intereſts of Great-Britain (1); the many humiliating circumſtances to which that na-

(1) "We have particularly directed that the Government of Fort St. George, may be at pains "to bring to his [the Nabob of Arcot] notice and recollection, that the preſent conteſt has no "ſort of concern with European politicks, and has not in the ſmalleſt degree, been occaſioned by diſputes or altercations between us and any other European power. That "from an averſion to war, we have diſſembled our ſenſe of TIPPOOS failure in the performance of ſeveral ſtipulations of the laſt treaty of Peace, as well as of many inſults and "injuries that he has offered to us, in the courſe of the laſt three or four years, and that we "ſhould have deſervedly incurred the contempt of all mankind, if, inattentive to the dictates "of honour, and the evident principles of political ſelf defence, we had tamely allowed an "arrogant and inveterate enemy to ſet the laws of the moſt ſacred treaties at defiance, and "aggrandize and prepare himſelf to act in a ſhort time with more efficacy againſt ourſelves "by the deſtruction of a neighbour and faithful ally, whom we were bound by the moſt "ſolemn engagements to protect and defend, without making an early effort at the preſent "juncture to curb his inſolence, and exact ſignal reparation for the many injuries that we "and our allies have ſuſtained from him."—Ben. Pol. Cor. 15th Auguſt 1790.

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tion had been ſubjected by the Sultaun; the claims of good faith towards her diſtreſſed Ally, the inoffenſive Sovereign of Travancore (1); the firm perſuaſion that poiſon or the dagger had afforded a welcome relief to many of her moſt gallant officers, barbarouſly made away with in Myſorean dungeons (2); and, a conviction that a like fate, ſtill awaited many more (3), all, all called aloud for redreſs. To the lot of CHARLES EARL CORNWALLIS, as Governor General and Commander in Chief in India, this glorious, yet arduous taſk fell, in conſequence of his appointment to thoſe important truſts.

(1) "Peace and friendſhip ſhall immediately take place between the ſaid [Eaſt India Company] and the Nabob TIPPOO SULTAUN BAHAUDER, and their friends and allies, particularly including therein the Rajahs of Tanjore and Travancore, who are friends and allies to the Engliſh, and the Carnatick Payenghaut; alſo TIPPOO SULTAUN's friends and allies, the Biby of Cananore, and the Rajahs or Zemindars of the Malabar coaſt are included in this treaty. The Engliſh will not directly, or indirectly aſſiſt the enemies of the Nabob TIPPOO SULTAUN BAHAUDER, nor make war upon his friends or allies; and the Nabob TIPPOO SULTAUN BAHAUDER will not directly or indirectly aſſiſt the enemies, nor make war upon the friends or allies of the Engliſh."——Treaty of peace between the Engliſh Eaſt India Company and the Nabob TIPPOO SULTAUN BAHAUDER, Signed 11th March 1784. Article 1ſt.

(2) "The peace concluded with him (TIPPOO SULTAUN) has every appearance of duration, though ill kept on his part, many of our Soldiers and Sepoys being ſtill detained in his hands, and many officers miſſing of whom no account had been obtained: and for them his plea may be, that they feil the victims of his barbarity before we obtained a right by treaty to their deliverance."—War. Haſt.

(3) "There is not the leaſt doubt that TIPPOO has ſtill a conſiderable number of our Europeans in his poſſeſſion, but as his retaining them is contrary to treaty, he poſitively denies it, and is at infinite pains to prevent our having any kind of communication with them. TIPPOO would be ſufficiently inclined to prevent meſſages from going to any of theſe unfortunate men, in order to avoid a clear detection of that article of the treaty, but, excluſive of that reaſon, ſeveral others have concurred to interrupt all intercourſe except by common meſſengers between him and the Company's Governors."—Lieut. Col. Roſs to a friend in England, 6th Nov. 1788.

Notwithſtanding

Notwithſtanding the high ideas, nay dread of the Sultaun's force entertained by the Princes of Hindoſtan; notwithſtanding the various proofs that Britain had recently obtained of his power, much expectation was founded on the great experience, found penetration, unimpeachable integrity, and unlimited credit of the Britiſh commander: Nor was that expectation diſappointed. The Marattas and the Nizam, from whom HYDER and his ſon, had wreſted conſiderable tracts of country, made early and urgent application to the Governor General, to unite with them in chaſtiſing TIPPOO SULTAUN. Pointing to the ſame object, NIZAM ALLY, had afterwards ſent MEER-ABUL-COSSIM, now MEER ALIM, to negociate at Calcutta, a cloſer connection with the Britiſh nation, as well as to adjuſt the balance due by the Eaſt India Company on account of tribute for the northern Circars (4).

(4) "His Highneſs the NIZAM not aſſenting to the propoſals made by Captain KENNAWAY, for ſettling on what he conceived to be fair and liberal grounds, the amount of the Arrears of Peiſhcuſh due by the Company, and being at the ſame time profeſſedly anxious to manifeſt on his part the ſtrongeſt deſire to increaſe and ſtrengthen the good underſtanding exiſting between the two Governments, deputed MEER ABUL COSSIM as his Vackeel to this preſidency, intruſting him with full and diſtinct powers to enter into treaties and engagements in his name, to alter and explain ſuch articles of the treaty of 1768, as bear an ambiguous meaning, and to finally adjuſt our mutual claims on his ſide of the Peiſhcuſh, due by the Company for the northern Circars, and on ours of the Revenues of the Guntoor ſince they became our right by the death of BISSAULET JUNG."—Minute of the Gov. Gen. Ben. Sec. Con. 10th July 1789.

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Guided by the dictates of honor, and by the wife and juſt policy of the great nation which he repreſents, the Governor General declined to enter into any engagement that might affect TIPPOO in deviation from the treaty of 1784. He, however, kept up a good underſtanding with thoſe Courts; adjuſted accounts with NIZAM ALLY on fair and equitable terms; and paid a balance of above nine lacks of rupees to which his Highneſs was in ſtrict juſtice entitled (1).

Soon after this period it became evident that TIPPOO SULTAUN entertained ſtrong intentions of hoſtility towards our Ally of Travancore. So clear a prelude, to an attack of a far more ſerious nature than any that had hitherto been made on the Carnatic, could not eſcape the penetration of EARL CORNWALLIS. Orders were, conſequently, ſent to the Government of Fort St. George, to conſider any hoſtilities on Travancore

(1) "After much diſcuſſion, MEER ABUL COSSIM acceded to the propriety of my remarks; "and I have the ſatisfaction to inform the Board; that the accounts ſo long outſtanding be"tween the two Governments are brought to a final adjuſtment, and the amount due by the "Company is ſettled at Arcot Rupees 9,16,665-11, for this amount I have agreed to grant "Bills in favour of the NIZAM, payable at Madras or Maſulipatam, as it may beſt ſuit the "Madras Treaſury; this liberty is granted by the tenor of the Treaty—and again, he [MEER "ABUL COSSIM] profeſſed himſelf perfectly ſatisfied with the verbal declarations which I "made to him, and with the aſſurances contained in my letter to his Highneſs, that the future "Peiſhcaſh ſhould be punctually paid when due." Minute of the Govr. Genl. Ben. Sec. Con. 20th July 1789.

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core in breach of treaty as a declaration of war againſt the Eaſt India Company (2).

The inſtant that news of the firſt attack on the lines reached Bengal, the moſt vigorous preparations were ſet on foot, to ſupport the Rajah; to puniſh ſuch preſumptuous procedure, and to check the career of a prince whoſe boundleſs ambition knew no reſtraint.

NIZAM ALLY and the Marattas were now informed, that the time for humbling this diſturber of the public peace had been precipitated by himſelf, and they were invited to join in this neceſſary though arduous undertaking (3). Stimulated to exertion by revenge, they, rea-

(2) "The Rajah [of Travancore] having been expreſsly included by name as our Ally in "the late Treaty of Peace, we are called upon, by motives of honour and policy, to defend "him and his country; and TIPPOO having been ſpecifically informed laſt year that ſuch "was our determination, he would be ſenſible that his invading the country of Travancore "would certainly be conſidered by us as amounting to a declaration of war againſt the Company. "It muſt, however, be admitted, that it is not abſolutely impoſſible that the violence of TIP"poo's paſſions, and a confidence in his ſtrength, may induce him to act in oppoſition to the dic"tates of all deliberate and probable reaſoning; and on our part, prudence requires that means "ſhould be concerted for defending our own Territories, and thoſe of our Allies; and for obtain"ing ample ſatisfaction for any injuries that they may ſuſtain.—If the intelligence which you may "receive of TIPPOO's motions and preparations ſhould be ſuch as to impreſs you with a con"viction of his intentions to invade Travancore, you are to conſult with the Officer command"ing the Troops at your Preſidency on the beſt mode of aſſembling the body of the Army, and "on the moſt proper meaſures to be taken for providing effectually in the firſt inſtance for the "defence of our own Territories as well as thoſe of our Allies. But if you ſhould receive cer"tain information that TIPPOO has invaded any part of the dominions of the Nabob of Arcot, "or of the Rajah of Travancore, you are to conſider him from that moment as at war with "the Company. You will then put in execution the meaſures which have been previouſly "concerted; and you are likewiſe to uſe every means in your power to collect funds for de"fraying the expence of Military preparations; Govr. Genl. in Council to the Govr. and "Council of Fort St. George, 23d Sept. 1789."

(3) Governor General in Council, to the Governor and Council of Fort St. George. "In "the event of being forced into hoſtilities, you will diſpatch immediate notice of the rupture to "the Governor and Council at Bombay, and to the chief and commanding officers at Tellicherry, "with directions to them to complete to the interior line of defence which they had begun ſome "months ago, and to form connections with the neighbouring Rajahs, and to the Company's

dily entered into engagements, that, promiſed reſtitution of their ancient rights. Of the preparations carried on, and alliances entered into by the Governor General, TIPPOO SULTAUN could not long remain in ignorance. At afar, in every quarter, he beheld lowring clouds, that united, approached, and threatened to burſt a furious ſtorm on his dominions.

To the Government of Fort St. George poſitive orders had been ſent, that a powerful and well appointed army ſhould immediately take the field. In Bengal the Military eſtabliſhment was encreaſed (1), and choſen bands, vied with each other for a preference in accelerating the downfal of the deſpot. From thence acroſs the peninſula, alliances were formed with the Peiſhwa, and other leading chiefs of the Maratta empire (2). His Highneſs NIZAM ALLY KHAN entered warmly into the league (3). At Bombay, General ABERCROMBIE, held a ſteady and compact corps in conſtant readineſs; and,

"Reſidents at Hydrabad and Poonah, deſiring that they will, without loſs of time, take ſuch "ſteps as may be in their power to perſuade the NIZAM and the Marattas to ſeize ſo favorable "an opportunity, to reſent the many injuries they have ſuſtained from TIPPOO, by declaring "in our favour."—29th Auguſt, 1789.

(1) "Agreed, at the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, that an augmentation of "the army under this preſidency do immediately take place, by the addition of two Companies "of the preſent ſtrength to the eſtabliſhment of each of the native battalions, and of one Duffadar and twenty troopers to each troop of native cavalry." — Minute of Council in the Military Department, 1ſt February, 1790.

(2) See Treaty of Offenſive and Defenſive Alliance between the Eaſt India Company and the Marattas.—Appendix No. 1.

(3) See Treaty of Offenſive and Defenſive Alliance between the Eaſt India Company and NIZAM ALLY KHAN.—Appendix No. 2.

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in ſhort, two thirds of Hindoſtan ſeemed to threaten a revolution in Myſore.

On his deathbed, HYDER ALLY left in charge to his ſon and ſucceſſor cautiouſly to beware of quarrels with the Engliſh; to obſerve in ſilence, and if poſſible without concern, the riſing greatneſs of that powerful people in Hindoſtan, and, at all events, to ſecure their friendſhip; nay, his laſt words earneſtly preſſed a much beloved conſort (4) to hold in conſtant check the ambitious ſpirit of her ſon, which he well knew ſoared even to the extirpation of all European ſettlements in the eaſt. TIPPOO regarded theſe wiſe admonitions of a dying father with ſeeming acquieſcence. The day, however, on which he firſt filled the muſnud dawned with military preparations. Every means that treaſure could bring forward were employed in adding ſtrength to the countries over which he then ruled, in forming magazines, and in procuring artificers and engineers. His inducements towards that claſs of men extended even to Europe. That the Sultaun had this at

(4) It has been aſſerted, by a writer of repute, in a publication entitled "Memoirs of the war in Aſia" that this Lady was merely one of Hyders concubines. The fact is otherwiſe. The mother of TIPPOO SULTAUN, ſtill in life, was beſtowed in mariage on HYDER long ere he became ruler of Myſore. Her brother, MOCTUM, was a General in the army of that Empire many years previous to the uſurpation of the preſent houſe; and it was to his abilities that HYDER was chiefly indebted for his elevation. It is highly probable that the preſence either of the brother or the huſband would have procured a more reſpectful treatment of this lady from her Biographers.

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heart, and that he was not altogether unſucceſsful, the ſilent yearning of many a father, the agonizing ſorrow of many a mother, the flowing tears of ſiſters, and the diſtraction of connections ſtill dearer throughout the Britiſh dominions amply acknowledge.

To hazard opinions on the conduct of men that held appointments of truſt, at a time when the very meaſures they adopted are become ſubjects of national enquiry, muſt be deemed preſumption in any writer poſſeſſed of but moderate political information. Difficult, however, muſt be the taſk, that attempts to account, on principles of propriety or prudence, for ſo ſtrange a want of attention to ſelf-defence in the Carnatic (1), when an ancient and powerful enemy had taken arms (2). Parſimony in

(1) "Reſolved, that a General order be publiſhed, notifying that the troops in the ſeveral diviſions are to be conſidered in cantonments without being put upon a field eſtabliſhment of bullocks and public followers, excepting thoſe only that are under marching orders to join at the General rendezvous of their reſpective diviſions." Fort St. George, Pol. Con. 26th January 1790.——again—"We have not thought it expedient to put the army entirely on a field eſtabliſhment, as the expence attending it would be very heavy, and productive of great inconvenience by the diminution of our pecuniary reſources, an inconvenience that would probably be greater than the ſhort delay which might be occaſioned in the proviſions of bullocks and followers, when indiſpenſably neceſſary."—Ibid. 16th February 1790.

(2) Edward John Holland to Earl Cornwallis.—"It has been a ſubject for real concern to me, that your Lordſhip ſhould have entertained an opinion that there was a diſpoſition in this Government to act contrary to the inſtructions from your Lordſhip in Council. In a ſituation of affairs ſo critical reſpecting Tippoo Sultaun, your Lordſhip will be ſenſible of the peculiar embarraſſment in ordering a large Army, in all its diviſions, on a Field Eſtabliſhment, at a very heavy expence, every month of which is an object of great magnitude. Any explanations on my part of the meaſures adopted by a Government, of which I was only an individual Member, cannot be ſuppoſed to be complete, and may not, perhaps, be conſidered ſtrictly proper. I have conſidered it, however, as a tribute of regard and reſpect due from me to the late Preſident; but your Lordſhip will, I hope, perceive that it has

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an individual is innocent, as it only deſcends to meanneſs, even in its very worſt ſtage; but, when it affects the intereſts of a nation, it alters its nature, and aſſumes a very different title. That a parſimonious war, drains a ſtate of more money by protraction, than ſudden and extraordinary exertions at the beginning, is a fact too well eſtabliſhed to require additional proof. But, from contemplations that afford nothing beſides melancholy reflections, we turn without regret, to trace the honeſt exertions of zeal and honour, whether accompanied by ſhining abilities, brilliant ſucceſs, or, even, by the inſeparable attendants on adverſe fortune.

To proſecute the war with vigour and effect, it now became neceſſary, not only to provide for the protec-

"been a particular object of attention with me, to avoid all obſervations tending to controverſy which I know was a rule of conduct with the late Preſident; as it was always his with, as well as my own, both from inclination and ſituation, to ſhew every deference, reſpect, and attention to your Lordſhip, to which you are, in every reſpect ſo juſtly entitled." 2d March 1790.——Earl Cornwallis to Edward John Holland.—"I have received your letter, dated the 3d inſtant, and although I diſlike controverſy as much as the late Governor of Fort St. George, and felt it a very painful taſk to be obliged to write letters of reprehenſion, the duty of my ſtation requires that I ſhould ſay, that I think the late Government of Fort St George were guilty of a moſt criminal diſobedience of the clear and explicit orders of this Government, dated the 29th Auguſt and 13th of November, by not conſidering themſelves to be at war with Tippoo from the moment that they heard of his attack on the lines of the Rajah of Travancore, which made a part of his former poſſeſſions, and were guaranteed to him by us in the late Treaty of Peace.—So far am I from giving credit to the late Government for economy, in not making the neceſſary preparations for war, according to the poſitive orders of the ſupreme Government, after having received the moſt groſs inſult that could be offered to any nation. I think it very poſſible that every Cath of that ill judged ſaving may coſt to the Company a Crore of Rupees, beſides which, I ſtill more ſincerely lament the diſgraceful ſacrifice which you made, by that delay, of the honour of your country, by tamely ſuffering an inſolent and cruel enemy to overwhelm the dominions of the Rajah of Travancore, which we were bound, by the moſt ſacred ties of friendſhip and good faith to defend." 30th March 1790.

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tion of the poſts and diſtricts, that range along the bay of Bengal, from the northern extremity of the Circars to Cape Comorin, but by the moſt ſtrenuous exertions to penetrate into the very heart of the enemy's dominions. At Calcutta, it was determined, by the Governor General in Council, to ſtrengthen the Carnatic army with ſix complete battalions of ſepoys (1), and one of artillery, from the Bengal eſtabliſhment (2). Thus augmented, the actual force deſtined for the war, on the eaſtern ſide of the peninſula, conſiſted of one regiment of Britiſh dragoons, five regiments of native cavalry, three battalions of artillery, twelve regiments of European foot, and thirty-ſix battalions of native infantry. Excluſive of this force, eight native battalions, employed, in times of peace, on the collection of the revenue, together with about fifteen hundred European

(1) "Agreed, that the Commander in Chief be requeſted to form a detachment of ſix "battalions of Sepoys, with a proportion of artillery and laſcars adequate to the ſervice of four "ſix-pounders, to be taken from the ſecond battalion of artillery, and from the twelve com-"panies of laſcars ordered to embark on the Houghton and Cheſterfield, which detachment is "to proceed by land to the Southward under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Cochrell."——Minute of Council in the Military Department, Fort William, 18 Feb. 1790.

(2) "The Second battalion of Artillery is directed to be held in readineſs to embark for "Fort St. George, at the ſhorteſt notice. All men incapable of field duty belonging to this "battalion are to be transferred to the Companies of the other battalions at the Preſidency, "from which the ſecond battalion is to be immediately completed to the fixed eſtabliſhment "with men fit for field ſervice. Twelve complete companies of laſcars are to be attached to "this battalion, and held in readineſs to embark with it."——G. O. by Earl Cornwallis, January 30, 1790.

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and native invalids might be ſtationed for the defence of the ſeveral garriſons as occaſion might require. The gallant Commodore Cornwallis, whoſe ſpirited exertions in the weſtern hemiſphere, during the former war, juſtly obtained the general applauſe of his country, was at this period in charge of his Majeſty's ſquadron throughout the Indian ſeas; and, to connect the operations of the Carnatic army with thoſe of General Abercrombie on the Malabar Coaſt, and of our Allies along the ſhores of the Decan, the naval arrangements could not have been intruſted with a more vigilant or zealous officer. In ſhort, the reſources of Bengal; the weight of the hoſts in alliance; and the magnitude of the Britiſh power in India, when directed by ſuch ability and experience, furniſhed ample grounds to hope for a favorable termination to the war.

Early in the year 1790, poſitive orders again diſpatched by the Governor General to the Governor and Council of Fort St. George, evidently diſcovered a determined reſolution to demand ſpeedy redreſs of Tippoo Sultaun for his preſumptuous, and daring breach of the

 treaty

treaty which he executed in 1784 (1). The military preparations already commenced were profecuted with vigour (2). At Trichinopoly and Waulajabad, two diſtinct armies were ordered to be in readineſs for motion (3), either of which was ſuppoſed equal to encounter TIPPOO in the field(4); but, they were intended to act againſt him in conjunction or ſeparately according as the circumſtances of the war might require. In the Northern Circars, a detachment was directed to aſ-

(1) "Our letters dated the 29th Auguſt and 13th of November laſt, inſtructed you to conſider the company to be at war with TIPPOO, if he ſhould attack any part of the dominions of the Nabob of Arcot or Rajah of Travancore, that were in their poſſeſſion at the late treaty of peace. And our letter dated the 27th of January laſt, expreſsly ſaid, that TIPPOO's attack on the Travancore lines left no further room for deliberation, but was to be looked upon as a declaration of war. Under theſe circumſtances we have conceived that you have been occupied for ſome time paſt either in making the neceſſary preparations, or in carrying on the war with the utmoſt vigour in your power, according to our poſitive and repeated inſtructions."—Governor General in Council to the Governor and Council Fort St. George, 17th March 1790.

(2) "Affairs are ſo critically ſituated, and the laſt letters from Bengal ſeem ſo ſtrongly to imply that vigorous meaſures are neceſſary, that averſe as I am to incurring unneceſſary expences, I am decidedly of opinion, that the reſt of Colonel MUSGRAVE's Plan ſhould be put into imediate execution, of aſſembling and encamping the corps under marching orders at Waulajabad, and then joining them, perhaps, to the Camp at Trichinopoly, with bullocks and proviſions ſufficient to move for forty days, every exertion being made to ſupply the different garriſons with grain."—Minute of Major General MEDOWS, Fort St. George, Mil. and Pol. Con. 5th March 1790.

(3) "We have iſſued the neceſſary orders for the proviſion of the draught and carriage bullocks, which will be required for the equipment of the troops and ordnance in the centre and ſouthern diviſions, ordered to be in readineſs for field ſervice; and we are employed in taking the meaſures requiſite for ſtoring the garriſons in the Carnatic with grain."—Governor in Council Fort St. George, to the Governor General and Council 23d February 1790.

(4) "The idea of the centre army not being able to penetrate the Myſore Country aroſe wholly from the apprehenſion that there might be a deficiency of equipment, but by no means from an opinion that the force under your command when properly provided is not equal to the accompliſhment of whatever operations it enters upon."—Major General MEDOWS to Colonel KELLY, 22d Sept. 1790.—For this voucher and for many of thoſe that appear throughout this volume, I am indebted to my much eſteemed friend, Captain ROBERT BARTON, of the 76th Regiment.

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ſemble, which from its ſtrength would be capable of protecting ſupplies, of co-operation with the powers in alliance, or of deſultory inroads into Myſore, ſhould the movements of the enemy render that meaſure adviſeable. It was now rumoured, that EARL CORNWALLIS meditated to take the charge of the war upon himſelf. The arrival, however, of Major General MEDOWS at Fort St. George, about the latter end of February, put a ſtop to this report; and as the indefatigable ſpirit of that Officer was immediately directed towards aſſembling the troops, the gloom that inaction had formerly thrown over the Britiſh intereſt throughout the Decan, gave way before brighter proſpects. By the 18th of March, an encampment might be ſeen in the neighbourhood of Conjeveram (4) under the command of Colonel MUSGRAVE, an officer who had particularly diſtinguiſhed himſelf in America. This force moved towards Trichinopoly on the 29th, and was joined on the following day by the firſt diviſion of the reinforcements from Bengal, which conſiſted of three well diſciplined companies of Artillery, being part of

(4) 19th L. D. 52d 71ſt — 3d Native Cavalry, 4th ditto, 1ſt bat. coaſt Art. — 2d Bat. Coaſt Infantry, 4th ditto, 9th ditto — 84th ditto, 85th ditto

treaty which he executed in 1784 (1). The military preparations already commenced were profecuted with vigour (2). At Trichinopoly and Waulajabad, two diſtinct armies were ordered to be in readineſs for motion (3), either of which was ſuppoſed equal to encounter TIPPOO in the field(4); but, they were intended to act againſt him in conjunction or ſeparately according as the circumſtances of the war might require. In the Northern Circars, a detachment was directed to aſ-

(1) "Our letters dated the 29th Auguſt and 13th of November laſt, inſtructed you to conſider the company to be at war with TIPPOO, if he ſhould attack any part of the dominions of the Nabob of Arcot or Rajah of Travancore, that were in their poſſeſſion at the late treaty of peace. And our letter dated the 27th of January laſt, expreſsly ſaid, that TIPPOO's attack on the Travancore lines left no further room for deliberation, but was to be looked upon as a declaration of war. Under theſe circumſtances we have conceived that you have been occupied for ſome time paſt either in making the neceſſary preparations, or in carrying on the war with the utmoſt vigour in your power, according to our poſitive and repeated inſtructions."—Governor General in Council to the Governor and Council Fort St. George, 17th March 1790.

(2) "Affairs are ſo critically ſituated, and the laſt letters from Bengal ſeem ſo ſtrongly to imply that vigorous meaſures are neceſſary, that averſe as I am to incurring unneceſſary expences, I am decidedly of opinion, that the reſt of Colonel MUSGRAVE's Plan ſhould be put into immediate execution, of aſſembling and encamping the corps under marching orders at Waulajabad, and then joining them, perhaps, to the Camp at Trichinopoly, with bullocks and proviſions ſufficient to move for forty days, every exertion being made to ſupply the different garriſons with grain."—Minute of Major General MEDOWS, Fort St. George, Mil. and Pol. Con. 5th March 1790.

(3) "We have iſſued the neceſſary orders for the proviſion of the draught and carriage bullocks, which will be required for the equipment of the troops and ordnance in the centre and ſouthern diviſions, ordered to be in readineſs for field ſervice; and we are employed in taking the meaſures requiſite for ſtoring the garriſons in the Carnatic with grain."—Governor in Council Fort St. George, to the Governor General and Council 23d February 1790.

(4) "The idea of the centre army not being able to penetrate the Myſore Country aroſe wholly from the apprehenſion that there might be a deficiency of equipment, but by no means from an opinion that the force under your command when properly provided is not equal to the accompliſhment of whatever operations it enters upon."—Major General MEDOWS to Colonel KELLY, 22d Sept. 1790.—For this voucher and for many of thoſe that appear throughout this volume, I am indebted to my much eſteemed friend, Captain ROBERT BARTON, of the 76th Regiment.

ſemble,

ſemble, which from its ſtrength would be capable of protecting ſupplies, of co-operation with the powers in alliance, or of deſultory inroads into Myſore, ſhould the movements of the enemy render that meaſure adviſeable. It was now rumoured, that EARL CORNWALLIS meditated to take the charge of the war upon himſelf. The arrival, however, of Major General MEDOWS at Fort St. George, about the latter end of February, put a ſtop to this report; and as the indefatigable ſpirit of that Officer was immediately directed towards aſſembling the troops, the gloom that inaction had formerly thrown over the Britiſh intereſt throughout the Decan, gave way before brighter proſpects. By the 18th of March, an encampment might be ſeen in the neighbourhood of Conjeveram (4) under the command of Colonel MUSGRAVE, an officer who had particularly diſtinguiſhed himſelf in America. This force moved towards Trichinopoly on the 29th, and was joined on the following day by the firſt diviſion of the reinforcements from Bengal, which conſiſted of three well diſciplined companies of Artillery, being part of

(4) 19th L. D. 52d 71ſt | 3d Native Cavalry, 4th ditto 1ſt bat. coaſt Art. | 2d Bat. Coaſt Infantry, 4th ditto 9th ditto | 84th ditto 85th ditto

a complete battalion ſent from thence by ſea, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel CHARLES RUSSEL DEARE.

A minute detail of every trifling circumſtance that might occur on the march of a body of troops, through a well-known country, would afford but little entertainment to the reader, eſpecially as the enemy had kept at a diſtance of about one hundred miles; nor is it conceived that an acquaintance with the ſeveral grounds of encampment, which muſt be acquired through a chain of harſh Malabar expreſſions, can furniſh either adequate amuſement or information (1). One circumſtance however, alike authentic and remarkable demands notice. Various extenſive tracts, through which this diviſion of the army had to direct its route, are covered with thick jungle, particularly, in the neighbourhood of Trinomalee, and from thence to Tyagar. In paſſing through theſe tracts, many followers of the camp, ſome of them armed, were carried off by tygers, the principal

(1) The Reader of a different opinion may ſatisfy curioſity:

March,	29,	Oollore,	April,	19,	Manoorlapetta,
April,	10,	Maundoor,		20,	Poundoor,
	11,	Walcherry,		21,	Benavoor
	12,	Wandiwaſh,		22,	Wariamagur,
	14,	Mailoor,		24,	Rajamagur,
	15,	Chittapet,		25,	Ootatore,
	16,	Maungulum,		28,	Munſapetta,
	17,	Trinomalee,		29,	Trichinopoly,

inhabitants

inhabitants of theſe jungles: nay, out of a ſmall party of ſepoys, that had reſolutely determined on a joint defence againſt one of thoſe animals, four were miſerably wounded. On the 29th of April, the corps under the command of Colonel MUSGRAVE, formed a junction with the diviſion aſſembled under Colonel NIXON at Trichinopoly (2).

Having declared his opinions with reſpect to the outlines of the meaſures neceſſary to be adopted by the Preſidency of Fort St. George, and relying on the integrity of thoſe to whom their execution muſt be intruſted during his abſence, Major General MEDOWS reſolved to take the field in perſon (3), and commanded that the Army ſhould wait his orders on the plains of Trichinopoly. From Madras, he took paſſage by ſea to Tranquebar in the Veſtal frigate; arrived in camp on the 24th of May; reviewed the Army that day, and on

(2)

36th,	1ſt Bat. Coaſt Infantry,		16th ditto,
72d,	5th ditto,		20th ditto,
2d, N. Caſt.	6th ditto,		23d ditto,
5th ditto,	7th ditto		

(3) "The Preſident has the honor to announce to the Board his intention of proceeding "a few days to the ſouthward, in order to take the Command of the Army. The Preſiden "cannot think of laying down any rules for meaſures to be tranſacted in his abſence; the Board "will act as circumſtances may require. He is prepared to have the fulleſt confidence in them, "and deſires that all letters, not of a private nature, may be opened by them. When immediate deciſion is neceſſary, they will of courſe decide upon them; but when the certainty of "communications admit of it, and the ſubjects are of importance, he requeſts that they may be "communicated to him, previous to any determination upon them." Minute of Major Genl. MEDOWS, Fort St. George, Mil. and Pol. Con. 7th March 1790.

the

the 26th, opened a campaign which ultimately turned out advantageous to Great Britain, and creditable to her Arms. Whilſt the climate proved favourable to the operations of the troops in one collected body, the General was ſecure of brilliant ſucceſs; but, the annual viſitations of the monſoon, together with the difficulty of procuring ſubſiſtance during the approaching rainy ſeaſon, rendered a ſeparation of the troops indiſpenſably neceſſary. Conſequently, diſtinct command enſued: and, on the experience of the leaders their country had now to depend. The ſtrict diſcipline, the ſtubborn valour of a few corps, however, on a very critical occaſion, turned out the beſt bulwark of the public weal. The operations and movements of the Army from the day that General MEDOWS aſſumed the command, became particularly intereſting, as they materially affected the duration and general iſſue of the war, conſequently they lay claim to minute detail.

The General that wars in the Eaſt, although he has provided an ample porportion of troops, ſtores, and treaſure, for the execution of his deſigns, will ſtill find that he has many obſtacles to remove and difficulties to encounter. The climate is highly unfavourable to the European

European part of an army. If rumours of hoſtilities have gone abroad, the utmoſt exertions, together with the moſt laviſh expenditure of money, cannot, on ſome occaſions, procure carriage and draught cattle either to purchaſe or hire(1). Coolies, Laſcars, Bearers, with various other deſcriptions of followers are indiſpenſably neceſſary to attend troops in the field (2); and, theſe can only be obtained through individuals who already poſſeſs the confidence of the natives. Here, it is in times of peace only that preparation for war can be made with effect. In a country where not only the neceſſaries of life, but every ſpecies of equipment muſt be conveyed on beaſts of burden, forage too becomes a moſt material object of attention. Every expectation for that article muſt

(1) "Upon the ſlighteſt rumour of an approaching war, the inhabitants almoſt equally apprehenſive of their Cattle being ſeized by the Nabob, or plundered by the Enemy, always drive them into impenetrable woods and other inacceſſible places, where they muſt remain concealed from our moſt diligent reſearches, and when once the inhabitants have thus ſecured their Cattle they are not to be allured by money, or terrified by threats to produce them again, at leaſt in numbers ſufficient for our demand. We muſt either purchaſe or hire Bullocks; but, it is not, in our option to do either, unleſs authorized by Government, and enſured that they will be employed for at leaſt four months certain, which will be ſome, indemnification for taking them from other employments, and leaving them expoſed to the riſk of falling into the hands of the enemy; nor can we flatter ourſelves that any ſubſequent exertions on our part, even with every ſupport that Government can afford us, will enable us to provide a ſufficient number of draft and carriage cattle for the guns, amunition, ſtores, camp, equipage, and proviſions required even for any conſiderable detachment".—Carnatic Bullock Contractors to JOHN HOLLAND, 21ſt January 1790.

(2) "I take the liberty to ſtate that various other ſpecies of equipment are alſo abſolutely neceſſary for enabling the troops to take the field, ſuch as Coolies, Laſcars, Doolies, &c. without which (granting that it is in all reſpects complete as to bullocks) the Army muſt unavoidably remain inactive." Colonel Muſgrave to the Governor and Council of Fort St. George, 18th February 1790.

depend

depend on the nature of the ſoil where the army is to act.

In diſtricts where forage does not abound, food not only for the bullocks that convey the ſtores muſt be provided, but, provender and the means of tranſporting it muſt be procured for the cattle that carry food for thoſe firſt loaded. In calculations for this branch, the numbers muſt diminiſh progreſſively until the loweſt is reduced to one bullock carrying ſomewhat more than is ſufficient for ſelfmaintenance. But, as theſe ſpeculations lead from the intention of this work, it becomes neceſſary to return to the Military operations.

The army, now nearly fifteen thouſand fighting men, was formed into ſix brigades. The Europeans into two, the Natives into four. To each European corps were attached two twelve pounders, and to each Native battalion two ſix pounders. The park conſiſted of eight braſs eighteen pounders, four iron eighteen pounders, and four howitzers. Stores, ammunition, proviſions for fifty days, the neceſſary conveyance, in ſhort whatever was conſidered eſſential to the grand object of the campaign was in readineſs for motion.

Carrore, a regular garriſon, the capital of a fertile diſtrict,

trict, and diſtant from Trichinopoly about fifty miles, was at that time the neareſt poſt occupied by the enemy. Thither the General directed his courſe, advancing by eaſy marches until he reached Coitore(1). In order to collect grain and to afford protection to the country, the army halted ten days at this place. With ſimilar intentions Major CUPPAGE was detached on the third of the month with three battlions of ſepoys to Kiſtnaveram. Captain BROWN with the ſame views had been previouſly detached to Coortallum with his own battalion. Theſe judicious arrangements, beſides ſecuring to the General what ſupplies the country could afford, furniſhed an opportunity to repair the carriages that had been damaged, and to refreſh the cattle after their fatigue.

Previous to any effuſion of Chriſtian blood, ſome interchange of civilities took place between the leaders of the two hoſtile armies. The SULTAUN anxious for the fate of his moſt valuable poſſeſſions haſtened to avert the ſtorm that threatened them by conciliatory propoſals. The cannon with which he had lately de-

(1) 26th, Allitory, - - - - Miles, 6 Fur. 4.
27th, Pogamoody, - - - - 10 0.
31ſt, Prodopliam and Coitore, - - - 9 4.

moliſhed

moliſhed the defences of Travancore now became unneceſſary incumbrances, It is ſaid that they were thrown into the deep waters of the Paniani. With a choſen body of horſe and foot, the Myſorean rapidly approached the capital of his dominions on the plains to the eaſtward, whilſt the reſt of his troops reaſcended the weſtern Ghauts or remained to oppoſe Colonel HARTLEY on the Malabar Coaſt.

Four days before the Britiſh army moved from the plains of Trichinopoly, he diſpatched a letter from Coimbatore, addreſſed to Major General MEDOWS, in the following terms: "I have received your friendly letter of the 20th of Rajub 1204 (the 6th of April) by your hircarrah, and I have underſtood the whole of its contents; that you wrote me reſpecting your arrival and appointment to the Government of Madras, and it has been the cauſe of much pleaſure to me, as the friendſhip and good-will between this Circar, the Engliſh Rajah (1), (the King of England) and the Company, which is founded on particular treaties, is ſo well known that it ſtands not in need of explanation; nevertheleſs, at this time, notwithſtanding the bonds of friendſhip are firmly eſtabliſhed, in conſequence of the intervention, in certain neceſſary and important concerns, and the repreſentations, (contrary to the fact), of certain ſhortſighted perſons to you, they have cauſed an army to be aſſembled on both ſides. As this event is improper among thoſe who are mutually at friendſhip. I therefore wiſh, that in order to clear it up, and to have certain important matters repreſented, to ſend to you a perſon of dignity, together with ſome other perſons, that the Vakeel of the Circar having arrived with you, may explain the whole circumſtances to you; and, that the duſt, which has obſcured your upright mind, may be removed. Agreeably to the cuſtom of friendſhip, you will quickly inform me of your approval of my ſending a dignified perſon of this Circar, and you will ſend orders to the confines of the Carnatic not to moleſt him, but that the Vakeel be eſcorted to you in ſafety. In a word, the wiſh of my heart is this, that agreeably to the articles of the Treaty of

(1) The haughty Muſſulman, habituated to abject ſubmiſſion from the Native Lords of the Eaſt, is loath to acknowledge an equal. Rajahs have been made and unmade, as the ſeveral Emperors willed, from the firſt eſtabliſhment of the Moguls in Hindoſtan. The day that they ſubmitted to a Mahomedan yoke, their importance ſunk beneath the preſſure. Without anceſtry, or qualities of the heart at all in account ſurely the Sovereign of Great Britain has a juſt claim to reſpect amongſt the Princes of this age on the ſcore of might alone. Ere two years had elapſed, pent up in his capital, the proud Sultaun trembled as he opened the gates, whilſt his herald ſubmiſſively approached the repreſentative of his Britannick Majeſty to proclaim the truth of this aſſertion.

" peace, our friendſhip may daily encreaſe; and that by " the favor of the Almighty, there may never be the " ſmalleſt deviation therefrom. In the ſame manner " as I before wrote on this ſubject, ſo I now again write " to you—Conſtantly rejoice me with accounts of your " welfare—may you be proſperous!"

To this letter the General diſpatched the following anſwer juſt as the Army entered the dominions of the Sultaun. " I received your's, and I underſtand its con- " tents. You are a great prince; and, but for your cru- " elty to your priſoners I ſhould add an enlightened " one. The Engliſh equally incapable of offering an " inſult as of ſubmitting to one, have always looked " upon war as declared from the moment you attacked " their ally, the King of Travancore. God does not " always give the battle to the ſtrong, nor the race to " the ſwift, but generally ſucceſs to thoſe whoſe cauſe " is juſt—upon that we depend."

The SULTAUN no ſooner received this letter than he ſet out for Seringapatam with the utmoſt expedition. He directed that all his regular troops ſhould aſſemble in that neighbourhood. For a time, he abandoned his eaſtern low countries to their fate; and, regardleſs

gardleſs of the ſtores with which his numerous garriſons on the plains were provided, he committed their protection to looties and peons.

On the 12th the Britiſh army again proceeded (1), and three days afterwards poſſeſſion was taken of Carrore, which had been previouſly abandoned by the enemy. This fort is well built. It has a ſtrong ſtone wall with ſeveral baſtions, a deep ditch, and good glacis. The ſtrength of the place, the ſickly ſtate of the army, the importance of the conquered diſtrict, and the advantage of communication with Trichinopoly, contributed as inducements towards fixing on Carrore for a conſtant poſt (2). At this ſtation an hoſpital was eſtabliſhed. All the ſick amounting to upwards of twelve hundred men; all the iron eighteen pounders, two of braſs, and two howitzers, were depoſited in the fort; all the convaleſcents, with two companies of

	Miles, Fur.
(1) June 12th, Vetticotty, - - - -	7
13th, Kiſtnaveram, - - - -	7
15th, Carrore, - - - -	10

(2) " When Rice arrives from Tanjore or Trichinopoly, be pleaſed to acknowledge the re- " ceipt of it, and do the beſt you can to keep it in a ſtate of preſervation; and, as nearly as you " are able to aſcertain, ſend weekly returns of the grain you have in ſtore, ſpecifying the quan- " tity of Kiſtnaveram Paddy beat out, what remains, the prize-grain, and the quantities of Rice " you may receive at different times from Tanjore and Trichinopoly, that I may be able to in- " form the General of the ſupplies he may expect from your Garriſon; and be particularly at- " tentive in keeping the Tanjore and Trichinopoly grain ſeparate from the Kiſtnaveram."—THOMAS KINGSCOTE, to Capt. PARR, 31ſt July, 1790.

the

the firſt European coaſt regiment were ordered for its garriſon; and the command of the whole was conferred on Captain PARR.

The enemy's horſe now began to appear. They were wary, yet troubleſome. They avoided action, yet were teazing and vexatious. Whenever our cavalry advanced they fled, but as often returned, and hovering on the ſkirts of the army, they contrived to carry of great quantities of cattle, and to wound many followers. In one of theſe excurſions, four men on horſeback and two on foot, ſtrayed within the Piquets at night and ſurrendered. Next day, Cornet FORBES, with a party of STEVENSON's regiment, found means to come up with a body of their horſe whom they inſtantly attacked and put to flight. The leader of this detachment, being of a higher caſt than the generality of thoſe in ſimilar ſituations, determined to meaſure ſwords with Mr. FORBES. The combat immediately commenced. Spirit and dexterity in horſemanſhip was oppoſed to firmneſs of mind and ſuperiority of bodily ſtrength. On the third rencounter the Caledonian brought the Hindoo to the ground; but, he had the credit of ſhedding the firſt Chriſtian blood, in this war, as he had inflicted

a ſlight wound on Cornet FORBES. This party ſlew a conſiderable number of the enemy, and returned to camp with four priſoners. Intimidated by theſe checks, the looties for ſome time kept at a more reſpectable diſtance, although they ſtill continued their uſual daily viſits.

About this period, a chain of regular fortifications, with extenſive dependant diſtricts ſubmitted to the Britiſh arms, in ſuch rapid ſucceſſion, and with loſs ſo very inconſiderable, as not only to exceed the expectation, but to gratify the utmoſt wiſhes of the General. on the 3d of July the Army marched from Carrore and advanced towards Aravacourchy (1). That poſt totally incapable of reſiſtance ſurrendered immediately, and was put in poſſeſſion of ſome friendly Polygars. The Killedar, with ridiculous pomp, fired two cannon at the advance guard of our Army before he received a ſummons for the delivery of the Fort; he, then, after ſome further gaſconade, requeſted permiſſion to diſcharge more guns, proteſting at the ſame time that no damage ſhould be done to our troops, and urging that

		Miles.	Fur.
(1) July 3d. Coilpetta,		13	4
5th Aravacourchy,		7	4

the

the Sultaun would be much offended at the ſurrender of his garriſon without an adequate defence. But, as apparent reſiſtance now, might from the contagion of example, occaſion ſerious oppoſition by other garriſons at a future period, this requeſt met with a peremptory refuſal.

Daraporam, abandoned by the enemy, was taken poſſeſſion of without oppoſition on the 10th (1). Cornet RIDEOUT, on this day, having under his command a troop of Stevenſon's regiment ſurpriſed a body of the enemy's horſe, that were negligently dreſſing their victuals. They amounted to about a hundred and fifty in number; and, although half the troop had been on detachment, the attack was made with ſuch ſpirit, that the whole party were put to death, with the exception of one ſirdar and ten privates, whom he brought priſoners into camp. Sixty horſes too graced the ſucceſsful addreſs of the victors.

At Daraporam, the General found a large ſupply of grain and other neceſſaries. He determined to form

	Miles.
July 7th, Tallycor,	10,
8th, Coorambaddy,	10,
9th, Rangapaliam,	5,
10th, Daraporam,	11,

a depot at this ſtation, and from thence to move with as little incumbrance as poſſible towards Coimbatore. He directed that all the ſick, all the convaleſcents of the army, all weak horſes, all draft and carriage cattle unfit for immediate ſervice, all the battering cannon with their ſtores, all wheel carriages not abſolutely neceſſary ſhould remain behind; that captains, ſtaff officers, ſubalterns of cavalry and artillery ſhould double up in their tents; that in the infantry four ſubalterns ſhould have but one marquee; and, in ſhort, that all the camp equipage which could poſſibly be diſpenſed with, ſhould be put into the fort. Four companies of the firſt European Coaſt regiment, with a detachment of two hundred ſepoys were ordered in as a garriſon, and the command was beſtowed on Captain SWAIN.

Beſides the garriſon left in Daraporam, Major YOUNGE with his own regiment of cavalry, the 2d, 7th, and 20th battalions of native infantry and ſix ſix-pounders had directions to remain in that neighbourhood, until further orders. This detachment from its central ſituation was well calculated to eſcort proviſions from Carrore for the army, and to co-operate with any body of troops, that might be employed in the reduction of

Dindigul or Palligautcherry. There were alſo good grounds to expect that a conſiderable ſupply of grain might have been collected and thrown into either of the magazines that muſt of neceſſity have been eſtabliſhed previous to any irruption into the upper country. The Army diveſted by theſe meaſures of every poſſible incumbrance, marched towards Coimbatore (1), and took poſſeſſion of it on the 21ſt without moleſtation. Fifty Peons that garriſoned the place attempted as they fled to burn the Pettah. They did not however ſucceed.

Coimbatore waſhed on one ſide by a very large lake, and ſituated on the ſkirts of an extenſive plain at the diſtance of about ſeven miles from the mountains, had formerly been the capital of an independent and powerful Rajah. The fort, which is very extenſive, was found in good repair, and the town although abandoned by its inhabitants, ſuffered but little damage. Here the Sultaun had erected a ſtately Palace wherein he occaſionally re-

		Miles.	Fur.
(1) July 17th,	Coodavi,	16	4
18th,	Trippoor,	13	4
20th,	Shamalaperam,	12	
21ſt,	Singanalore,	13	
22d,	Coimbatore,	5	

ſided

ſided. It is a maſterly piece of architecture decorated in the Mahomedan ſtile. Some of the apartments are very ſpacious though not much ornamented. The upper rooms, which conſtitute the haram, are richly painted, and have annexed to each two cloſets and a bath. In front of the palace, a veranda highly finiſhed, looks into a large area with an elegant range of buildings on either ſide, and directly oppoſite ſtands a well built treaſury which compleats the ſquare.

The dependence that diſtricts have on their capitals throughout Hindoſtan, together with the extraordinary fertility and vaſt extent of the country, rendered Coimbatore a poſt of the utmoſt importance; it was therefore furniſhed with a ſtrong garriſon, which was augmented or diminiſhed according to the exigency of the ſervice. From their firſt appearance, until now, the enemy diſcovered by their want of countenance that none of the Sultaun's ſtable horſe, had as yet appeared in the field. Thoſe that hitherto oppoſed the army were a deſpicable banditti called looties. A ſet of unprincipled wretches that feel attachment for the banners of no Prince; that exiſt by indiſcriminate plunder; that acknowledge no diſtinction of friend or

foe, where their intereſt is concerned; and, that are conſequently alike obnoxious to and deteſted by the regular troops of all ſtates whatſoever.

The General had now to combat with an enemy far different from that juſt deſcribed. On the 22d of the month, he received intelligence of SAHID SAHIB's approach to Demiacotta with not leſs then three thouſand ſtable horſe. He immediately determined to give battle, and for that purpoſe detached the whole cavalry ſupported by two companies of ſepoys, with four pieces of cannon to that poſt. By 10 o'clock at night, the detachment came up with about thirty of the horſe, all of whom were made priſoners. The fort having now taken the alarm commenced a heavy fire, which, together with a ſcarcity of forage, rendered it neceſſary to fall back ſome diſtance.

On the 28th, the cavalry again advanced towards Demiacotta with the ſepoys and guns. They paſſed cloſe to the fort without a ſhot on either ſide, and ſoon after the enemy's tents were ſeen at the diſtance of about two miles. When our troops had approached as near as the river, which run between them and SAHID SAHIB would admit, a few ſhots, well aimed by Captain HOWLEY,

LEY of the Madras eſtabliſhment, from the ſix pounders, made him decamp with great precipitation and confuſion, directing his flight towards the Guzzlehatty paſs. The immediate object of the detachment being thus effected, the whole fell back to Velladi, from which place they moved occaſionally to Shawore, Shallore, Occarro and to the other adjacent villages, according as it became adviſable from the intelligence obtained with reſpect to ſupplies of grain and of forage.

Other objects, however, beſides that of repelling SAHID SAHIB's diviſion rendered it neceſſary to continue this detachment in advance for ſome further time. Whatſoever plan of operations the General might think proper to purſue in the low countries, it was evident that a chain of poſts cloſely connected with each other, extending from the Coromandal Coaſt to the foot of the Guzzlehatty-paſs, muſt be attained previous to any invaſion of Myſore from the Coimbatore diſtrict. On this principle, Tanjore, Trichinopoly, Carrore, Erroad and Sattimungulum, preſented themſelves as links that muſt of neceſſity be ſecured; and, in order to obtain poſſeſſion of ſuch of theſe poſts as were ſtill occupied by the enemy, as well as to keep the country,

country, and in particular the line of communication, free from SAHID SAHIB's horſe, it became requiſite to watch his movements at Sattimungulum and Poongaur, the only places at which the Bevanee river was at that time fordable.

Motives of ſtill greater importance urged the propriety of keeping a watchful eye on thoſe fords. Captain Sir JOHN KENNAWAY, reſident at Hydrabad, had intimated to the Engliſh commander, that the Sultaun had reviewed a well appointed army to the eaſtward of Seringapatam, about the 7th of this month, and a Bramin that had arrived in camp from that capital, with various other teſtimonies confirmed this intelligence.

Juſt as Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD advanced towards SAHID SAHIB, Lieutenant Colonel STUART had inſtructions to proceed againſt Palligautcherry. The monſoon had by this time ſet in to the ſouthward at a ſeaſon of of the year much earlier than uſual; inceſſant ſhowers of rain had overflown the whole face of the country; and, the unſurmountable obſtacles that from this circumſtance took their riſe, rendered it neceſſary to abandon the deſign of reducing Palligautcherry until the waters ſhould ſubſide.—The detachment, conſequently, fell back to Poodoor, diſtant from Coimbatore about twelve miles.

Another detachment conſiſting of the firſt native Carnatic brigade, with one eighteen and ſix ſix-pounders, which ſet out on the firſt of Auguſt, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel OLDHAM, to reduce Erroad, was attended with better ſucceſs. To ſtrengthen this detachment, Lieutenant Colonel DEARE, of the Bengal artillery, with his Majeſty's 36th regiment, the 5th and 25th battalions of Coaſt native infantry, two native companies excepted, proceeded by the ſame route on the 5th of the month. This reinforcement, which conducted ſix pieces of cannon, four ſix and two twelve pounders proved unneceſſary, for, Erroad had ſurrendered to the firſt diviſion, on the day that ſucceeded the departure of the ſecond from camp, after an interchange of a few ſhots with the advance guard.

Two other diviſions of the army were put in motion at the ſame inſtant with that under the command of Lieutenant Colonel DEARE. Major SKELLY, with his Majeſty's 52d regiment and two twelve-pounders, was ſent to command at Daraporam; and, in order to reduce the ſtrong fort

fort of Dindigul, Col. STUART advanced by the route of Yarriacottah with a detachment conſiſting of the 2d regiment of native cavalry, the 2d, 7th and 20th battalions of Carnatic native infantry, two companies of the 1ſt European Coaſt regiment, together with about two hundred men from the engineer and artillery departments, with ſix ſix-pounders and two mortars, under the immediate command of Lieut Colonel MOORHOUSE.

To render this corps the more competent to the preſent ſervice, Lieutenant HELASS of the coaſt eſtabliſhment, had been ſent to Carrore with four companies of the 2d battalion of native infantry, ſome days previous to the departure of Colonel STUART, in order to eſcort two iron eighteen pounders to Yarriacottah, at which place he had been directed to wait the orders of that officer (1). Captain ORAM, then on his way from

(1) "I have alſo the honour to acquaint you, that a detachment will march from Camp on "the 5th inſtant, under Lieutenant Colonel STUART, againſt Dindigul, which is to be ſup- "plied from Carrore, by order of the Commander in Chief, with two battering guns (iron "eighteen pounders) and two mortars; and, that Lieutenant HELASS marched from camp "yeſterday, with four companies of ſepoys in order to eſcort from Carrore the guns and mor- "tars for Lieutenant Colonel STUART's detachment.—Lieutenant HELASS has orders to be "at Carrore on or before the 9th inſtant, and to march on the 11th from thence with the "guns and mortars for Lieutenant Colonel STUART's detachment and to be at Yarriacottah "with them on the 15th inſtant. The Commanding Officer of artillery has been directed to make "the neceſſary arrangements for both detachments. A conductor of ſtores and gun laſcars, with a "proportion of bullocks, have in conſequence gone with Lieutenant HELASS, and what further is "required will go with Lieutenant Colonel STUART's detachments, or be provided from Carrore, "agreeable to the arrangements made by the Commanding Officer of artillery.—The General

Madura

Madura to camp, with the 22d Coaſt battalion and ſome recruits, was alſo ordered to join this detachment; but, as this officer was high in the confidence of his general, he had inſtructions to attempt the reduction of Dindigul on his advance either by ſurpriſe, by ſtratagem, or by negociation, according as circumſtances might render the enterprize adviſable (2). On this occaſion, however, diſcretion was recommended not leſs than zeal

"deſires that you will loſe no time in making the neceſſary preparations, depending upon "your command for the above detachment, and that you will provide the detachment of Lieu- "tenant HELASS with rice, to enable him to march from Carrore with ſeven day's proviſions, "as the two mortars have been added to the detail of ordnance for Lieutenant Colonel STU- "ART's detachment ſince Lieutenant HELASS marched from camp. I requeſt you will inform "Lieutenant HELASS of this circumſtance, that he may take the mortars as well as the eigh- "teen pounders under his charge.—Adjutant General to Captain PARR, 3d April, 1790.

(2) "From every account received by the Commander in Chief, it appears that Dindigul is "not ſtrongly garriſoned, but on the contrary, that the troops in it are few and ill diſciplined, "and the reports received from different quarters intimate, that TIPPOO has given orders to the "Killedar there to evacuate the place on the approach of the army; under this conſideration, "joined to the importance of the poſt, and the quantity of proviſions it is ſaid to contain, the "Commander in Chief deſires that you will endeavour to poſſeſs yourſelf of Dindigul, if the mea- "ſure appears to you practicable from the intelligence you may have received, or may receive "on the march. If you judge it practicable to ſeize the poſt by ſurpriſe, the Commander in Chief "will have no objection to your attacking it in that manner; but I am directed to acquaint you "at the ſame time, that while the Commander in Chief leaves it hereby in your option to at- "tempt to poſſeſs yourſelf of the poſt by ſurpriſe, or in any other manner you may judge prac- "ticable with the detachment under your command, he truſts as much to your diſcretion as to "your ſpirit, as he is equally anxious to guard againſt the conſequences of a failure in this "ſervice, as to obtain poſſeſſion of the poſt. You are therefore to conſider on this principle "the orders now ſignified. Should you judge it imprudent to attempt taking Dindigul by ſur- "priſe, the Commander in Chief deſires you will take a poſition near the fort and ſummon "it to ſurrender, provided the ſtrength of the garriſon, or of detachments of the enemy near "it are ſuch as to warrant the meaſure, and that you are to ſignify to the Commander of the "Fort, by the perſon you ſend in with the ſummons, that the Commander in Chief is deter- "mined to put the garriſon to the ſword, if it is not delivered up to you.—Should you ſucceed "in any attempt that puts you in complete poſſeſſion of the poſt of Dindigul, the Commander "in Chief deſires that you will remain in it with your detachment, until you receive his fur- "ther orders, and that you will communicate your ſucceſs without delay. I am deſired to "repeat to you the Commander in Chief's reliance not only on your gallantry, but on your "diſcretion in the execution of the orders now ſignified, and that if you cannot with prudence "attempt getting poſſeſſion of Dindigul you will ſo regulate your march as to join the army "by the moſt ſafe route."—Inſtructions to Captain ORAM, 25th July, 1790.

for the ſervice, and with propriety, for the ſtrength of the hill, together with the incorruptible integrity and reſolution of the Killedar, diſcovered that all expectation of reducing the fort, by any other means than by regular approaches, had been founded on falſe intelligence.

On reconnoitering Dindigul, Captain ORAM diſcovered that it had undergone conſiderable repairs and improvements ſince the late war; the wall of the upper fort had been almoſt wholly rebuilt; inſtead of two baſtions which was all it then had, eight were now completed; three ciſterns that had been repaired by the directions of SAHID SAHIB ſupplied it with abundance of water; and, as the upper and lower forts, contained from ſix to ſeven hundred fighting men without any ſcarcity of cannon, ammunition, or proviſions, it was judged adviſable not to hazard an attack.

Agreeably to his inſtructions Captain ORAM ſummoned the Killedar, HYDER ABBAS, to ſurrender the fort; he proteſted that private property ſhould not be touched, that the troops ſhould be eſcorted through the late acquired territories into whatever part of Myſore they preferred,

ferred, and denounced at the ſame time the Commander in Chief's determination to put the garriſon to the ſword, ſhould they perſiſt in a wanton and uſeleſs defence. This ſummons was ſent by a Subadar.

The haughty Mahomedan although he deigned to ſend a verbal reply, could not be prevailed on to keep the letter. "Tell your Officer, that it is not poſſible "to account to my Prince, for the ſurrender of a "fort like Dindigul, therefore, if any other perſon "comes on that errand, I will blow him from a "cannon."

Notwithſtanding the difficulties that aroſe from great improvements in the fortification of Dindigul, as well as from its natural ſtrength, the ſervice was ſo vigorouſly proſecuted, that by dint of perſeverance and extreme fatigue, all the ordnance of the detachment opened againſt the walls on the morning of the 20th, from batteries that had been erected to the northward of the Pettah, within five hundred yards of the hill. Embrazures, however, that had been opened for two guns on the 21ſt would not bear on the breach, yet, although there was an inceſſant fire kept by the fort upon the parapet, it was taken down, and by ten o'clock, the

whole of the heavy cannon had their proper direction.

Two additional iron eighteen pounders now arrived under the eſcort of Lieutenant JOHN TAYLOR, with ſome European artillery from Carrore; and the cannonade which laſted for two days, though anſwered by the fort, with conſiderable effect, made a breach of ſome extent in that part of the work which was viſible to the beſiegers; but, as the nature of the hill concealed about ſix feet in height from the foundation of the wall, ſo much of it remained intire. Several circumſtances at this time induced Lieutenant Colonel STUART to determine on a ſtorm, of which he directed that Major SKELLY ſhould take the lead.

A ſerjeant and twelve, ſupported by Lieutenant EVANS, with thirty men, in equal proportions from the grenadiers of the 52d regiment, from the light infantry of that corps, and from the fourth European coaſt regiment, compoſed the forlorn hope. After this diviſion, the European flank companies, together with the 2d and 22d Coaſt battalions, advanced in ſucceſſion. The onſet was reſolute and fierce. The reception was determinate and bloody. Attack ſucceeded attack with freſh and redoubled fury; but the Killedar inured to danger,

danger, and not to be ſurpaſſed in valour, headed his beſt troops at the breach, which was further defended by muſquetry from a turrett at one extremity, and from the flank of a baſtion at the other, neither of which defences had been hurt; a number of pikemen too ſtood ready to puſh down whoſoever obtained the top of the wall. Animated by the example of their leader, again and again, the aſſailants repeated their efforts; yet the deſperate reſiſtance of the garriſon ſupported by various advantages from nature and art, rendered it neceſſary to abandon the deſign of carrying Dindigul by ſtorm, for a time. The party conſequently foiled, remained in the ditch of the lower fort, leaving the gallant Mahomedan in poſſeſſion of his ſhattered yet well defended ramparts.

Towards ten o'clock, Major SKELLY judiciouſly directed that Captain ORAM who had the immediate command of the native troops ſhould advance ſome companies up the hill. The ready execution of this order prevented the enemy from ſtrengthening the defences at the breach by keeping up a conſtant and well directed fire during the night. About four o'clock in the morning, this party was withdrawn, and the

the whole diviſion, diſappointed of their object retired to camp. Abandoned by a great part of his garriſon during the night, the Killedar with the light of the enſuing day expoſed a white flag on the breach in token of a diſpoſition to ſurrender (1). Terms of capitulation moderate yet honorable being readily granted, Captain BOWZER with two companies of the firſt European Coaſt regiment was commanded to take charge of the fort (2).

At the time that Lieutenant Colonel STUART was thus occupied in reducing the poſts, which held the Polygars and others, that inhabited the ſouthern extremity of the SULTAUN's dominions in awe, Captain WAHAB with his own battalion was employed in collecting a ſupply of cattle and of grain, from the fer-

(1) Return of the killed and wounded of the detachment under the command of Lieut. Colonel STUART at Dindigul.—Killed, 1 Enſign, 2 Serjeants, 1 Corporal, 1 Matroſs, 2 Privates—Wounded, 1 Drummer, 18 Privates, 1 Havildar, 1 Laſcar, 9 Sepoys—Killed Enſign GEORGE DAVIDSON, 20th battalion.

(2) "The Commanding Officer congratulates the detachment on this days important acquiſition; which is intirely due to the impreſſion made by their ſpirit and activity on the minds of the enemy. His ſenſe of this, he will take the earlieſt opportunity of mentioning to the commander in chief, in terms the moſt honourable to all concerned. In the mean time he begs that Lieutenant Colonel MOORHOUSE will pleaſe to accept his warmeſt thanks for the judgement and perſeverance with which he conducted the attack of the place, and in which he was perfectly ſeconded by the Artillery Officers and men under his command. Major SKELLY will be pleaſed to accept his beſt acknowledgement for the exertion made by him and the ſtorming party under his command laſt night: and he is confident nothing but the unuſual difficulties, that oppoſed themſelves to an aſſault, which circumſtances made it neceſſary at all events to attempt, could have prevented its intire ſucceſs."—Detachment Orders—Dindigull 22nd Auguſt 1790.

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tile and extenſive diſtricts, that were held in ſubjection by the vicinity of theſe ſtrong holds.

Whither the cruel treatment of inferiors attributed to the SULTAUN, be real, or exaggerated, or altogether imaginary (3), it is certain that his ſubjects in this quarter yielded to a change of Government with a degree of reluctance, ſeldom exhibited by the inhabitants of Eaſtern countries. After a careful concealment of all grain and other valuable articles in pits dug into the earth, they abandoned their houſes removing at the ſame time their cattle of whatſoever deſcription, yet the fertility of the ſoil and the dexterity of the natives in ſearching, rendered it impoſſible to prevent the invaders from procuring conſiderable ſupplies. In traverſing theſe diſtricts, Captain WAHAB experienced but little oppoſition. Chucklegurry alone ventured to reſiſt. The Polygars of this fort, about four hundred in num-

(3) "If a farmer neglecting the cultivation of his farm, and ſuffering the lands to lay waſte, ſhall impoſe fines upon the Ryuts and make undue exactions from them, to enable him to fulfil his own engagements, he ſhall be made to pay to Government the amount of ſuch undue exactions over and above the ſtipulated rent; meaſures muſt alſo, in future, be adopted to prevent any perſon from levying oppreſſive fines, &c. from the Ryuts; and defaulters in this reſpect ſhall be made to pay the amount of ſuch exactions and be moreover fined themſelves."—Again—"Land which has lain fallow ten years, ſhall be delivered to Ryuts to cultivate upon Cowle; the firſt year they ſhall be exempt from paying any revenue, and the ſecond year they ſhall only pay half of the cuſtomary aſſeſſment, but the third year the full amount thereof ſhall be collected from them. Land which is barren, mountainous and rocky, ſhall alſo be given to the Ryuts to cultivate; and the firſt year they ſhall be intirely exempted from the payment of revenues; the ſecond year they ſhall be aſſeſſed at only a fourth of the uſual rates, and the third year at one half, but the fourth year they ſhall be aſſeſſed at the full rate."—Myſorean Revenue Regulations, p. 4-6 & 7.

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ber, confident from the ſtrength of the place, inſiſted on certain terms; but as theſe did not at all infringe on the principles that the General had adopted with reſpect to the garriſons of the enemy in the low countries, they obtained his ready conſent (1). Pyny, Collumbrum, Colaveram, Animally, with various inferior poſts ſurrendered without oppoſition.

After ſome neceſſary arrangements had been adjuſted the detachment that had reduced Dindigul marched againſt Palligautcherry by the route of Daraporam (2). In order to inſure ſpeedy ſucceſs to this deſign, it was judged adviſable to reinforce Lieutenant Colonel

(1) "The General Orders that you allow the inhabitants of the hill fort of Chucklegurry "to carry off their private effects on their delivering up the fort. TRIMULROW is directed to "ſend a party to take poſſeſſion of it; and you are to give it over in charge to the perſons "TRIMULROW will appoint. I am directed by the General to obſerve, that he expects the hill "fort of Chucklegurry will be given up immediately on the Killedar's being acquainted that "the terms of ſecurity to private property are admitted."——Adjutant General to Captain WAHAB, 25th Aug. 1790.

(2) "The General approves in the moſt extenſive ſenſe of the word, of the whole of "your conduct in the attack of Dindigul, and in every other reſpect, but is extremely "concerned to hear of your indiſpoſition, and deſires that you will not think of farther fa"tigue immediately, unleſs you find yourſelf in every reſpect equal to it. He wiſhes you "to carry towards Palligautcherry as much ſhot, ſtores and grain, as you can poſſibly find "conveyance for, and that you will be at Palligautcherry as ſoon as you can conveniently "arrange matters. What may farther be neceſſary, beſides what is with your preſent detach"ment, will meet you there from this quarter; and, the General begs you will let me "know the probable day of your arrival at Palligautcherry, that whatever is ſent from here "may arrive there the day after your detachment. The route is left intirely to your own "judgement. As the General is deſirous to keep his original field force as complete as "poſſible, he wiſhes you to let me know your opinion as to the garriſon that will be required "for Dindigul in order that a proportion of troops for the purpoſe may be drawn from Tri"chinopoly, Madura, or Palamcottah, either to Dindigul or to join the army in the room of "thoſe left in Dindigul."—Adjutant General to Lieutenant Colonel STUART, 27th Auguſt 1790.

STUART

STUART with the flank companies of the 71ſt and 72d regiments, with eight companies of the 14th battalion of native infantry, and with four battering pieces of cannon, eighteen pounders. The other two companies of Captain WAHAB's battalion had been ſtationed at Warriore and Madoogery under Enſign SHAW, on purpoſe to protect the cattle of the army whilſt grazing, and, as theſe ſeveral detachments had conſiderably weakened the line, it was judged adviſable to continue Enſign SHAW on that ſervice for a time. KISTNA and PRUMAUL, two of the enemy's ſpies, who had been taken on the former attempt againſt Palligautcherry, attended this force; their lives having been forfeited, it was natural to ſuppoſe that they would endeavour to redeem them by ſome eſſential diſcovery.

The batteries opened againſt Palligautcherry on the morning of the 21ſt September, with ſuch juſt aim and ſcientific effect, that the guns of the fort had not only been ſilenced, but before night a practicable breach was reported (2). Lieutenant Colonel STUART had by this

(2) From the following account of this ſiege I find occaſion to differ but little. It was evidently written on the ſpot, and with the very beſt intentions. On that account it is after the moſt careful enquiry and correct information that I venture to deviate in a few particular points from the narrative of that writer.——"Palligautcherry, September 22d.—The batteries againſt Pal"ligatcherry opened yeſterday morning between ſix and ſeven o'clock, and in an hour after, the

time obſerved, that part of the glacis, from a defect in its conſtruction, would afford cover from the fire of the Fort. In order to favor a ſtorm, and to benefit as much as poſſible by this diſcovery, Major SKELLY, then on duty in the lines, was directed to form a lodgement, under this cover before break of the enſuing day. In the mean time, Captain ORAM, with Lieutenant MACKENZIE of the Coaſt engineers, who had both been here in the courſe of the former war; attended Lieutenant Colonel MOORHOUSE in the early part of the night to reconnoitre, and to ſhew him the bed of a tank where a party might be lodged in front of the workmen. The Colonel return-

" enemy's guns were ſilenced; by four in the afternoon a practicable breach was made in the " curtain of the eaſt face; and at two o'clock this morning, after ſeizing the outwork by ſur- " priſe, the Killedar called for Coule, and agreed to ſurrender the fort."——The following cir- " cumſtances accelerated the fall of the place:—" Colonel STUART having ſeen, that " part of the glacis oppoſite to the north extremity of the eaſt face of the fort, was " raiſed high, with little or no ſlope, and would probably afford perfect cover from " the guns of the fort, directed Major SKELLY who was field officer of the day, to " endeavour to get poſſeſſion of it during the night, or rather juſt before day-break in " the morning, when his party might be ſupported by the fire of the batteries—That " part of the glacis adjoined the Sortie or gateway of the covert-way, and on the other, the " ſouth ſide of the gateway, was a ruined circular work, which had been raiſed high and " protected both the Sortie and the hollow under the glacis beyond it from the flank fire of " one of the two baſtions on the middle, and one on the ſouth-eaſt angle of that face— " The high part of the glacis and the gateway, which was directly oppoſite to the " breach, were of courſe the parts fixed on for the lodgement. Captain ORAM of the " 22d battalion, and Lieutenant MACKENZIE of the Engineers, who were both here " formerly, and knew the place, went to reconnoitre in the evening, and not only " found that the men were all withdrawn from the covert-way; but, imagined from the " great ſilence, that the garriſon had deſerted the fort—They even called out, and nobody an- " ſwered or ſeemed to hear them—Captain ORAM went immediately and mentioned theſe cir- " cumſtances to Major SKELLY, who was at the north battery and field officer of the trenches— " He conſulted alſo with Captain WAHAB of the 14th battalion, who was on duty and com- " manded the native troops in the trenches; he agreed in the propriety of ſeizing the favorable

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ed to camp to iſſue ſome neceſſary directions; but the other two gentlemen, joined by Lieutenant MEULH of the Madras Eſtabliſhment, proceeded with extreme caution to the creſt of the glacis, where, on looking into the covered way, they diſcovered that the enemy had retired from thence, and imagined from the dead ſilence which prevailed that the garriſon had evacuated the fort. They repeatedly called aloud, but no one

" opportunity, and inſtantly went down with one of the grenadier companies of the 2d bat- " talion of ſepoys, and took poſſeſſion not only of the high part of the glacis and gateway, " but alſo of the circular work. Major SKELLY followed in a few minutes with three more " grenadier companies of ſepoys, and half a company of the 52d regiment; the other " half that was at work ſoon followed. The company of the 2d battalion was diſcovered and " fired on from the fort; but returned the fire, and kept their ground with great ſteadineſs " till the reſt of the party came up and enabled them to maintain the lodgement. Lieutenant " MACKENZIE with the pioneers and working parties, with gabions and faſcines alſo came " up from the eaſt battery, and in the face of an inceſſant fire of muſquetry and frequent diſ- " charges from a gun on a baſtion immediately oppoſite, ſoon converted the top of the glacis " into a parapet, cloſed up the gateway and the gorge of the circular work ſix feet high, " made a platform of the gate, and in four hours, by midnight, an eighteen pounder was " firing from the gateway, as through the port hole of a ſhip, laying open the breach, and " from end to end raking the fort. The four mortars were alſo brought down and chucked " the ſhells over with inevitable effect. The fire of our muſquetry from the glacis and the " circular work at length overcame that of the enemy, and at three o'clock in the morning, " juſt as the gorge of the circular work was ready to receive two more eighteen pounders " which Major MOORHOUSE had ordered for the eaſt battery; we unexpectedly heard a " man cry out Coule, and deſired to treat. The terms of protection from the Nairs, ſecurity " to perſons and property granted.—Our men were admitted into the covert-way, and in the " morning the garriſon aſſiſted us to get the plank over the ditch, which had ſerved them as a " bridge, and had been thrown down in the afternoon, on withdrawing their parties from the " covertway. At ſix in the morning the companies of grenadier Sepoys, who had behaved " ſo ſteadily during the night, marched over this bridge in great triumph and with ſtill more " eaſe, marched into the body of the place through the breach. When the troops entered " the fort, the Killedar JEMEH KHAN, a Pitan, was ſeated in his Durbar, in great ſtate, " oppoſite to the parade, and ſeemed to expect that Major SKELLY was to come and " make his Salaam to him. He was allowed to ſit ſtill, till all the guards were poſted, " and after an explanation with ſome of his people whom he ſent out, he at length came " himſelf and apologized for his conduct, by ſaying he did not know our cuſtums.—He " had been wounded in his ſword hand, is a very athletic ſtout man, and no doubt a perſon " of reputation in TIPPOO's Army. His garriſon, he ſays, conſiſted of 400 fighting men, and " 200 Pioneers, but they were not ſo brave as he could have wiſhed them; he ſays, he had ſix

made anſwer. Captain ORAM's voice was however heard at a battery where Captain WAHAB was then on duty. That Officer immediately advanced with the grenadier company of the 2d Coaſt battalion and took poſſeſſion of the glacis, barrier, and of a high circular outwork which commanded the other defences in this quarter. Major SKELLY, field officer on duty, to whom Captain ORAM had ſent early information of theſe tranſactions inſtantly arrived, and on examining the poſts that had been obtained, he determined to maintain the lodgement, and directed that three companies of ſepoys, and one of the 52d regiment, ſhould immediately be called for that purpoſe.

The fort, which by this time had taken the alarm, kept up a briſk fire, but the ſepoy grenadier company maintained their ground with much ſteadineſs until

" or eight killed, and eight or ten wounded, but his killed muſt have been conſiderably more, " as we found ſeveral dead bodies on the ramparts, and in different places, of whom he did not " know. Our loſs during the the ſiege is only one Serjeant, and two Sepoys, killed in the " trenches by cannon ſhot; and Enſign MACMILLAN, of the 52d regiment, three privates " of that regiment, and three Sepoys wounded laſt night, but none of them dangerouſly. " The fort is quadrangular, a ſmall but neat place; none of the faces 200 yards in length " the rampart, berm, ditch and covertway, all remarkably good and broad, particularly the " ditch which is alſo very deep, and without the aſſiſtance of the garriſon would have coſt " us both time and trouble to paſs. The fort is wretchedly provided with guns and military " ſtores, and has nothing in it of any value, except 200,000 muſket bullets, and proviſions for " 1000 men for two Months. Among ſome of the Killedar's papers, delivered over with " the public accounts, is a letter from TIPPOO ordering him, to make Muſſelmen of all " the Nairs and Infidels in this diſtrict, which has the following emphatical concluſion. In " ſhort, you are by every exertion of judgement and policy, whether by violence or by " conſent, to make a Muſſulman of every infidel in your diſtrict."—Periodical Publications of the time.

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the arrival of the reinforcement enabled them to ſecure the lodgement. Enſign MACPHERSON of the 52d regiment, who acted as an aſſiſtant engineer, having brought up the workmen, in a few hours converted the gateway into an embraſure from which an eighteen pounder raked the fort with irreſiſtible effect. By three o'clock in the morning, two other guns of the ſame calibre were ready to open from the gorge of the circular work, but the enemy intimidated further by a conſtant diſcharge of ſhells from four mortars and by vollies of muſquetry, requeſted permiſſion to ſurrender (1). Terms nearly ſimilar to thoſe allowed to the garriſon of Dindigul were granted on this occaſion, and poſſeſſion was taken of Palligautcherry early in the morning. Here, a conſiderable quantity of grain, and other articles fell to the captors. It was directed that all the iron battering guns ſhould remain in the fort. The 2d and 22d Coaſt battalions were ordered for its garriſon; and, as capacity for the arrangement

(1) It is ſomewhat extraordinary that this ſtrong hold ſhould be reduced at this period by means ſo nearly ſimilar to thoſe by which it fell in the former war, " At night, Captain " MAITLAND, with a part of the four flank battalions under his command, took advantage " of a heavy rain to drive the beſieged from the covert way. He was ſo fortunate as to " ſucceed, and purſued them within the firſt and as far as the ſecond gateway; there he was " ſtopped; but maintained his ground with great ſpirit and ability until an addition of " troops arrived. The enemy was ſo much alarmed with this mode of attack; that they ca- " led out for quarter, and put us in poſſeſſion of a fort capable of making a long and deſ- " perate reſiſtance."—Ful. on India, p. 298.

of

of the ſupplies that muſt be drawn from the Palligautcherry diſtrict was not leſs neceſſary than experience and military talents. The command was beſtowed on Captain WAHAB.

Whilſt the ſucceſsful and meritorious exertions of Lieutenant Colonel STUART, of Lieutenant Colonel OLDHAM, and of Major SKELLY, deprived the SULTAUN of the territory which had until now remained in his poſſeſſion in the low countries to the ſouthward of the Bevanee and Cauvery rivers (1), the detachments that SAHID SAHIB advanced to ravage the country in his front met with perpetual rebuffs. Of theſe, the moſt conſiderable were oppoſed by Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD, by Major AFFLECK, and by Lieutenant BAILLIE, all of his Majeſty's 19th light dragoons, on occaſions diſtinct, both as to time and ſituation.

On the 16th of Auguſt, Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD with a corporal and ſix dragoons ſet out from his encampment at Shawore towards a troop that had been ſent on detachment in courſe of the foregoing day, under Lieutenant HUDDLESTONE. On the Colonel's arrival at Oucarro, he had intelligence that a body of the enemy's horſe plundered the country, and advanced to attack the detachment. With twelve file from the troop and his own original eſcort, Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD proceeded in queſt of this enemy, he diſcovered their advance within one hundred yards of the village of Oucarro, and by an immediate and reſolute charge, he put the whole body of the enemy to flight. Subadar CAWDER BEG with MAHOMED HOOSSEIN, of DARLEY's regiment, particularly diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their gallantry on this occaſion (2).

Four days after this ſkirmiſh, Major AFFLECK having under his command two troops of dragoons, and an equal number from DARLEY's regiment, had been abroad to ſcour the country, and to avenge whatever injuries had been done to the inhabitants. The party had advanced but an inconſiderable diſtance when it fell in with a large body of the enemy's horſe whom they

(1) "The rich tract that lies below the mountains of Myſore, extending from Carrore to "Coimbatore, and from the bottom of the hills to the confines of Madura and Trichinopoly. "A country abounding in every kind of production for the ſupport of armies, and which may "be conſidered as a chain of magazines eſtabliſhed by TIPPOO SULTAUN for the invaſion of "the ſouthern provinces, in the ſame manner as the Baramaul country may be conſidered as "affording him the means of invaſion on the eaſt."—Ful. on India, p. 112.

(2) "The Commander in Chief is highly delighted with the decided and ſpirited manner in "which you ſo ſucceſsfully attacked the ſuperior numbers of the enemy's horſe, that appeared "on your arrival near Oucarro, and has ſome hopes that before you receive this, you may "have recovered the three horſes from the ſudden manner in which the enemy retired to the "oppoſite ſide of the river. The General alſo notices with much ſatisfaction your report of "the good conduct of Subadar CAWDER BEG and MAHOMED HOOSSEIN, of Darley's regi"ment."—Adjutant General to Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD, Auguſt 18, 1790.

they inſtantly attacked with ſpirit and ſucceſs (1). The fugitives that eſcaped were indebted for ſafety to their uſual habit of flying in all directions. Upwards of forty were cut to pieces, but as their horſes were trained to puſh for camp on the fall of their riders, twenty only could be caught.

Not many days after this ſkirmiſh, Lieutenant HUDDLESTONE whilſt he reconnoitred in front of the encampment, fell unexpectedly on a conſiderable body of SAHID SAHIB's horſe that lurked on the ſouthern banks of the Bevanee river. Theſe he immediately attacked and repulſed, but ſupported by a body ſtill larger, they faced about, and attempted not only to ſurround the troop, but threatened to cut of its retreat. In the mean time, news of theſe untoward circumſtances had reached the encampment. The picquets which conſiſted of one troop of the 19th light dragoons and two of native cavalry under the command of Lieutenant BAILLIE, ruſhed on to the relief of Lieutenant HUDDLESTONE, they cut in amongſt a large body of the enemy's horſe and put them to the route; they drove the

(1) "The General is exceedingly pleaſed with the report of your propoſed operations againſt "Sattimungulum and Demiacottah, and of the ſucceſs of the party under Major AFFLECK. "The General aſſures himſelf that every thing will continue to be conducted in the beſt and "moſt ſpirited manner."—Adjutant General to Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD, 22 Auguſt, 1790.

fugitives

fugitives headlong into the river which was both deep and rapid, and, having completely effected their deſign, both parties returned in ſafety to camp.

Whilſt the cavalry were engaged in theſe ſkirmiſhes againſt SAHID SAHIB's diviſion. Lieutenant Colonel OLDHAM and Major YOUNGE were employed on the important ſervice of filling the Magazine at Erroad (1). In order to benefit further by the exertions and experience of Colonel OLDHAM, in this capacity, he had in-

(1) "I am directed to ſignify to you from the commander in chief, that his firſt object at "preſent is to lodge in Erroad as much rice as can poſſibly be conveyed to that ſtation, from "Carrore and Trichinopoly, or from any other quarter, and that your detachment is to be em- "ployed until further orders in furniſhing eſcorts for that purpoſe. As Erroad will be chiefly "ſupplied with rice from Carrore and Trichinopoly, (and from Tanjore, via Trichinopoly) you "are directed to conſider Carrore as the head quarters of your detachment, it being a central "ſituation, in communication with the poſts of Trichinopoly and Erroad from whence the ne- "ceſſary eſcorts may be moſt conveniently furniſhed. In order to accompliſh the object ſo ear- "neſtly deſired by the commander in chief, as far as it can be done, by the bullocks that went "from camp with your detachment, you are directed to furniſh an eſcort to Erroad for the bul- "locks that can be loaded with rice at Carrore, on receipt of this letter, and to ſend another "eſcort to Trichinopoly with thoſe that cannot be loaded at Carrore, provided you learn from "Mr. GORRY that bullocks cannot be ſupplied from Trichinopoly, agreeably to the expectations "of the commander in chief, in conſequence of the inſtructions ſent to Mr. GARROW. "It is to be obſerved, that bullocks ſent to Erroad are invariably to be returned to Carrore "after they have delivered their loads, in order to be employed as often as poſſible, in com- "pleting the depoſit, intended to be placed in Erroad. I have furniſhed Mr. KINGSCOTE, "and the officers commanding the poſts of Trichinopoly, Carrore, and Erroad, with a copy of "this letter, in order that the neceſſary arrangements may be made on their part in communi- "cation with you and all other parties concerned for promoting with method and diſpatch "every matter connected with the important object of placing a depoſit of rice at Erroad. "Although the article of rice only is mentioned in the above inſtructions from the Comman- "der in Chief, I am directed to ſignify that you are to conſider every other article in Mr. "KINGSCOTE's department to be protected and eſcorted between Trichinopoly and Erroad, "by the detachment under your command. I am directed to add, that as the recovered men "of the ſick left at Trichinopoly, may be uſefully applied to leſſen the detail of eſcort from "your detachment, it will be adviſable for you to communicate immediately on that head with "the Officer commanding there."—Inſtructions to Major YOUNGE, Auguſt 11, 1790.

 ſtructions

ſtructions to continue in the collection of what grain the adjacent diſtricts could afford, and, at the ſame time, to ſend a detachment conſiſting of the 5th and 25th battalions of native infantry, with one eighteen, two twelve, and two ſix pounders, under Major CUPPAGE, to Allicooly, to co-operate with the cavalry in the reduction of Sattimungulum and Demiacottah (1). The 16th battalion of native infantry had been alſo ordered to the ſame place a few days previous to the march of this detachment. Theſe three battalions, the 19th light dragoons, the 2d and 5th regiment of native cavalry, with all the artillery of this corps, croſſed the Bevanee on the 26th of Auguſt under the command of Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD. Sattimungulum was immediately ſummoned to ſurrender, but the Killedar

(1) "As Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD happens to be ſenior to you, and as his original orders carried him with the cavalry to explore the country between Coimbatore and the Bevanee, and to the fords on that river, in communication with Sattimungulum and Demiacottah, on which ſervice he has advanced part of the cavalry towards the river oppoſite to Sattimungulum, the General has thought it more adviſable to leave the operations againſt Sattimungulum and Demiacottah to Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD's direction, without ſubjecting you to the command of an immediate ſuperior, while the ſervice does not render the meaſure neceſſary. For this reaſon, as well as to have the benefit of your arrangements and exertions, for accompliſhing the important object of placing a depôt in Erroad, and, until a large proportion of our force is advanced to the north ſide of the Bevanee, the General has thought proper to direct the detachment from your force to proceed under Major CUPPAGE, and to act under the orders of Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD, and deſires me to acquaint you that he hopes two battalions with the aſſiſtance of the cavalry, will be ſufficient for the operations that will fall to be carried into execution at preſent at Sattimungulum and Demiacottah, and that whatever part of Major CUPPAGE's detachment is left on this ſide the river, may be uſefully employed in protecting the eſcorts of grain, which it will probably be found adviſable to draw from Erroad to Sattimungulum and Demiacottah."—Adjutant General to Lieutenant Colonel OLDHAM, 20th Auguſt, 1790.

heſitated

heſitated on the meaſures that he ought to adopt. In the mean time, Captain STEWART, who had been ſent with his battalion in advance, diſcovered that the troops on guard at one of the gates had abandoned their poſt. Of this circumſtance he neglected not for a moment to take advantage. He ruſhed into the body of the work, and by this ſudden and judicious movement he obtained poſſeſſion of the fort without loſs of blood.

Although the troops in the field had hitherto ſubſiſted, in a conſiderable degree, at the expenſe of the enemy, ſuch were the exertions of the reſpective commanders, that grain had been collected in the ſeveral Magazines, ſufficient for upwards of one year's conſumption; the draught and carriage cattle of the army, from the rich verdure that covered the whole face of the country, had completely got the better of their fatigue; and, the cavalry horſes, fattened with luxuriant choulum, rejected all grain and enriched the contractors.

To account for the high ſtate of cultivation at which Coimbatore had arrived will be found a leſs arduous than intereſting taſk. The mountains called Ghauts, whilſt

they deeply indent the plains at ſeveral diſtinct points, do not terminate, but, in their range they frequently advance and recede without any break or diminution of height: conſequently, they give riſe to an incredible number of ſtreams. The Cauvery, the Bevany, and the Noel rivers, too; from their interſection of the country in ſo many different directions; from the various branches that are forced out of them into ſeparate and diſtinct channels, as well as from the ſupply of water that they receive from a double monſoon, contribute in a high degree to the fertility of the ſoil, and, though the religious tenets of the Bramins have a ſtrong tendency to forward cultivation, the moral and political doctrines of that ſect are not leſs calculated to encourage agriculture.

Quiet, ſober, diligent, and abſtemious, though corrupt as vice can make him with reſpect to ſome other duties, the Hindoo ryut more then compenſates for the want of that active induſtry which characteriſes the chriſtian huſbandman, by a degree of patient perſeverance unknown amongſt the inhabitants of other countries; accuſtomed through every ſtage of life to bend his body or to ſquat upon the ground, he readily becomes an excellent

excellent cultivator of the earth, and, from the minute attention with which he regards whatſoever is the object of his purſuit, no weed is ſo trifling as to eſcape his obſervation, no tendril ſo concealed as to avoid his reſearch. The land, too, as if grateful for ſuch extraordinary attention, yields a return beyond any equal ſpace on the ſurface of this globe. Without any manure whatſoever, and ſolely dependant on water to fertilize the ſoil, Hindoſtan, in general, produces two, three, and ſometimes four harveſts (1). Tanjore annually produces five, nay ſix ſucceſſive crops have been reaped in that country. But, though faſcinated beyond all meaſure by theſe bewitching ſcenes, by theſe choice gifts of nature and of induſtry, ſtill, as the deſcription of them is in ſome degree foreign to the preſent deſign, it muſt give way to the continuation of military operations.

With what anxiety and concern the SULTAUN beheld his moſt valuable and productive territories, thus

(1) "Moſt of the rivers of Bengal have their banks cultivated with rice, of which there are a "variety of ſpecies, the ſoil is ſo fertile in ſome places, that a ſingle grain of rice will yield "a meaſure of two or three ſeers. Some land will produce three crops a year, vegetation is "here ſo extremely quick, that as faſt as the water riſes, the plants of rice grow above it, ſo "that the ear is never immerſed. Men of experience affirm, that a ſingle ſtalk will grow ſix "cubits in one night."—Again—"The ſtalks of rice riſe as faſt as the water, unleſs the inun-"dation be very rapid before the grain is in the ear, in which caſe the crops are deſtroyed." Ayeen Akberry, vol. 2, p. 9-40.

wreſted

wreſted out of his poſſeſſion, can be better conceived than conveyed by any communication of thought. The fall of Sattimungulum having deprived him of all acceſs to Coimbatore but by the ford of Poongar, he boldly determined to deſcend the ghauts, at the Guzzlehatty paſs, and to try his fortune on the plains before that ford ſhoud be alſo occupied. Widely different was the army that he aſſembled for this purpoſe and reviewed in the beginning of Auguſt at Seringapatam from that with which he invaded Travancore in the foregoing December. Yet, the difference was ſtill more wide between the corps that he had now to encounter and his antagoniſts on the former occaſion. However, in expectation of bringing about by ſtratagem and fineſſe, what he was unable to accompliſh by force of arms, he put his troops in motion as ſoon as he had ſatisfied himſelf with their equipment.

Until this period of the war none of thoſe calamities that invariably tarniſh Mahomedan invaſions had extended their baneful influence to the low countries. Conqueſt was not diſgraced with murder or rapine. Whatſoever tended to bring diſcredit on the cauſe met with condign puniſhment. Humanity, the conſtant attendant

attendant on Proteſtant armies, circulated with free ſcope. Mercy and mildneſs ſoftened the hardſhips that the neceſſity of the times had inflicted upon the people; they cheriſhed the peaceful huſbandman that could not be completely protected, and cloſely accompanying the anxious and watchful care with which the new ſubjects had been treated, they convinced them that nothing neceſſary to their happineſs ſhould ſuffer the moſt diſtant neglect (1).

(1) "Conciliation, to the Company's Government, of the inhabitants of the country "through which your detachment marches, muſt be of eſſential ſervice, not only as it relates "to ſupplies of proviſions of every deſcription, but to procuring intelligence of the force "and ſituation of the enemy. The Commander in Chief, enjoins your utmoſt attention to "that object, by maintaining ſtrict diſcipline among the troops and followers of the detach"ment, and by indulgent treatment to the natives. The Commander in Chief thinks it "will be an adviſable meaſure, on account of the natural timidity of the natives, to adv nce "a few companies of Sepoys, under an intelligent Officer, a days march at leaſt, in "front of the main body of your detachment, to cover the ſupplies the country affords, and "to prevent the inhabitants from deſerting their villag s on your approach, by aſſuring them "of protection and fair dealing in every tranſaction"—Inſtructions to Lieutenant Colonel OLDHAM, 1ſt Auguſt 1790.——"The General aſſures himſelf that you will maintain ſtrict "diſcipline amongſt the troops and followers of your detachment, and that indulgent treatment "of the natives will be attended to on the march."—Inſtructions to Major YOUNGE, 3d Auguſt 1790 ——"You are further directed from the Commander in Chief to maintain "ſtrict diſcipline among the troops and followers of your detachment, and to uſe every "exertion that the inhabitants may be treated with indulgence."—Inſtructions to Lieutenant HELASS, 2d Auguſt 1790.

CHAPTER

A SKETCH

OF THE WAR WITH

TIPPOO SULTAUN.

CHAPTER THE THIRD.

THE torrents of abuſe that have been poured forth by popular orators againſt their countrymen in the eaſt, to anſwer certain political purpoſes, can never be ſtemmed whilſt learned writers, through mere declamation, contribute to impreſs on the minds of the public vague ideas of oppreſſions, extortions, and other viola-

tions of good order unneceſſarily committed on the "harmleſs Hindoos."—"Happy would it be", ſays a learned profeſſor, "if any of the four European nations "who have, ſucceſſively, acquired extenſive territories "and power in India, could altogether vindicate itſelf "from having acted in this manner." As ſteams that find vent from alembicks catch fire at the approach of a light, and endanger the adjacent vats, ſo do theſe miſchievous allegations arreſt diſpoſitions prone to humanity and poiſon the minds of the people. Like mephitick fumes, that collect on water-butts in the holds of ſhips, they do no hurt whilſt in confinement; but the moment that the bung is ſtarted, the mariner muſt look to his candle.

How far other European nations can acquit themſelves of theſe cruel inſinuations, however neceſſary for them to declare, is wide from the ſubject of the preſent enquiry; all that is now intended, is to affirm with confidence, that although in the transfer of extenſive dominions from one people to another by conqueſt, it is impoſſible that many individuals, particularly amongſt the principal families, ſhould not ſuffer hardſhips; yet, no great revolutions were ever ſo ſtrongly

ly marked by humanity and general benevolence as thoſe effected by the Britiſh nation in India.

When crimes of ſuch deep hue come to light the perpetrators of them, muſt, at all times, be branded in civiliſed ſociety with a ſtamp of infamy; conſequently, allegations of that tendency, ought never to obtain belief until every prepoſſeſſion has been minutely ſifted; until every tendril of prejudice has been eradicated; until truth has been traced through every poſſible fibre; and until proof and conviction have been ſubſtantiated beyond the poſſibility of error. Indirect inſinuations of barbarity always wound more deeply than ſpecifick attacks, becauſe, their poignancy being artfully concealed, they evade all detection, and readily impoſe on the humane malicious preſumptions for poſitive proofs. It is not whether the natives of Hindoſtan enjoy more comfort under the Britiſh Government, than they did before their country had been viſited by ſtrangers of the Muſſelman perſuaſion, that can here determine. The point at iſſue is, whither their ſufferings have been increaſed or diminiſhed by the introduction of Chriſtians into India; and, whither the principles and practice of a Mahomedan or Chriſtian Government,

on a candid comparative view, are beſt calculated to render the Aborigines happy.

If a greater progreſs in ſcientifick knowledge and civiliſation; if perfect toleration in religion however diſſonant from reaſon and nature; if a certainty that their burdens have not been increaſed by their preſent rulers; and, if the conſideration that it is not Hindoos, but the followers of Mahomed, that have ſuffered by the conqueſts of the Chriſtians, can aſſiſt in fixing a juſt criterion for deciſion, there can be little room to heſitate.

Britiſh declaimers againſt their countrymen in India, will find it difficult to produce one inſtance of cruelty in the Eaſt, that does not owe its invention, either to the Aborigines themſelves or to their Mahomedan conquerors. They will find it difficult to prove, that a Briton has been at all privy to theſe barbarities, or that he has introduced others in their ſtead.

At the puniſhments that Hindoos inflict on their delinquents, the moſt hardened chriſtian would ſhudder; and at the inhuman villanies that they commit under the cloak of religion, his very hair would ſtand on end.

A deſpot that ſews up inferiors in raw-hides, on the ſuppoſition

ſuppoſition of offence, is not known among chriſtians. It is not to Britain that India is indebted for the invention of pinching with cloven bamboos the extremeties of the human frame; neither was the practice of burying a delinquent to the chin in an erect poſture, and of tantalizing with his cravings, by expoſing food and water at a ſhort diſtance, imported into India by Britons; ſtill more deteſtable to that people, muſt appear the abominable and cruel wretch, that deprives his father of exiſtence, as ſoon as he outlives the power of ſelf-maintenance, although the act from its frequency, attracts not the leaſt ſymptom of compaſſion among the "harmleſs Hindoos."

From whatſoever deluſion theſe unjuſt declamations prevail, it is a notorious fact, that one uniform attention to the dictates of humanity has invariably marked the footſteps of Britons, and the progreſs of their arms, from a CLIVE to a CORNWALLIS; and, thoſe who have ſerved in ſtations of reſponſibility are not to be told, that the fatigues of their appointment are conſiderably encreaſed by the vigilence neceſſary to prevent the natives from cruelly abuſing each other.

After a reſidence of many years in India, Mr. HOLWELL

WELL ſays, that the Gentoos, in general, are as degenerate, crafty, ſuperſtitious, litigious, and wicked a people, as any race of beings in the known world, if not eminently more ſo; and, in a letter from Colonel HARRIS to Captain PARR, whilſt in command of an out ſtation in the Coimbatore diſtrict, are the following words "As the natives holding a truſt or appointment are often impreſſed with ſentiments which lead them to practices highly unjuſtifiable, General MEDOWS places implicit confidence in your zeal and vigilance, to prevent, as much as poſſible, SAHAJE, from abuſing the truſt repoſed in him, either by oppreſſing the inhabitants by unuſual exactions, or by obſerving any conduct towards them that is repugnant to the dictates of humanity and juſtice" (1). Now, this very SAHAJE was ſo high in the eſtimation of the natives for humanity, that the ſame letter deprived NANA SUBIA of the truſt in queſtion notwithſtanding his being a man of fair repute; but, a ſincere wiſh to do away any part of that odium, which is ſo freely, wantonly, and unjuſtly laviſhed in the ſpeeches and writings of learned men, is offered in apology for a digreſſion, which may be cloſed with this remark, that it would be commendable in orators and authors, to meaſure their aſſertions by the teſt of eſtabliſhed facts, and not by the unfounded aſperſions of individuals foured into abuſe by diſappointment or diſcontent.

(1) "The black Agents, who manage the whole detail of collection in the different diſtricts, are eager to perpetuate oppreſſion, and to enforce unuſual meaſures by unprecedented means" —again—"If an individual native is incautious enough to diſplay his wealth, the Rajah's Miniſters ſeldom reſt till he is caught and plundered: whips, ſcourges, thumb ſcrews, and other inſtruments of Indian torture, are daily applied to the unhappy ſubjects in every Cutcherry, or court of juſtice, throughout the country."—Ful. on India, p. 248-53.——Inſtances out of number, might be adduced in confirmation of the text. During the Rohilla war, ample protection, afforded to the natives by the Britiſh troops under Colonel CHAMPION, availed them nothing. The inſtant the army advanced SUJAH-UL-DOWLA ravaged the country, plundered the inhabitants, cruelly abuſed their perſons, and after robbing them of all their jewels and other valuables, he ſet their villages on fire.

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The deſcent of the SULTAUN into the Coimbatore diſtrict was ſo ſudden, ſo ſilent, and ſo ſkilful in all reſpects, that it inſtantly occaſioned a very material change in the general aſpect of affairs. It laid open proſpects that threatened with diſaſtrous calamity the intereſts of Great Britain throughout the Carnatic. In a juſt balance it appeared, for a time, not only to render the war, at the beſt, tedious; but, evidently to outweigh all former ſucceſſes. It was a touchſtone to Britiſh proweſs.

That an enemy not ſhort of forty thouſand fighting men accompanied by double the number of followers, provided with an immenſe train of artillery, and ſupplyed with a conſiderable ſtock of proviſions, ſhould

deſcend

deſcend the ghauts at Guzzlehatty undiſcovered, muſt appear truly ſtrange, to ſuch as are at all acquainted with the nature of that paſs, and with the ſituation of the detachment in advance. But that they ſhould have croſſed the Bevany river, without any intimation of their approach, muſt have ſtruck the General as the leaſt probable of all improbable events. Of this picture whatſoever is maſterly appertains to the SULTAUN; and, until the diſcipline and valour of the troops are brought into view, the patriot that attempts to paint the ſcenes in their true colours, muſt for ever wiſh the firſt features veiled under a deep ſhade or thrown into a diſtant back-groud.

At two o'clock in the morning of the 13th September, Captain CHILD having under his command the picquet of his Majeſty's 19th light dragoons, and thoſe of the 2d and 5th regiments of native cavalry, was ordered to reconnoitre the country as far as the ford at Poongar, ſome miles diſtant from the encampment. A few hours afterwards the 5th regiment of native cavalry under the command of Major DARLEY, was alſo ordered to advance halfway to Poongar to ſupport the picquets if neceſſary, ſeveral large parties of the enemy had

had by this time croſſed the Bevanee, and towards break of day, Captain CHILD diſcovered a formidable body of horſe at a very inconſiderable diſtance. This was not a time to heſitate. An immediate and judicious charge ſecured to the picquets a ſafe and unmoleſted retreat.

Two roads lead from Sattimungulum to Poongar, one winds with the river, the courſe of the other is in a more direct line. The former was taken by Captain CHILD, but as Major DARLEY had no intimation thereof he followed the latter, and therefore did not fall in with the Picquets. The country through which theſe diviſions had to paſs is in a very high ſtate of cultivation, and, being almoſt wholly laid out in encloſures of from one to two hundred feet ſquare, bound by a cloſe milk hedge, the range of the eye is very confined.

The regiment had advanced but a few miles when about two hundred of the enemy's horſe were obſerved at a ſmall diſtance. A diſpoſition was rapidly made for attack and purſuit. From the nature of the country it became neceſſary to form into two diviſions; the one on the right was commanded by Lieutenant WILSON, the other by Major DARLEY; both advanced

to the charge, came up with the enemy, and put them to flight. The fugitives being moſtly diſmounted by the onſet, or ſlain by the ſword or carbine, few eſcaped, except ſuch as concealed themſelves among the buſhes, whilſt our loſs was trifling. Large bodies of horſe now appeared advancing from different directions; Major DARLEY therefore judiciouſly determined to take poſt on a height in his rear, where both flanks would be covered by a ſtrong hedge.

Having diſpatched a well mounted European Serjeant to Colonel FLOYD with intelligence, the Major ordered a ſquadron to cover whilſt the remainder of his corps paſſed a narrow defile to obtain the poſition which he intended to occupy. The ſquadron ſtood firm, and repulſing by the fire of their carbines a large body that threatened the regiment, the whole paſſed the defile in ſafety. Major DARLEY now formed his men on the ground that he determined to diſpute; and although their Virgin Swords were oppoſed to ten times their numbers, he had the ſatisfaction to witneſs the adroitneſs of a field day evolution, as well as the diſcomfiture of the Enemy.

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The advantage that diſcipline has over the bravery of individuals and the power of disjointed multitudes, never appeared more conſpicuous than on this occaſion. A corps of cavalry not exceeding three hundred in number, remained unbroken and unmoved in the face of from ſix to ſeven thouſand horſemen, equally armed, and as individuals nothing inferior in perſonal courage. Various movements were now made by the Myſorean horſe in order to induce Major DARLEY to alter his poſition; a ſmart fire was kept up on different parts of his regiment; nay, many Sirdars of the Sultaun's army in order to encourage their main body to advance, charged our Officers and periſhed in the attempt. Several, however, from their amazing dexterity in the management of their horſes had the good fortune to eſcape unhurt.

Under theſe circumſtances it is impoſſible to aſcertain the exact lapſe of time. In all probability, upwards of three quarters of an hour had paſſed, before the 3d regiment of native cavalry, commanded by Major STEVENSON was announced in the rear. The junction was at a period critical indeed, for it intimated that on this day the cavalry of the King and

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Company ſhould prevail decidedly over thoſe of the Sultaun. At a ſhort conference the two Majors determined that no time ſhould be loſt in charging the enemy; but, as DARLEY's had already undergone much fatigue, it was propoſed by Major STEVENSON that his regiment ſhould lead the attack. The picquets under Captain CHILD on their retreat to camp, attracted by the ſound of the muſquetry now approached the field of action, Colonel FLOYD was alſo ſeen at no great diſtance with the 19th light dragoons.

The enemy obſerving ſo many parties haſtening to the ſupport of their opponents, and conſcious of the ill ſucceſs they had already experienced againſt this ſmall body, gave up the conteſt. Conſequently they began to move off; ſtill, however, they preſerved order. Our cavalry advanced with ſpirit; came up with the fugitives, and purſued them with conſiderable ſlaughter. Two troops of the King's dragoons had got into an enclofure in which there was a large body of the SULTAUN's horſe without any paſſage for eſcape except that by which both parties had entered. In theſe troops there were ſeveral men that had ſeverely ſuffered in captivity after the late war; and, as they had it now in their power

power to ſatiate their reſentment, the opportunity was not neglected. The enemy made bold reſiſtance; yet the conteſt was ſoon decided by the nervous arm of the Britiſh dragoon. A ſtandard of Mahomed graced the victory, and with it upwards of five hundred brave Muſſelmen with moſt of their horſes, were for ever loſt to their prince, whilſt our ſufferings were confined to a few fleſh wounds.

For ſome days previous to this action, rumours of the SULTAUN's deſcent into the Coimbatore country, by the Guzzlehatty paſs, had circulated through the detachment. An immenſe cloud of duſt that rapidly approached the cavalry now confirmed theſe reports beyond a poſſibility of doubt. Indeed, it was too evident that great part of his infantry had even paſſed the river. It was therefore jugded proper to form a junction with the line, which had been already drawn up in order of battle upon a riſing ground in front of the encampment. The captured Horſes being ſecured, this meaſure was put into effect without any loſs of time.

In order to form a juſt conception of the conteſt at Sattimungulum, it may be neceſſary to convey ſome idea of the ground on which the detachment was encamped, of the

the adjacent river, and of the country in its neighbourhood. The fort of Sattimungulum, is ſituated in a plain on the Northern bank of the Bevanee, at the bottom of the mountains. From this fort a road about fifteen miles in length leads through the Guzzlehatty paſs into the kingdom of Myſore. An inflection of the river near to the ground of encampment, confined the motions of the detachment either to the front of the enemy, or to the road that leads to Coimbatore; and on the left there was a rock, the ground near to which had a craggy, rugged, and uneven ſurface.

About nine o'clock in the morning, three guns that had been brought down to the oppoſite bank of the river, opened upon our grand guard, which was immediately ordered to join the line. The SULTAUN by this meaſure, expected to attract the attention of the detachment whilſt his main body moved to attack our left in a quite different direction. A general diſpoſition was now made to reſiſt the advance of the enemy. The cavalry were poſted with their rear towards the rock already deſcribed; the Infantry extending the line to the right of the Cavalry, preſented a firm front to the SULTAUN; and, the baggage of the detachment under the protection of four

four troops of the 2d regiment commanded by Major PATTER, was with the Surgeons directed to take poſt behind the rock, and amongſt the ſtones.

From the cloſeneſs of the hedges with which that country abounds, the enemy brought ſix pieces of cannon to play on the line, without any intimation of their approach, until it was conveyed from their own mouths. The ordnance of our detachment made immediate anſwer; but as the quantity of ammunition would admit of no waſte; and as there was much reaſon to expect a length of ſerious and cloſe action, it was judged expedient not to contend with this enemy in what has been always conſidered his forte a diſtant cannonade. Unmoleſted therefore by Colonel DEARE, he rapidly brought more guns into play, and from the ſemicircular ſituation in which he placed them, it was evident that he was taking meaſures to ſurround the detachment. Various movements now became neceſſary to prevent the enemy from getting the range of our line.

Before two o'clock fifteen pieces of cannon remarkably well ſerved did much execution. The cannonade ſeemed principally directed againſt the 36th regiment, and many brave fellows of that corps were either ſeverely

wounded

wounded or killed on the ſpot: Nor did the Native infantry come off unhurt. It is impoſſible to aſcertain the exact number that fell on this occaſion; but, as the operations of the detachment were confined to a very ſmall ſpace of ground; as upwards of two hundred men were ſeverely wounded during the day; and, as in a cannonade the proportion of the ſlain to the wounded, is much greater than in muſquetry, the loſs muſt have been very conſiderable.

The Muſſelmen like the Grecians are averſe to warfare at night; experience had taught them that the exertions of Britons are clogged by no prejudices; and, to the dread of the bayonet alone muſt be attributed the retreat of the Sultaun with the ſun. Relinquiſhing at once all the advantages that he obtained during the day, he withdrew his guns towards Poongar, and diſcovered his motions by the hollow ſound of the Nagger.

Our infantry lay on their arms; our cavalry at the heads of their horſes; the night was exceeding dark, and copious ſhowers of rain poured from the heavens when at a council of war, held about twelve o'clock, it was determined to move towards Coimbatore without baggage or followers.

At

At this Council a different opinion was manfully ſupported. It was propoſed that the cavalry ſhould join General MEDOWS with all poſſible expedition, and that the infantry ſhould wait the arrival of the Army in the fort of Sattimungulum. It was argued that the ſurrender of that fort would abandon a link that muſt endanger the whole chain, and thereby ſubvert the entire plan of the campaign. This mode of reaſoning was however over-ruled. Some individual apprized of the reſolution that had been adopted, directed a favourite ſervant to eſcape, and not to attend to the baggage. The ſervant told the ſecret to his friend; he to another; in ſhort it was ſoon made known to all. A report of this nature never fails to circulate amongſt a people kept awake by fear.

A diligent ſearch for artificers in order to repair the carriages that had been damaged during the day proved fruitleſs: very few of them could be found. Some European ſoldiers however ſupplied the deficiency, and directed by the inventive genius of Brigade Major DALLAS, and the experience of the artillery Officers, the whole was reported ſervicable by one o'clock in the morning. From an unfortunate delay in the

evacuaion of Sattimungulum, it was four o'clock before the troops could be put in motion; and, from the deſtruction amongſt the gun bullocks by the cannonade, the eighteen pounder, one twelve, and one ſix pounder, were unavoidably left behind. The detachment had obtained as far as Occarro, diſtant about twelve miles from the late encampment, when it halted.

It was now about eleven o'clock, and the advance of TIPPOO's army was plainly perceived moving towards the right of our corps. The bullocks had undergone much fatigue; the other twelve pounder, four ſix pounders, with ſeveral tumbrils, were conſequently left behind: yet the Sultaun continued to gain ground on Colonel FLOYD. He opened a cannonade on the rear diviſions which did not ceaſe during a march of ſeveral miles. About four o'clock he had advanced his whole force ſo cloſe as to oblige Colonel OLDHAM to halt and form. The cavalry had by this time foraged in the neighbourhood of Shawore, nearly two miles in front of the infantry; and, as information had been ſent to Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD of what had taken place, he returned to the ſcene of action with all poſſible expedition. The battle raged with much fury; diſcipline was oppoſed to

to numbers; and, the enemy from having ſucceeded in an attempt on the baggage meditated a charge on the line.

As uſual, the ardour of ſome Sirdars led them to paſs through the intervals of corps, and many loſt their lives in the attempt. The thickneſs of the hedges proved highly favourable to the intention of the Sultaun, as his infantry could approach ours unperceived: nor did they neglect this advantage. The ſeveral corps, however, cloſely obſerving the undaunted countenance of the 36th regiment continued firm and immovable. A large body of horſe threatning the battalion commanded by Captain A. BROWN, Major STEVENSON was detached to its ſupport. The Major in a ſpirited charge routed this enemy. Towards five o'clock ſeveral pieces of cannon were opened on both ſides, and the continuance of a heavy and well directed fire until ſix did much execution.

Circumſtances, in themſelves trivial, often affect the ſafety of multitudes. About this period a moſt fortunate report, announcing the approach of Major General MEDOWS circulated, and obtained ready belief throughout the detachment. A ſhout of exultation re-echoed from the right to the left of the line. The

ding of the ſepoys, which always accompanies the huzzas of the Britiſh troops previous to a charge, made the Sultaun imagine that the bayonet was not far diſtant. He had alſo ſome grounds to be anxious for the ſecurity of his retreat, as the field of battle, was not nearer to the ford at Poongar, than the actual ſituation of the Grand Army during the engagement. Perhaps, too; the loſs of ſome conſiderable Sirdars; the ſevere fatigue he had lately undergone, and the approach of night, might have contributed towards the determination of the Sultaun. Certain it is, however, that at this period he with-drew his whole force, leaving the detachment in quiet poſſeſſion of a well-diſputed field. (1)

(1) When Officers, high in the ſervice, condeſcend to detail the operations that they directed, their narratives muſt ever be ſought after in proportion to the degree of curioſity that is awakened by the importance of the tranſactions they relate. The ideas entertained of the writer's candour, his rank in life, added to the influence of the object on the war, will ſtill contribute to keep alive the avidity with which Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD's deſcription of the conteſt at Sattimungulum has been peruſed. Under theſe impreſſions it would be highly culpable to with-hold the enſuing letter. It is not with an intention to point out defects that any addition has been made to the facts therein ſtated. It is with a view to give every individual, as far as poſſible, his juſt ſhare of well earned laurels, his juſt ſhare of claim to the kindneſs of his country.——Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD to Lieutenant Colonel STUART.—Camp at Pachipolliam, September 21 1790. "My dear Colonel, as you will have "many relations, with little exactneſs, of ſome late occurrences during my command of a detachment of the army on the Bevanee, I am deſirous of ſtating the principal ones to you myſelf, that a juſt opinion of them may be formed by an officer I ſo much eſteem and reſpect. "My corps was augmented after the forcing of Sattimungulum, ſo that it conſiſted of the "King's regiment, and ſixteen ſquadrons of native cavalry, his Majeſty's 36th regiment, and "four battalions of native infantry, with eleven pieces of cannon ſerved by the Bengal artillery. One of theſe battalions of ſepoys garriſoned Sattimungulum, the reſt of my corps "was encamped near it, on the ſouth-ſide of the Bevanee. For ſome days I had many vague "reports of reinforcements to SAHID SAHIB, who was ſtationed at Guzzlehatty, the bottom "of the paſs; his force conſiſted entirely of horſe, as they ſaid of 6000, but of very little me"rit: ſeveral cavalry ſkirmiſhes took place, in which the enemy was always beaten with great

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The victors now moved to an advantageous ground ſomewhat nearer to Coimbatore than the ſcene of action. From thence the encampment of the Sultaun was diſcovered by the blaze of his fires which extended

"loſs, and almoſt none on our part. At length ſome priſoners affirmed that TIPPOO had deſcend"ed the Gaut's in conſiderable force, and indeed we obſerved a much better cavalry than we "had been uſed to. In the night of the 12th inſtant, I ſent Captain CHILD, with three ſquadrons, "up the ſouth-ſide of the river, to reconnoitre; and early on the 13th inſtant, Major DARLEY, "with his regiment, to ſupport him. About an hour and a half afterwards, I received "information that Major DARLEY, was ſurrounded by a large body of horſe: I moved "out with the remainder of the cavalry to his relief, beat the enemy, killed about 400 of "them on the ſpot, and returned to camp. Captain CHILD joined me juſt before the attack, "after having beat a body of the enemy's cavalry at Poongar, forcing them into the river, where "many were killed and drowned: the priſoners affirm that TIPPOO was at Dumicottah. "About ten the ſame morning a large body of horſe and foot, with four guns, moved down "the north-ſide of the river, and cannonaded the grand guard; the corps were ſoon formed in "order of battle, and took a poſition in front of the camp, with the cavalry in the ſecond line; "a large body of the enemy now appeared in front, and began to open guns, firſt on my right "wing, and ſucceſſively on my centre and left. I imagined they fired from about fifteen guns, "but deſerters and others ſay, there were nineteen. Lieutenant Colonel DEARE, who com"manded the Bengal artillery, was killed early in the day, and his next officer, Captain "SAMPSON, was ſoon diſabled by a ſevere wound in the head; Lieutenant ARMSTRONG of "the 36th regiment was killed; Surgeon Aſſiſtant MORRIS, of the native cavalry, was ſe"verely wounded, and died in the night. The axle-trees of my two twelve pounders ſoon "gave way, and a ſix-pounder was diſabled; the reſt fired with excellent aim, but ſparingly, "as my ſtock of ammunition was not great. Our line ſtood on the ſhoulder of a riſing ground "to the right on its ſummit; it was ſtoney, but free from buſhes. The enemy was on ſtrong "ground among incloſures and villages, and at a conſiderable diſtance, ſo that moſt of the ſhot "ſtruck the ground ſhort of our line, though ſome went an incredible diſtance beyond it. The "cannonade was kept up until perfectly dark; nothing on earth could exceed the bravery and "firmneſs of every man in our whole line. When it was dark I determined to join "the Commander in Chief, and to take the ſhorteſt route to Coimbatore. Captain "DALLAS, who is always active and ſertile in expedients, got timbers from the fort, "and new axle-trees were made during the night for both twelve-pounders, but one "of them only could move with the corps next morning. The 16th battalion was "withdrawn from the fort, and we marched off in two columns, one of infantry, and the "other of cavalry, about day-break; the baggage forming a third column more remote "from the enemy. The ſlaughter of the gun-bullocks had been ſo great, that we could "not move the eighteen-pounder, and it was left on the ground, with one diſabled ſix"pounder, and one of the twelve-pounders. Early on the 14th, as ſoon as the enemy "ſaw the troops in march, a large body of cavalry croſſed the Bevanee, and fell "upon the baggage, ſo that great part of it was thrown down, and left to the enemy. "Surgeon's-mate SUTHERLAND was killed here. The country growing more confined at "Occarro, the corps proceeded in one column, the cavalry leading, and from this time the in"fantry was entirely conducted, and moſt judiciouſly managed by Lieutenant Colonel OLD"HAM, my ſecond. Major CUPPAGE whoſe experience and gallantry are well known to you, "commanded one of the brigades. The troops had hitherto marched unmoleſted by the en"emy; but from the high grounds between Occarro and Couriampollium we ſaw large bodies

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to the utmoſt range of viſion, and preſented to a contemplative mind an object not leſs aweful than magnificent. Here the detachment remained lying under arms and at the heads of their horſes as on the foregoing night, but on certain information of the General's march towards Velladi, it moved about two o'clock in the morning, and reached that place at ſun-ſet on the enſuing day. As the enemy did not continue the purſuit

" of horſe moving towards the line. The number of bullocks that had been killed, and " the exhauſted ſtate of the remainder, though every one had cheerfully ſupplied his own " private bullocks, obliged us to abandon the twelve-pounder and two ſixes; five ſix-pound- " ders were now left. The enemy brought guns to bear on the line of march, their ca- " valry began to preſs upon it, and our infantry was annoyed from muſquetry and rockets.

" About five in the evening Colonel OLDHAM formed his infantry on ſtrong ground, broken " by hedges. The enemy's infantry occupied the hedges alſo. This was about two miles and " an half ſhort of Shawore. Colonel OLDHAM had reſerved his fire till now. The enemy " ſeemed to imagine the moment arrived for the deſtruction of the corps; they ſhouted from " all quarters, fired hotly from all their guns and muſquetry, and plied their rockets: a body " of their cavalry moving down to charge our infantry, other large bodies cutting in among " our baggage, our cavalry inſtantly faced about, formed, attacked, and beat theirs off the " field, killing many of them and ſeveral of their horſes, with ſcarce any loſs on our part. " Their attack on our infantry was bold but injudicious; they ſuffered heavily in man and " horſe, and were completely beaten off without doing any injury to our infantry. Some of " their principal leaders fell cloſe to our ranks. Captain HARTLEY, of the 36th regiment, " was killed here in a gallant attempt to ſtorm a gun, and our infantry ſuffered loſs from their " guns and muſquetry, but their firmneſs remained unſhaken. Nothing could be more " inſtantaneous and judicious than the poſition taken by Majors DARLEY and STEVENSON, " and Captains PATER and CHILD, each at the head of their reſpective corps. I had only " to wiſh, and the cavalry performed. Nothing could be more evident than that the enemy's " cavalry, his ſtable horſe, was held in moſt complete check by our cavalry. One of our guns " was laid for an howdered elephant, and ſtruck the howder: the enemy now retired beaten " from the field. We took up our ground near Shawore about ſeven at night, and fired three " ſignal guns. We marched before day on the 15th; we heard and returned three ſignal guns. " We reached Velladi at eight at night, having paſſed three days without eating, but not a " murmur was heard from any one. General MEDOWS had paſſed beyond this place with " a view to relieve us. On the 16th General MEDOWS joined us at Velladi, and I thought " myſelf happy in having brought him my corps, without other accidents than the uſual " caſualties of the ſervice. On the 13th and 14th, our loſs was as follows: —Killed, 42 " Europeans, 114 Natives, and 23 Horſes—Wounded, 86 Europeans, 194 Natives, and 11 " Horſes. Of the wounded officers none are ſevere caſes, but Captain SAMPSON's in the " head, and Lieutenant VELANCY, who has loſt a foot. I can aſcertain nothing of the " enemy's loſs; but many ſtragglers whom we have picked up, all ſay it was extremely heavy,

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no extraordinary occurrence took place on this march. No tidings of the army could however be obtained. Brigade Major DALLAS therefore propoſed to go ſingly in queſt of them. The offer was approved, and after traverſing a country of thirty miles, the Major returned at duſk with directions to remain at Velladi until further orders.

With a decided intention to compel the enemy to come to action, or to reaſcend the ghauts, the Engliſh General, no ſooner had intelligence of his deſcent into the plains, than he determined to put the army in motion towards the ford of Poongar. When he reflected on the number, equipment, and, above all, on the high diſcipline of the corps which had been poſted in advance, not a doubt remained on his mind but that eve-

" and that three principal men were killed; moſt of them ſay, Burhan ud Dien Cawn, a " brother-in-law of Tippoo's, was killed.—I have the honour to be, My dear Colonel, Your's " moſt faithfully, (Signed) J. FLOYD."——" P. S. I ſhould like to dwell on the exem- " plary good conduct of the ſepoys, horſe and foot; all I can write cannot exceed their " merits. His Majeſty's regiments and the artillery did themſelves juſtice, with their ac- " cuſtomed valour and conduct."——Again I repeat, that every deviation from the above letter, and every difference from the accounts of other candid writers, is ſubmitted after the moſt careful enquiry has been made, and after correct information has been obtained. Amongſt the officers wounded at Sattimungulum, beſides thoſe mentioned by Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD, the following names ought to have been inſerted. Of the 36th regiment, Captains WIGHT and DELANY, Captain Lieutenant OVEREND, and Lieutenant PURFOY. Of the Bengal artillery, Lieutenants HORSBOROUGH and WINBOLT. Of the Coaſt cavalry, Lieutenant FLOYER, and Cornet and Adjutant DALLAS. Of the native infantry, Lieutenant ARTHUR MACALLY. My information alſo ſtates a ſpirited charge made by Cornet BRABAZON with a troop of Dragoons on a very ſuperior body of the enemy, but does not mention the exact time. It ſtates the Europeans killed at forty-three, the wounded at ninety-eight, the miſſing at ſeven; the natives killed at one hundred and twenty-eight, the wounded at one hundred and thirty ſeven, the miſſing at one hundred and forty-eight; the horſes killed at twenty-two; the wounded at eight, the miſſing at twenty-eight.

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ry nerve would be ſtrained to maintain Sattimungulum until reinforced, ſhould the Sultaun be hazardous enough to riſk an attack. Firm in this opinion he took a direct courſe for its relief early on the 14th of the month, and encamped on that day within four miles of Velladi. Here the noiſe of Colonel FLOYD's ſecond engagement was diſtinctly heard; and, with intention to intercept the enemy at the ford of Poongar, or to obtain any poſition whatſoever between his army and the Bevanee river, General MEDOWS, ſtill ignorant of the evacuation of his advanced poſt, marched early in the morning of the 15th to within a few miles of Demiacottah. The Sultaun, however, apprized of theſe movements, and conſequently fearful that his retreat would be cut off, abandoned all deſigns againſt the detachment, and fled with precipitation acroſs the Bevanee river (1).

In the mean time, the General, with a view to ſtrengthen Coimbatore, directed that Lieutenant Colonel STUART, who had then proceeded in order to be-

(1) "Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD reached Velladi on the 15th in the evening, from "which ſtation the Commander in Chief had advanced to within a few miles of Demiacottah on "the ſame morning, in order to intercept the enemy at the ford on the Bevanee, where they "muſt have croſſed to the attack of Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD's detachment, or to fall on "their rear in the event of their having advanced to any diſtance on the ſouth ſide of that river, "which movement had the effect of making the enemy relinquiſh any further attack on Lieu-"tenant Colonel FLOYD, and of retiring their force precipitately to the north ſide of the river." Adjt. Genl. to Colonel KELLY, 22d September 1790.

ſiege Palligautcherry, ſhould ſend back the flank companies of the 71ſt and 72d regiments(2). He commanded that the ſixth battalion ſhould advance from Erroad in the direction of Sattimungulum (3); and, he apprized Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD of his intention to puſh the Sultaun, either by advancing by different routes from the two reſpective diviſions, or after forming a junction, by preſſing againſt the enemy in one compact body (4). The wary Mahomedan uſed every means that caution could dictate to avoid the Chriſtian General in the field on terms of equal advantage. He occupied a ſtrong poſt on the north bank of the Bevanee; that river afforded protection to his front; on either flank Demiacottah and Sattimungulum ſtrengthened his poſition; he neglected not to guard the ford at the latter place as

"(2) You are on receipt of this to order the flank companies of the 71ſt and 72d regiments "to march to Coimbatore, where they are to wait further orders. Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD "was attacked near Sattimungullum on the 13th, and beat off the enemy, by the firing heard "yeſterday the attack appears to have been renewed, but we do not know the reſult."—Inſtructions to Lieutenant Colonel STEWART, 15th September, 1790.

"(3) The garriſon of Erroad, as eſtabliſhed by Lieutenant Colonel OLDHAM under Lieu-"tenant CORNER, is to continue; and the 6th battalion and two ſix-pounders, with the ex-"ception of ſuch part of it as may be ſtationed at Bevincoral, is to march to Sattimungul-"lum to join the troops there, the force now at Coimbatore marches towards Sattimungulum "to-morrow" Inſtructions to Captain MACPHERSON, 13th September, 1790.

"(4) If the enemy (ſuppoſed to have attacked Sattimungullum) have retired, and that it is "adviſable and practicable, in regard to the river, for your detachment to croſs the Bevanee, "he wiſhes you to do ſo; but, if the enemy have not retired, you are to remain in your "preſent ſituation until further orders, the intention of the General being to puſh TIPPOO, or "his Officer commanding below the ghauts to the utmoſt extent that is adviſable, according "to circumſtances, either, by a movement from different routes, of the force at head quarters "and your detachment, or by joining them before a further movement in advance is made." Inſtructions to Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD, 14th September, 1790.

well as that at Poongar; and, by detaching ſwarms of horſe in different directions, he attempted to diſtract the attention and to thwart the deſigns of the Engliſh Commander.

The neceſſary care had no ſooner been beſtowed on the ſick and wounded by lodging them in ſafety at Coimbatore, than the General advanced towards Shawore (1) in anxious queſt of the enemy; there was alſo ſome likelihood that the Sultaun might attempt further to deſtroy the chain of communication by moving in force againſt Erroad (2). Under theſe impreſſions, Captain MACPHERSON, then in charge of that diſtrict, had inſtruc-

			Miles.	Fur.
(1) September	14th,	Four miles South of Velladi,	16	3
	15th,	Five miles South of Demiacottah,	14	5
	16th,	Velladi, - - -	10	5
	18th,	Conjepeleam, - -	12	7
	20th,	Shawore, - - -	8	6

" (2) Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD's detachment having reached Velladi without proviſions, " and with only a very inconſiderable proportion of ammunition and camp equipage the com- " mander in chief joined it on the 15th in the morning at that place, halted one day to re- " move the ſick and wounded to Coimbatore, and then moved with his collected force towards " Shawore, in order to give the enemy battle, and cover Erroad, whilſt the troops there, and as " much of the proviſions as could be carried away, were drawing off to Carrore, with the ex- " ception of a ſmall garriſon to be left in the Fort of Erroad."—Adjutant General to Colonel KELLY 22d September 1790——" Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD's detachment having been " under the neceſſity to retire from Sattimungullum, the General is apprehenſive that the ene- " my may move in force directly againſt Erroad, and therefore deſires that you fall back " to Carrore with the troops in the Erroad diſtrict, and that you carry with you, or diſpatch " before you march, as many of the cattle loaded with proviſions, &c. as poſſible. But you " are to conſider the preſervation of the troops under your command as the firſt object, and " conſequently that what relates to the cattle and proviſions is only to be adopted provided " you have no cauſe to believe that the enemy will advance towards you in force before they " can be diſpatched to Carrore with ſafety."—Inſtructions to Captain MACPHARSON, 16th September, 1790.

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tions to retire towards Carrore; he was directed to collect what cattle could be found in the neighbourhood of Erroad; to withdraw from that garriſon all ſtores for which he could poſſibly procure conveyance; he was to conſider the troops under his command as an eſcort for the protection of the whole as far as was conſiſtant with their ſafety; and, in order to take charge of the fort, with what ſtores could not be carried away, he had directions to leave a Subidar and one company of ſepoys for its defence (3). A compliance with theſe orders added the 6th battalion to the detachment, then under the command of Major YOUNGE, at Carrore.

From Shawore the General fell back to Coimbatore (4), in order to cover the operations againſt Palligautcherry, and the various ſupplies which could not be lodged in Erroad with ſafety from the period that the detachment at Sattimungulum had been compelled to

(3) " I had the honour yeſterday to ſignify the Commander in Chief's orders for your " marching to Avanaſhee with the 6th battalion of native infantry, and all the proviſions which " you have the means of conveying from Erroad, leaving as a garriſon the detachment in that " quarter of the 1ſt and 16th battalions under Lieutenant CORNER.—I am now deſired to " communicate the Commander in Chief's orders, that inſtead of marching to Avanaſhee with " the proviſions as above mentioned, you are to march to Carrore; and to leave only in Erroad " a ſubidar and a company of native infantry, provided you have not the means of carrying " with you to Carrore all the proviſions lodged in Erroad."—Adjt. Gen. to Capt. MACPHERSON, 20th Sept. 1790.

			Miles.	Fur.
(4) September	21ſt	Patchepaleam, - - -	12	7
	23d	Coimbatore, - - -	14	4

retire.

retire (1). On the 29th the General again advanced towards the Bevanee in queſt of the enemy; and on the arrival of the army at Gopalchittypaleam, it was evident, that Tippoo's encampment had been moved from thence but a few hours: he certainly did not expect to be diſturbed at ſo early a period, for, two elephants, two camels, with about one hundred bullocks, loaded with rockets, were found upon the ground. Two days after this the hoſtile armies again occupied the ſame plain at Erroad (2): ſtill the Sultaun carefully preſerved a diſtance of one march. Erroad had been ſhamefully ſurrendered on the 25th of September, to a party of the enemy's horſe, who permitted the company that compoſed its garriſon to proceed to Carrore, but the Subi-

(1) "The army arrived at Shawore on the 20th, but as no accounts had been received from "Palligautcherry during theſe operations, the Commander in Chief thought it advisable to "move in the direction of Coimbatore, not only to cover effectualy the ſiege of Palligautcherry "but the ſupplies of every deſcription which could not be lodged with ſafety in Erroad after "our advanced detachment at Sattimangulam had been under the neceſſity of falling back, and "a movement of the army became proper to cover the operations carrying on at Palligautcher-"ry in communication with the junction to be effected at that place with the Bombay troops "under Lieut. Col. HARTLEY. The army for theſe purpoſes, marched yeſterday from Sha-"wore, halts at this place and moves to Coimbatore to-morrow, from whence it is the intention "of the Commander in Chief to advance again in a few days towards the Gazulehatty paſs "with his collected force, except only ſuch diviſions of it as he may judge neceſſary to leave at "Palligautcherry after the place ſurrenders."—Adj. Gen. to Colonel KELLY, 22d September 1790.

			Miles.	Fur.
(2) September	29th,	Patchepaleam,	14	4
	30th,	Shawore,	12	7
October	1ſt,	Occarro,	10	7
	2d,	Gopalchittypaleam,	14	
	3d,	Coondapoddy,	12	3
	4th,	Erroad,	11	4

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dar that commanded was diſmiſſed the Company's ſervice with diſgrace.

It was now evident by the movements of the Sultaun, that he meditated a deſign to cut off, not only the ſupplies expected with Major YOUNGE, but the whole of the detachment by which they were eſcorted (3). Of this the Major fortunately obtained early information. A truſty trooper that entered the enemy's camp in diſguiſe on the 2d of October, reported his whole force in motion towards Carrore, near to the road by which the detachment had to paſs, and at a diſtance that did not exceed thirty miles (4). The Major conſequently relinquiſhing every idea of a junction for the time, waited for further orders under the protection of the fort. Correct information of the Sultaun's movements being likewiſe obtained by the Commander in Chief, he proceeded rapidly towards Major YOUNGE with the whole

(3) "Anxious to hear of Major YOUNGE and the convoy under his command, allow me to "requeſt every information in your power on that ſubject. It was intended that he ſhould "have come here, but he is now ordered to fall back to Carrore, which place, I heartily hope "to hear he reached in ſafety."—Lieut. Col. HARRIS to Capt. PARR; Coimbatore, 23d September 1790.

(4) "I have information that a large party of the enemy is in the country, and muſt requeſt "for the ſecurity of the detachment that you will order the two three pounders and the neceſ-"ſary ammunition to accompany them to be in readineſs. Lieutenant HARGRAVE will wait "on you at five o'clock to receive the guns and recovered Europeans."—17th Sept. 1790.—again—"I have this moment received information that a large party of the enemy with guns "are at Caronelly, and that their intentions are towards this place, I have made the neceſſary ar-"rangements in caſe of their appearance."—Major YOUNGE to Captain PARR, 4th Oct. 1790.

army.

army. He arrived at Cudimoody on the 6th (1); was joined by the convoy on the enſuing day; and, on the 8th returned with all the ſupplies towards Coimbatore.

In the mean time the Sultaun did not remain inactive. Foiled in his principal object, he determind to attempt the recovery of the garriſons that had been lately wreſted out of his poſſeſſion whilſt the army was at a diſtance too conſiderable to afford them any relief.

From the immenſe ſupply of elephants and camels with which he had been conſtantly provided; from the number and ſuperior quality of his bullocks; from the great diſproportion on a comparative view of the canvas pitched by both armies; and, from his requiring but few wheel carriages, in conſequence of a total prohibition of ſpirituous liquors throughout his encampment, the rapidity of his movements exceeded that of the Britiſh army in a degree ſcarcely to be credited. Daraporam, the firſt object of his attention, was ſurrounded by horſe on the fixth. Next day his whole force encamped within one thouſand yards of its walls; and, by

	Miles,	Fur.
(1) October 5th, Caroneily,	16	4
6th, Cudimoody,	8	

break

break of day on the eighth, batteries were ready to open on three faces of the fort, at equal diſtance from the ditch and the encampment. Unprovided with cannon, the garriſon, which now conſiſted of about one hundred Europeans and double that number of native troops, obtained an honorable capitulation, which was ſtrictly adhered to by both parties (2).

To the delay of a few days at this poſt may be attributed the preſervation of Coimbatore, with the guns and numerous ſtores that it contained (3), for, whilſt the SULTAUN was employed at Daraporam, the 10th, 13th and 14th Coaſt battalions, with one battalion from the King of Travancore, the whole under the immediate

" (2) Captain EVANS is to take charge of the priſoners under capitulation that formed the " garriſon of Daraporam. The officers and men left ſick in that garriſon who have alſo fallen " into the enemy's hands and have returned are to be with their corps. As ſoon as an opportu- " nity offers, the whole of the priſoners taken at Daraporam will be ſent to the preſidency, " in the mean time they are to be conſidered on camp allowances, but are not to ſerve during " the war, conformable to the parole given by the officers. Such of theſe priſoners as are ſent " ſick into garriſons in communication with the army, are to be reported particularly to the of- " ficers commanding, that they may not be put on duty when recovered, and that they may " be removed to the preſidency by the earlieſt opportunities."—General Orders, 18th October, 1790.

" (3) It is probable that the whole or a part of TIPPOO's force may appear before Coimbatore. " You, or the officer commanding there muſt defend the poſt to the laſt moment and to the laſt " man, as the commander in chief will move with the army to it's relief. Such of the ſick " officers and men left in Coimbatore, as are ſufficiently recovered to do duty ſhall take com- " mand, and conſequently the ſenior officer doing duty ſhall be conſidered in the command of " the Fort; for which purpoſe, you are directed to notify the orders this letter contains " to all the officers left ſick at Coimbatore. The army marches to-morrow to Cudi- " moody, will halt there the day after in order to form a junction with Major YOUNGE's detach- " ment from Carrore, and will march the day following towards Coimbatore, by ſuch marches " as may be neceſſary for the relief of that poſt"—Inſtructions to Lieutenant CHALMERS 5th October, 1790.

command

command of Captain KNOX, fortunately reinforced Coimbatore, and put a ſtop to every apprehenſion for its ſafety. Lieutenant Colonel HARTLEY whoſe ſucceſsful exertions will be detailed in due time, having arrived at Palligautcherry, had ordered theſe corps to Coimbatore, agreeable to inſtructions from the commander in chief (1). A number of ſick and convaleſcent officers that reſided in the palace, now attracted the notice of HOOSSEIN CAWN, one of the enemy's Sirdars, whoſe diviſion at that period conſiſted of about fifteen hundred horſe. He had approached within ſix miles of his object, when he received intelligence of the reinforcement; he immediately relinquiſhed the deſign of capturing theſe gentlemen and ſuddenly withdrew towards Sattimungulum.

"(1) Lieutenant Colonel STEWART at the head of a detachment from this army at Palligautcherry, which place ſurrendered to him on the 22d inſtant, has received orders, to march on the 26th inſtant to Coimbatore, leaving in Palligautcherry four battering guns (eighteen-pounders) and ſuch garriſon as he may judge ſufficient for the defence of the poſt, provided the detachment under your command does not arrive at Palligautcherry on or before the day he marches; but if you ſhall join him before that time, the charge and defence of the poſt of Palligautcherry is to be left intirely to your detachment, only that the troops of the Fort St. George eſtabliſhment now belonging to it, are to join Lieutenant Colonel STEWART and to march under his orders to Coimbatore. The four battering guns are at all events to be left by Lieutenant Colonel STEWART in Palligautcherry. I am therefore commanded to ſignify, that if you arrive at Palligautcherry before Lieutenant Colonel STEWART marches, you are to conſider yourſelf under his orders; but if you arrive there after Colonel STEWART has marched, you are to relieve the garriſon left by him in Palligautcherry, and to order it with the whole of the troops of the Fort St. George eſtabliſhment, now forming part of your detachment to march to the head quarters of the army at this place, and you are to remain in charge of the poſt of Palligautcherry with the reſt of your detachment until you receive the commander in chief's further orders." — Inſtructions to Lieutenant Colonel HARTLEY, 24th September, 1790.

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The army encamped at Singanellore (2), diſtant from Coimbatore about ſix miles, on the 15th of this month, having Captain WAHAB with his battalion at equal diſtance between the fort and the encampment, in order to keep the communication open. SHAYCH-BABIN, one of the enemy's ſpies was executed on the march from Carrore, and eight Europeans that ſhamefully plundered beyond the picquets were carried off by Looties (3). Having provided for the ſick and having ſent all carriages and baggage that could be diſpenſed with into the garriſon, the General put the army in motion on the 20th, and encamped at Erroad on the 2d of November (4).

(2)

		Miles,	Fur.
October 8th,	Pooraſhcottapaliam,	7	4
9th,	Sheelamoottapaliam,	10	
11th,	Ramalingapaliam,	10	4
12th,	Periapaliam,	10	4
14th,	Soomanoor,	15	0
15th,	Singanellore,	12	2

(3) "The ſick able to walk who are permitted to fall out of the ranks, and thoſe conveyed on carriage bullocks, are to move on the ſame flank with the baggage between the line and the line of carts. Commanding Officers of corps, will be held reſponſible that their ſick do not ſtraggle on the march. The Commander in Chief is concerned to find that ſeveral ſoldiers were carried off by the enemy's horſe yeſterday, he expects that there will be no cauſe to make ſimilar reports to Head Quarters on any future occaſion, the picquets are expreſsly ordered to ſeize any ſoldier going beyond them, and to fire on thoſe they cannot eaſily apprehend."—General Orders, 13th October 1790.

(4)

		Miles,	Fur.
October 20th,	Soomanoor,	12	2
21ſt,	Valipaliam,	12	4
23d,	Avanaſhee,	8	2
25th,	Shamaraſhepaliam,	13	4
Nov. 1ſt,	Perentory,	10	0
2d,	Erroad,	12	0

S Avanaſhee,

Avanaſhee, near one of the grounds of encampment on this march, is a well built village, with a ſmall yet ſtately Pagoda, about one hundred and fifty feet in height. A ſtaircaſe incapable of admitting two men abreaſt, or even one bulky perſon, winds to its top; and, as innumerable ſwarms of Batts fly about in every direction, the aſcent is not leſs offenſive than dangerous to the eyeſight. A ſubſtantial wall, twelve feet high, ſurrounds the Pagoda. Three well built ſwamy houſes, or temples with arched roofs, and doors at one end ſtand, in the encloſure; and, at no conſiderable diſtance ſeveral braſs and copper images that had been concealed with much caution were diſcovered in a deep cell. Theſe, doubtleſs, in times of peace, occupiedthe temples, and ſymbolically repreſented certain attributes of the Supreme Being(1), to whom alone Gentoos conſecrate places of worſhip.

(1) "The General received opinion of the Hindoos being Polytheiſts has no foundation in truth, for although their tenets admit poſitions that are difficult to be defended, yet that they are worſhippers of God, and only one God, are incontrovertable points."—Again,—"They one and all believe in the unity of the Godhead, and although they hold images in high veneration, yet they are by no means idolaters, as the ignorant ſuppoſe. I have myſelf frequently diſcourſed on the ſubject with many learned and upright men of this religion and comprehend their doctrine."—Ayeen Akbery vol. 3.——"Reverence! Reverence be unto thee a thouſand times repeated! Again and again Reverence! Reverence be unto thee! Reverence be unto thee before and behind! Reverence be unto thee on all ſides, O thou who art all in all! Infinite is thy power and thy glory! Thou includeſt all things, wherefore thou art all things!—Again.—Thou art the father of all things animate and inanimate; thou art the ſage inſtructor of the world, worthy to be adored! There is none like unto thee; where then in the three worlds, is there one above thee? wherefore I bow down; and with my body proſtrate upon the ground, crave thy mercy, Lord!—Bhagvat Geeta, p. 95.

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In front of this building ſtands an obeliſk, forty-five feet high, on the top of which there is a lamp that is only light on certain feſtivals. In the neareſt ſtreet, two unwieldy carriages attracted the notice of every paſſenger. Each of them ſupported a huge and irregular frame of teakwood, on which were carved figures of the moſt diſguſting appearance. When the lamp is lighted, theſe carriages are put in motion by men and bullocks. Bramins and others in the hopes of obtaining remiſſion of their ſins aſſiſt by pulling at the traces, and many infatuated females proſtrating themſelves before the wheels, meet a death alike certain and much more terrible than the funeral pile. A clear ſtream that empties itſelf into the Noel river ſeperates the village from the ſanctuary; but, the communication is rendered eaſy by means of a ſtrong but inelegant ſtone bridge.

From the top of the Pagoda there is a view that can never fail to pleaſe; the mountains here, forming an immenſe arch, which ſtretches from the ſouth towards the north, of a ſudden riſe in one grand and majeſtick wall, that ranges at the diſtance of from twenty to thirty miles; jungles eternally verdant complete-

ly over-ſpread the ſurface of thoſe mountains from their baſe to their ſummits, and the plains around as far as eye can reach are fertile in the extreme(1). Large clumps of trees with extenſive ſheets of water protect and enrich the country; villages defended by walls, hedges and ditches are to be ſeen in every direction, and however bold the aſſertion, it is nevertheleſs true, that no part of Great Britain exhibits a higher ſtate of cultivation.

On the march to Avanaſhee, Brigade-Major DALLAS, with Cornet MACKAY, and a troop of cavalry, fell in with about fifty of the Sultaun's Stable Horſe whom they inſtantly attacked and put to flight. About one half of this party was cut to pieces, and four troopers with twenty-ſix horſes were brought into camp. On the ſame day a reſolute dragoon, named Parkes, fell in whilſt flanking, with ſix of the enemy, mounted, in an avenue ſo narrow that there was not room for two men to engage abreaſt. He took advantage of the confined ſituation, levelled three of them with the ground, and

(1) "The greateſt part of this empire (Hindoſtan) is arable land, and in ſome places the ſoil "has ſuch ſtrength that they always cultivate the ſame ſpot, without there being any diff'rence "in the crops. In many places they have three crops of rice in a year, and in ſome even "more. The vine bears fruit in the firſt year."—Ayeen Akbery tom 3. p. 5.

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after ſecuring their horſes he joined the line with one priſoner.

On the 25th of October, Colonel TRENT having under his command the 4th brigade of infantry, with three troops of native cavalry was detached to Carrore in order to eſcort a ſupply of proviſions to the army(2), which he was informed would occupy a poſition a little to the ſouthward of Erroad. The priſoners taken at Daraporam were directed to embrace this opportunity for proceeding to the preſidency of Fort St. George; and, Major PATTER, with the 2d regiment of cavalry, and a battalion of native infantry, two companies excepted,

(2) "Lieutenant Colonel TRENT marches to Carrore in the command of a detachment "for the protection of proviſions to be drawn from that garriſon agreeable to the directions that "Mr. KINNEIR is inſtructed to give concerning them. The Commander in Chief deſires "you will uſe every exertion in your power to enable Lieutenant Colonel TRENT's detachment "to proceed without delay to join the army. I am further directed to acquaint you that the "25th battalion of native infantry with two field pieces from Lieutenant Colonel TRENT's "detachment is to compoſe part of the garriſon of Carrore until further orders, and to deſire "that you will deliver the enclo'ed letter to Lieutenant Colonel TRENT which contains his "inſtructions to the above effect. I am likewiſe deſired to ſignify to you from the Commander "in Chief that if the enemy ſhould appear in force againſt Carrore, the Senior Officer of the "troops there, whether he belongs to the detachment or the garriſon, is to take the command "of the whole and is to be reſponſible for the defence of the place, which on all occaſions, and "in all ſituations muſt be defended to the laſt man and to the laſt moment; but that in any "other ſituation, the officer commanding the preſent or any other detachment ſent to Carrore, "is not to interfere with the command of the fort and garriſon, or any other matter appertain"ing to the command of the place further than by ſuch applications as may be neceſſary for "conducting publick ſervice between two officers having ſeparate commands. I am deſired by "the Commander in Chief to add, that he is extremely ſatisfied with your attention and ac"tivity in the command of Carrore, and that he aſſures himſelf you will continue your exertions "for the publick ſervice. I am deſired to acquaint you that the priſoners taken at Daraporam, "who have been permitted to return, proceed to Carrore with Lieutenant Colonel TRENT's "detachment under charge of Captain EVANS on their way to the Preſidency, and that they "are to march to Trichinopoly from your fort as ſoon as the road is ſufficiently ſafe, or that "an opportunity offers for their proceeding under the protection of an eſcort."—Inſtructions to Captain PARR, 24th October 1790.

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was sent to expedite the Convoy; but, from a delay of the original detachment, which became the subject of enquery before a General Court Martial, it was the 7th of November ere a junction took place.

Just at this period of time, Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD, who had been sent with the cavalry to reconnoitre as far as Bevincoral, a town at the confluence of the Bevanee and Cauvery advanced with a small party several miles to the northward of these rivers, and ascertained that the Sultaun after crossing the latter at a ford some miles higher up about the beginning of the month, had proceeded with his whole force in a northerly direction. For some time it was apprehended, that his intentions were to ascend the Martinelly pass by the fort of Coveriporam; but, a sudden wheel which he made to the eastward evidently contradicted this opinion.

By the death of that excellent officer, Colonel KELLY of the Madras establishment, on the 24th September, the command of the centre division devolved on Lieutenant Colonel MAXWELL, of his Majesty's service. Conformable to instructions from the Governor and Council at Fort St. George, Colonel MAXWELL had made considerable progress in the reduction of the Barrahmahl valley previous to the late movement of the

the SULTAUN. It has been confidently asserted, "that "a junction of the two armies was intended, and that "TIPPOO could hardly be ignorant of it (1)." That a junction should be practicable, must have been at all times of importance; yet, it will be difficult to demonstrate, that any fixed determination to unite the centre with the southern army, at a given point, at all existed in the mind of our leader, from the period of the engagement at Sattimungulum(2), until the enemy by advancing towards the former had placed himself in a situation extremely critical (3).

(1) Rennell's marches of the Army, page 34.

"(2) I am directed however to acquaint you, that in the present situation of matters the "movement of the force under your command will depend upon circumstances, and the in- "structions you may receive from the board, the commander in chief having thought it ne- "cessary to remove on the 14th instant, with the force at Coimbatore, in consequence of intelli- "gence received the day before, either to cover and support the detachment at Sattimungullum "under Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD, or to advance from that post in conjunction with it as cir- "cumstances should require. Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD having sustained and repelled a very "heavy cannonade from the enemy on the 13th, after attacking with great success a superior "body of their cavalry on the same morning, thought it advisable from the information he had "received of the enemy's encreasing force, to move on the 14th and join head quarters, when "he was again attacked near Shawore and again repulsed the enemy altho' with the loss of the "greatest part of the baggage and camp equipage, and of some pieces of cannon which it be- "came impracticable to draw off on account of the great slaughter made among the cattle be- "longing to his detachment on both days, some of these guns being disabled at the same "time in the axle-trees of the carriages and otherwise."—Adjutant General to Colonel KELLY, 22d September, 1790.

(3) "The army will move from hence to-morrow towards Bevincoral. The General is in- "formed that TIPPOO has marched towards Coveriporam on his route to the upper country by "the Martinelli Pass; but, if contrary to the information received, the Commander in Chief "finds that he crosses the Cauvery and moves in the direction of the troops under your com- "mand, this army will follow him. If TIPPOO has moved to the upper country, the Com- "mander in Chief desires that you will pursue your march by the route of Tappoor and Sa- "lem as expeditiously as possible to form a junction with the main army in this quarter, and "even if he has not moved to the upper country that you will still pursue your march by the "above route, availing yourself of such posts as it affords, and communicating from time to "time your situation to the Commander in Chief."—Instructions to Lieutenant Colonel MAX- "WELL, Errood 7th Nov. 1790.

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He had ſtudiouſly avoided Major General MEDOWS for upwards of ſeven ſucceſſive weeks in Coimbatore; he obtained but little advantage over a diviſion of his force in an attempt for two complete days, and when it is conſidered that the army in the Barahmahl conſiſted of above nine thouſand three hundred firelocks, commanded by an officer of known zeal and of conſiderable experience, his preſent alarm unqueſtionably aroſe from the danger that appeared to threaten his defenceleſs provinces to the northward. There are ſtrong grounds to believe that a junction of the two armies had not been determined on by Major General MEDOWS until the beginning of November (1). It is a fact now eſtabliſhed beyond the poſſibility of doubt, that Colonel KELLY did intend to invade the upper country, to beſiege Bangalore and to reduce the adjacent diſtricts under the Britiſh Government; he de-

" (1) I did myſelf the honor of writing fully to you on the 31ſt July upon the ſubject of " the exertion I thought abſolutely neceſſary to be made to enable Colonel KELLY with the " Carnatic army, to penetrate the Myſore Country via Bangalore, and to begin his march " by the 1ſt of October, on which day I will, if poſſible, march to attempt the ghauts. If this " is practicable, it appears to me, we may parry the monſoon, and ſo ſhorten the war, which " it would be economy to do at any expence; for we muſt be undone by procraſtination. If " this is impoſſible, Colonel KELLY's army had better go into cantonments, as ſoon as circum- " ſtances will admit. Colonel COCKERELL, on the firſt of October, ſhould march to join the " NIZAM, wherever he appoints, and I will do the beſt I can with Colonel HARTLEY, to " forward this important plan."—Major General MEDOWS, to the Council at Fort St. George, 14th Auguſt, 1790.

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tached Captain BEATSON, an officer deſervedly high in his confidence, with Captain READ, Lieutenant MUNRO, and a ſmall party of troops at an early period of the war, to aſcertain the practicability of entering Myſore by the Mugly, a paſs, hitherto but little known. In a letter to the Governor and Council at Fort St. George in their Military department, he clearly delineated the meaſures in his opinion the moſt likely to be attended with ſucceſs againſt the upper provinces, whilſt TIPPOO with his main body was held in check by Major General MEDOWS in Coimbatore. He obtained the approbation of that General to the plan of operations that he originally recommended (2); and, as the deſign had furniſhed ſubject for much converſation, conjectures concerning it had moſt probably extended to the enemy.

From whatever cauſe this plan was laid aſide; whither the ſudden deſcent of the Myſorean army at Guzzlehatty had produced any alteration in the deſigns of Major General MEDOWS; whither dear-bought ex-

" (2) I am commanded by Major General MEDOWS, commander in chief, to acknowledge " the receipt of your letter to him under date the 28th ult. and to ſignify that he approves " of the army under your command being employed in taking poſſeſſion of every fort, on the " common level between the ghauts and Ouſſoor, and in reducing the greateſt part of the " Bangalore province and the Barrahmaul to the Company's ſubjection, but that you are to " conſider at the ſame time the junction of the army you command in the feld with the main " army as a moſt eſſential object to be kept in view by you in the courſe of your operations."—Adjutant General to Colonel KELLY, 6th September, 1790.

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perience had discovered to the English commander, that the force of the Sultaun had been under-rated from the beginning; or, whither the invasion as the original favorite of Colonel KELLY had been abandoned at that officer's death, there remains not a doubt but that the immediate object of Colonel MAXWELL, besides that of keeping in view the practicability of a junction with the Grand Army, was, the conquest of the Barahmahl, and of the districts to the south-east of that valley, without any reference whatsoever to an invasion of Mysore, with the force then under his command.

However, as the vast disparity in cavalry, between the centre army and that of the Sultaun, might have been attended with consequences extremely painful to Lieutenant Colonel MAXWELL (1); as there was much reason to expect from the narrowness of the valleys, and from the intricacy of the passes, in the country

(1) "We immediately communicated to the Commander in Chief, by express, the situation "of Lieutenant Colonel MAXWELL, for although we had no apprehension that he could be "worsted in an action, yet we felt much anxiety lest the numerous bodies of cavalry belonging "to the enemy hovering around him, might cut off his baggage and distress him for want of "provisions; but we were soon relieved from all uneasiness, by a letter from the General, "informing us that he was crossing the Cauvery with the whole army in pursuit of the enemy "who had marched to the northward a few days before, with an intention it was supposed, of "attacking Colonel MAXWELL. The General added that he was under no alarm for the safe-"ty of the centre army, which though perhaps not able to beat the enemy in full force, could "certainly hold out until his arrival."—The President and Council of Fort St. George to the "Court of Directors, 20th Jan. 1792.

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through which the Sultaun had to advance, that all his address could not avoid coming to action; and, as the actual force and cautious conduct of the Mysoreans rendered an acquisition of strength desirable for the execution of the original plan of operations, the General determined on a junction with the centre division; and, for the first time detached couriers with notice of that intention (2), at the same period pointing out the route of Darampoory and Tapoor as the most proper to be pursued, from its placing the enemy in a direct line between the two armies.

Although the Sultaun had thus secured a start of one complete week's march, the nature of the ground over which he must of necessity convey his artillery and stores, left some hopes of being enabled to entangle him, amongst the hills, woods, and passes, that obstructed his advance; the grievous, yet unavoidable deficiency of cavalry in the centre division, too, rendered atten-

(2) "The Commander in Chief intended to march towards Bevinconal on this day, but on "account of the information received concerning the fords and that TIPPOO has crossed the "the Cauvery, he has ordered the army to cross the ford about three miles below Erroad. One "brigade and part of the stores are already across, he hopes the rest will be moved in the "course of to-morrow or next day, and that on the 10th or 11th instant, at farthest, the army "will proceed on its march from the north bank of the Cauvery towards Selim and Daram-"poory to form a junction with the troops under your command. The Commander in Chief "leaves it to your judgement, in the present situation of this army and the enemy, to take "post or to advance according as circumstances shall require from the information you receive "of the enemy."—Instructions to Lieutenant Colonel MAXWELL, 8th Nov. 1790.

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tion to expedition at this period doubly neceſſary. Alive to theſe impreſſions, in leſs than two days, the General croſſed his army with all the ſtores over the Cauvery, at a ford two hundred and fifty yards in breadth, and ſo deep that moſt of the bullocks and ſome part of the cavalry had to ſwim. The zeal and activity of the officers that filled the ſeveral public departments appeared at no time more conſpicuous than on this occaſion, for, although the boats had been either deſtroyed or carefully concealed by the early directions of the Sultaun, no lives were loſt, nor did any part of the proviſions or ammunition ſuſtain material damage.

A SKETCH

CHAPTER THE FOURTH.

ALTOUGH the grand army had thus withdrawn from the Coimbatore country, it does not appear that the primary plan of the campaign had been, as yet, altogether laid aſide, or that it had even undergone any material change, beſides the union of the centre diviſion with the main force. The poſts occupied in the conquered countries were not only continued, but ſtrengthned

ned with an addition of troops and of guns (1). The favorers of the original mode of attack produced many arguments in ſupport of operations againſt the ſouthern extremity of the enemy's dominions. They reaſoned thus.

It was on the diſtricts of Coimbatore, Erroad, Carore, Diraporam, Pallygautcherry and Dindigul, that the Sultaun had to depend for the principal part of his ſupplies both of grain and of forage, and, the degree of eaſe with which theſe countries are not only prevented affording him any aſſiſtance, but abſolutely wreſted out of his poſſeſſion clearly diſcovers the advantage of the

(1) "On your arrival at Carore with the detachment under your command, the 26th battalion of native infantry is to form part of that garriſon, and is to be placed there with two field pieces and the field equipments of the corps. The Commander in Chief deſires me to add that particular circumſtances connected with the ſituation of the public ſervice at preſent, have occaſioned his delaying a communication of this part of his orders until the arrival at Carore of the detachment under your command."—Inſtructions to Lieutenant Colonel Tarrt 24 October 1790.——"You are to ſend from Madura to Dindigul ſix iron eighteen pounders with as large a proportion of ſhot and ſtores for them as can be ſupplied from your poſt, under charge of the moſt truſty and capable of the Invalid Artillery men at Madura. The Commander in Chief is deſirous that theſe pieces of ordnance ſhall proceed to Dindigul as early as they can be forwarded with ſafety, ſo as to arrive before the Monſoon ſets in; and directs me to add, that as there may be ſome difficulty in procuring a proper eſcort for them from Madura, it will be adviſable for you to ſend a copy of this letter to Captain Bowsar, in order that ſuch an eſcort may be provided jointly from your garriſon and from Dindigul as can moſt conveniently be ſpared at the time the guns and the ſtores are in readineſs to proceed from Madura." Inſtructions to Major Sale 24th October 1790.——"Captain Lieutenant Torin has reported that he will have between ſixty and ſeventy horſes for the ſervice at Anjengo about the end of this month, the Commander in Chief directs that you will take the neceſſary meaſures for their being marched to Trichinopoly with all convenient expedition. Should their be any detail of the native cavalry regiment at Trichinopoly that can be uſefully employed in this ſervice, the Commander in Chief deſires it may be applied to aſſiſt in conducting the horſes to Trichinopoly, and that you will give the earlieſt notice of the probable time of the horſes arriving there."—Inſtructions to Lieutenant Colonel Badgers 3d November 1790.

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meaſure. They aſſerted, that nature, even, ſeemed to point out that quarter as the moſt proper object of attack; for, according to their reaſoning, that part of it not bounded by the territories of the Eaſt India Company or their allies, is divided from the reſt of the Sultaun's dominions, either by a ſtupendous chain of mountains penetrable but in very few places; or, by the river Cauvery, which, as it is affected by the Monſoon of either coaſt, is both deep and rapid, is but ſeldom fordable, and that only at particular ſeaſons of the year.

A ſouthern invaſion, they inſiſted, was likewiſe better calculated either to repel the encroachments of the Sultaun on the poſſeſſions of the Company and their allies, or to favour our exertions after the junction with the armies of Bombay and Travancore, as the operations of the enemy had rendered that meaſure neceſſary. It was ſaid, too, that "an invaſion by Guzzlehatty, and the poſſeſſion of that paſs, aſſured us an immediate acceſs to the capital of Tippoo's kingdom, commanding a communication with our new acquiſitions and with the Company's ſouthern provinces. "Beſides, as far as the ſyſtem of defending front, flanks, and rear, can be extended from the poſition of an

army

" army to the topographical circumſtances of a country, " it would enable us to ſecure thoſe territories from any " conſiderable irruptions (1)." Theſe arguments, however, are mere matter of opinion, mere ſpeculations of fancy, utterly invalidated by the experience of the enſuing years.

From the banks of the Cauvery, the whole army advanced on the 10th, towards Lieutenant Colonel MAXWELL, in the direction of the Tapoor Paſs, marching for the moſt part on the very road by which the army of the Sultaun had proceeded but a few days before.—Sankeridirgum, the capital of an extenſive diſtrict, appeared formidable to a degree on the ſecond day's march. Its diſtance from the left of the line was ſcarce two miles. Out of a well cultivated plain of conſiderable extent, the rock which appears about ſix hundred yards in diameter, and probably ſomewhat more in height, riſes perpendicular, all around, except at a few places where it overhangs it's baſe, conſequently it widens towards the top; and although ſcarcely acceſſible from nature, it is ſtrongly fortified, and had at that time a numerous and well ſupplied garriſon.

(1) Fal. on India p. 175 6.

Such

Such was the high ſtate of cultivation at which the diſtricts dependent on this Fort had arrived, that all the exertion of the inhabitants aided by a numerous army were not adequate to the effectual concealment or ſecurity of the grain or cattle. Both were procured in abundance. Whole herds of oxen wandering in jungles amongſt the haunts of wolves and tigers on the tops of the loftieſt mountains, diſcovered their new retreat by their lowings after the more luxuriant paſture of the valleys. The perſevering induſtry of the native troops and followers too, by means of ſteel prickers, and ſharp pointed rammers probed the earth, and expoſed abundance of depoſits, notwithſtanding the extreme caution of the Ryuts in forming deep excavations for the ſecurity of their hoards.

Wild and romantic as the Selim Valley appeared on the march of the 12th, few countries of equal dimenſions can compare with it, in real advantages of produce, in richneſs of ſoil, or, as to the beautiful ſcenery of the proſpect. The height of the ſurrounding mountains, notwithſtanding their ſudden declivity, enables the inhabitants of the valley to fill their extenſive reſervoirs more frequently than falls to the lot of other

 ſituations;

ſituations; for, as they range all along the feet of the mountains, and, as the valley itſelf is of no conſiderable breadth, they receive ſuch an ample ſupply of water, that the bottom may be flooded at every ſeaſon of the year; conſequently, ſugar-cane, paddy, and choulum, in all their different ſtages, formed ſuch a contraſt to the rugged jungle and naked rocks that ſurrounded them, and afforded ſuch a pleaſing relief to the eye that language is totally unequal to the deſcription. (1).

Here in a Mud Fort called Wombinellore, ſome hundred bullocks well loaded and juſt ready to ſtart, with a conſiderable quantity of grain were captured. An eſcort, probably of the looty kind, were indebted for their ſafety to the ſpeed of their horſes, but, as there is reaſon to believe that KUMER UL DIEN CAWN, had been left behind by the Sultaun to deſtroy what grain could not be carried away from this quarter, theſe might have been ſtable horſe detached from his diviſion.

Having penetrated ſeveral defiles which from natural

(1) I have dwelt at greater length on the deſcription of the diſtricts, to the northward of the Cauvery, in the direction that the army marched, as no writings that have come to my knowledge make any particular mention of their appearance, produce, or ſoil. This, however, does not apply to the Barahmahl valley, or to any other tract of country on the route of Major General Maſſey.

advantages

advantages muſt ever admit of eaſy defence, the General on the 13th reached the leſs pervious paſs of Tapoor, and encamped in a cultivated plain, that was barely ſufficient to contain the army and the ſtores. This plain is the bottom of an irregular baſon formed by a partial break in a range of hills that run along the eaſtern ſide of the Barahmahl valley. It is acceſſible only by the road on which the contending powers marched, and, as a narrow pathway, which was all that was made previous to the war, had been widened through rocks and amongſt trees and jungles, the fatigue that the Myſoreans muſt have undergone before they accompliſhed ſo ſevere a taſk, in ſo ſhort a time, muſt have been very conſiderable. Near this bottom, there is a large piece of water, that receives a variety of rivulets from the ſurrounding mountains, which it diſcharges in one ſtream called the Tapoor river. The ruggedneſs of the country, on either hand, rendered it neceſſary to raiſe a road through an arm of this reſervoir that was from ten to twelve feet in depth, and although the entrance from the ſouthward has no very conſiderable aſcent, ſtill, from its ſudden and narrow windings, together with its jungly and uneven ſurface,

 the

the water is the part of the paſs on this ſide that can be penetrated with leaſt difficulty.

The march of next day was checkered with ſcenes new and intereſting. It commenced by aſcending a hill of conſiderable height that promiſed herculean labour when the heavy guns and ſtores were taken into conſideration. Throughout the war no ſuch aſcent again offered to the main army. The length of the riſe, the ſteepneſs of the mountain, and the narrowneſs of the road ſeemed to threaten defiance to all exertion. The ardour of the troops, the only effectual reſource on ſuch occaſions, overcame every difficulty; and, about noon, the advance guard came to its ground in the Barahmahl valley.

A very ſingular occurrence now attracted general attention. At firſt it appeared that a few ſtraggling houſes had been built on the oppoſite ſide of the valley at the bottom of the mountains. By degrees, however, this ſcene aſſumed different aſpects; canvaſs ſprung up; ſeveral flags became viſible; and, the approach of an immenſe cloud of duſt, evidently beſpoke an armament in motion as well as an encampment on the riſe. Whither this was friend or foe, no individual

dual could at the time declare. All was conjecture. The moſt obſerving men ventured not to form any judgement; at leaſt, they expreſſed none for which they could adduce reaſonable grounds. All reſted in ſuſpence. For a full hour, however, canvaſs continued to riſe on both ſides. At length, three guns fired in our line, on an ill-founded ſuppoſition, that the encampment in ſight appertained to the centre army, at once appriſed the enemy of his danger and diſcovered to us our miſtake. In an inſtant his canvaſs diſappeared. His flags were lowered to the ground. "He immediately decamped and haſtened up the ghauts by the Oodeadirgum paſs (1)."

Eagerly bent on a junction with Lieutenant Colonel MAXWELL's diviſion, Major General MEDOWS ſtill continued his march toward Coveripatam (2). Although he had received early information of Colonel MAXWELL's

(1) "General MEDOWS informed us that he had ſeen the enemy two days before, about "Twenty miles diſtant, on his return from Colonel MAXWELL, pitching his tents juſt as our "army had come to the ground, after a long fatiguing march through the Paſs of Tapoor; "that three guns having been fired as a ſignal to Colonel MAXWELL, the enemy immediately "decamped and haſtened up the Ghauts by the Oodeadirgum Paſs."—Preſident and Council of Fort St. George, in their political department, to the Court of Directors 20th Jan. 1792.

		Miles.	Fur.
(2) November, 13.	Oohmaloor,	10	6
14.	Tapoor,	16	
15.	Adamancottah,	11	2
16.	Poolampatty,	13	6

advance

advance into the enemy's country on the 24th of October, near three weeks had now elapsed without communication or intercourse of any kind between the two commanders, nor had any tidings whatever of the centre division been received in the grand army during that period. The nearness of the enemy's principal force, too, added to the anxiety of the General, and strengthened all other grounds of alarm.

Impressed with these reflections, from Poolamputty, the Commander in Chief detached Captain MACALISTER with five squadrons of cavalry in the direction of Kistnaghery, in order to ascertain the exact position of the other army (2). Conducted by that officer, Colonel MAXWELL effected the much wished for junction, on the following day. Although greatly inferior in number as to infantry, and out of all comparison with respect to cavalry, watchful, cautious, and firm, his movements tended to provoke rather than to decline an engagement. He effectually baffled every attempt of the Sultaun for

(2) "The army arrived here this day, and will remain until the force under your command joins, you are to move as expeditiously as possible to this place. This will be delivered to you by an officer commanding five squadrons of Cavalry sent towards Coveripatam and Kistnaghery in order to ascertain the exact situation of the camp under your command, as the Commander in Chief has not received any of your letters of a later date than the 30th of last month, nor any intelligence that can be depended upon. The officer commanding the five squadrons is directed to return with you, or before, as you shall order".—Instructions to Lieutenant Colonel MAXWELL, 16th November, 1790.

three

three successive days, and justly obtained the approbation of his General, in language equally expressive and sincere, for conduct, which though strongly marked with manliness and fire, was by no means deficient in judgement (3).

In order to account for the late unexpected appearance of the enemy at Palicode; to form a clear idea with respect to the actual strength of the contending armies in the neighbourhood of the Barahmahl valley at this stage of the war; to unite, by just relation, the operations of the centre division with those of Major General MEDOWS in one connected chain, as well as to enable military men when employed on similar services at future periods to derive some benefit from the great experience of Lieutenant Colonel COCKERELL, it will be necessary not only to detail the progress of Colonel MAXWELL previous to his junction with the grand army, but to state the equipment of his force, and to trace at least some corps of which it was composed to the stations from whence they were originally called forth.

(3) "The Commander in Chief is extremely obliged to Lieutenant Colonel MAXWELL for the high order in which he has brought up his division of the army, and for his spirited and judicious conduct in offering the enemy battle for two days with so great an inferiority without quitting his advantageous and well chosen post to provoke it. The Commander in Chief has every thing to hope from the fine appearance of the Bengal detachment under Lieutenant Colonel COCKERELL."—General Orders, 20th November, 1790.

Conformable

Conformable to a minute of council in the military department at Fort William (1), the 26th and 28th battalions of bengal infantry, received orders from Earl Cornwallis to join the detachment deſtined for the field in the Carnatic, and commenced their march from Barampoor on the 27th February 1790. They croſſed the Hoogly at Ghyretty; advanced towards the Subunreka (2), and on the ſouthern banks of that river they joined the troops then encamped under the command of Major Russel (3).

On the 19th of March Lieutenant Colonel Cockerell arrived in this encampment, he aſſumed the command of the detachment, proceeded towards the Carnatic on the 22d, and was joined at Ballaſore by Captain Edward

(1) See Note 1, p. 48.

(2)

		Miles.	Fur.
February 27, 1790.	Ghyretty,	3	
March 2,	Burragong,	9	4
3,	Doorhatty,	12	
4,	Myappoor,	18	
5,	Cumnulpohia,	18	
6,	Chandsconnah,	16	
8,	Creſta babu hadegia,	16	4
9,	Midnapoor,	12	
11,	S. bank of the Caſſai,	3	4
12,	Moherrumpoor,	12	4
13,	Shuckerabad,	10	
14,	Rana Serai,	6	
15,	South bank of the Danton,	7	
16,	Jellaſore,	13	
17,	S. Bank of the Subunreka,	4	3

(3) The 3d, 7th, 13th and 14th Bengal battalions.

Montague

Montague with half his company of artillery and four braſs ſix-pounders (4). On the 27th they continued their march; forded the Mahanada, and halted at Jaggernaut for two days, in order to indulge the Hindoos of the corps with an opportunity of worſhipping the deity.

The march of the day on which the detachment reached this celebrated Pagoda commenced through a paſs of about ſix miles in length. Woods, jungle, ſwamps, and ſand-banks render this a barrier of ſuch ſtrength that it can ſcarcely be penetrated by any body of troops in the face of a reſolute enemy. An extenſive plain, with ſeveral irregular clumps of trees, opens to the ſouthward of this paſs; and, although the Pagoda, which ſtands in the middle of a broad and long ſtreet, is of conſiderable height, it is, from lowneſs of ſituation,

(4) In order to avoid flats and ſhallows in the roads of Ballaſore it is neceſſary for ſhips to anchor at the diſtance of about ſix miles from the land. This, together with a heavy ſurf, and the violent breakers that conſtantly roll over the bar, renders the debarkation of troops or ſtores always difficult, often dangerous. It is only at high water that a large boat can be, at all get over the bar. The diſtance from the ſea to Ballaſore, by the river, is about twelve miles, although by land it is ſcarcely ſeven. Here, ſeveral Portugueſe families reſide, there is alſo a French factory; but the trade of both nations in this quarter is very inconſiderable. However, with the aſſiſtance of rents that ariſe from ſome trifling grants of land, they contrive to ſupport a church with all the neceſſary eſtabliſhment. Sannahs and other coarſe cloth are manufactured at Ballaſore, but grain and ſalt are the chief articles of commerce. It would appear, that the Eaſt India Company keep a Reſident here more for political purpoſes than with a view to trade. The inhabitants, chiefly Hindoos, are ſubject to the Phouſdar of Cuttack, and as they pay no fealty to the Engliſh, articles of conſumption cannot be procured without conſiderable difficulty.

W ſcarcely

ſcarcely diſcernible at the diſtance of five miles (1).

Amongſt ſeveral tanks that are to be ſeen in the neighbourhood of Jaggernaut, there is one that is ſaid to exceed all others throughout Hindoſtan in dimenſions. Here, pilgrims, of whatever deſcription, are obliged to perform the laſt of ſeven ablutions before they approach the ſanctuary. The principal building as it appears from the outſide of a high wall that ſurrounds the conſecrated ſpace, is nearly of a parallelopiped figure. Another building, of ſmaller dimenſions, is connected with the former by an arched paſſage; ſeveral, of inferior ſize, detached at ſome diſtance, within the encloſure, encircle the inner temples, and figures that muſt ever diſguſt Europeans cover the ſuperſtruc-

(1)

			Miles.	Fur.
March	22,	Cuddum Nullah,	11	
	23,	Holiah Nullah,	14	4
	24,	Ballaſore,	5	
	27,	Paleah Nullah,	11	4
	28,	Boody Chokey,	10	
	29,	Kaunkee Bunſee,	11	
	30,	Rance ka Talaw,	9	6
	31,	Tundy Nullah,	11	4
April	1,	Between Gungaretty and Retumee Rivers,	12	
	2,	Kurſoat River,	8	
	3,	Gaingtee River,	13	
	5,	Lackipoor,	14	
	6,	Purdumpoor,	6	4
	7,	Cuttack,	10	
	8,	Lallaentee,	6	4
	9,	Ballagouttee River,	6	4
	10,	Boodai ka Talaw, or Nierbala	14	
	11,	Jeggernaut,	15	

ture

ture on all ſides. Theſe, however, typify certain attributes of the Deity according to the Theological tenets of the Hindoos; and, like the crucifix and other images of the Papiſts, they ſerve to awaken emotions that too often require ſuch incitements.

The houſes of Jaggernaut are chiefly of ſtone, and generally from four to five ſtories in height. The ſtreets are neither ſo wide as thoſe at Edinburgh, nor ſo narrow as the lanes of Benares. They hold a medium between theſe extremes. The wretched appearance of the lower claſs of inhabitants, as well as the miſerable huts they dwell in, beſpeaks the utmoſt degree of poverty; and ſwarms of mendicant zealots, that macerate their frames by innumerable mortifications, crowd every avenue that leads to the Goal where their pilgrimage muſt end.

Amongſt the many grievous extortions of the Bramins, one that they practice here is equally irreconcilable to true religion and repugnant to humanity. After the pilgrim has, with the moſt inflexible reſolution and perſeverence, undergone every neceſſary probation, his body is ſeized and caſt into a dungeon until he delivers up all the money of which he is poſ-

ſeſſed. If poverty has fallen to his lot, and that nought is left him to beſtow, he is doomed to confinement, until death, haſtened by want of ſuſtenance, puts a period to his exiſtence.

The priſon made uſe of by theſe dreadful inquiſitors, for they have totally perverted the inſtitutions of Brama, is ſurrounded by a walled ſpace, or court, of conſiderable extent. Here, in ſcattered fragments, the remains of innumerable victims ſerve to heighten the miſery of confinement, by conſtantly reminding the unhappy devotees of the fate that muſt ultimately terminate their ſufferings. Juſt as the detachment paſſed the gate of this encloſure, three bodies that theſe miniſters of horror conveyed to ſome diſtance, together with the diſmal lamentations of the ſurviving priſoners attracted the notice of the Hindoo ſepoys; and, notwithſtanding the utmoſt attention to diſcipline, it had nearly been productive of fatal conſequences. The eagerneſs diſcovered by the troops to liberate the unhappy ſufferers, together with the humane interceſſion of Colonel COCKERELL, procured the enlargement of a conſiderable number. It was through a miſtake of the guides that the detachment witneſſed theſe ſcenes.

Some

Some other acts of oppreſſion, daily practiced here, are of a nature by far too ſhocking to lay before a chriſtian reader.

Towards the middle of April the whole again proceeded; they croſſed the Chilka-lake (1); forded the Godavery river; halted about ten days at Ellore; again continued their march; and, after fording the Kiſtnah, they were joined by Captain BARTON with his own company of artillery, which at that time eſcorted ten ſix and two twelve pounders. This company had been ſent from Fort William to Maſulipatam by ſea.

From the banks of the Kiſtnah the detachment ſet out on the 22d June, and reached Poonamalee after a march of nearly thirty days (2). Here, they were

(1) As troops on their march to the ſouthward approach the Chilka-lake it will be neceſſary to provide both forage and fuel for, at leaſt, four day's conſumption. Of the ſeveral branches of this lake where boats are required the moſt conſiderable is about ſeven hundred yards in width and of great depth. The lake is in general divided from the ocean by a ſand-bank from two to five hundred yards in breadth and about thirty feet above the level of the water in height. The difficulty, of dragging the carriages through the ſand rendered it neceſſary on the 18th, to ſend all the ſick and ammunition to Ganjam by ſea. Barren as this country appears it is covered with immenſe quantities of deer; abundance of ſalt fiſh with freſh mullets and ſoals were alſo procurable from the natives.

(2)

			Miles,	Fur.
June	22,	Yettepore,	3	0
	23,	Gunjall,	8	0
	24,	Sundale,	12	0
	25,	Beupollam,	14	0
	27,	Yantipollam,	15	0
	28,	Cupee Culwah Nullah,	9	4
	29,	Gundamah Nullah,	9	4
	30,	Ongole,	7	0

joined

joined by his Majeſty's 76th regiment, at that time commanded by an officer, who, throughout the war, furniſhed ample proofs that the qualifications neceſſary for the active ſoldier, are noways incompatible with thoſe that form the correct gentleman.

The detachment again proceeding, joined the troops encamped under the command of Colonel ROBERT KELLY at Conjeveram on the 1ſt of Auguſt (1). This force, denoted the centre army, was now formed into two

			Miles,	Fur.
July	2,	Bank of the Pallar River,	13	4
	3,	Bank of the Manjroo River,	13	4
	4,	Ramiapattam,	11	0
	5,	Mirahmilladoera,	11	5
	6,	Alloer,	13	4
	7,	Cooeloor,	10	0
	8,	Nellore,	8	0
	10,	Vincutty Chery,	10	4
	11,	Allumbole,	13	0
	12,	Gundoor,	4	0
	13,	Wanjelly,	12	0
	14,	Nvarpitt,	6	4
	17,	Akarumpauk,	10	1
	18,	Akamapitt,	10	0
	19,	Aurmpawk,	9	4
	20,	Goomapoody,	14	0
	21,	Perishpollam,	9	0
	22,	Arambaucum,	10	0
	23,	Poonamalee,	12	0

			Miles,	Fur.
(1) July	29,	Caukiloor Plain,	10	0
	30,	Perambaucum,	10	0
	31,	Palliloor,	9	0
Aug.	1,	Conjeveram,	12	0

brigades

brigades and a reſerve (2). The cannon with which it was ſupplied conſiſted of four eighteen pounders, eight twelve pounders, twenty ſix pounders, two three pounders, and two five and a half inch howitzers, the whole of braſs, and commanded by Major DAVID WOODBURN.

In quality or in diſcipline, the oldeſt ſoldier of the eaſt never beheld an army which ſurpaſſed that of Colonel KELLY. Of about nine thouſand five hundred fighting men, four hundred and fifty-ſix were native cavalry; ſix hundred and fifty-two Bengal artillery; four hundred and ſeven Madras artillery; one thouſand two hundred and twenty-ſix his Majeſty's infantry; four hundred and ſeventy the Company's European infantry; four thouſand four hundred and ninety-nine Bengal ſepoys; one thouſand three hundred and thirty-three Coaſt ſepoys; with nearly five hundred followers variouſly armed and difficult of deſcription.

Although all the calamities that uſually accompanied broils with the houſe of HYDER, in former periods, had

(2)

First Brigade	Second Brigade,	Reserve.
74th Regiment,	76th Regiment,	4th Madras E. Battalion,
3d Bengal Sepoy Battalion,	7th Bengal Sepoy Battalion,	21ſt ditto Sepoy ditto,
13th ditto ditto,	14th ditto ditto,	27th ditto ditto,
26th ditto ditto,	28th ditto ditto,	1ſt Regiment of Cavalry,
Lieut. Colonel MAXWELL,	Lieut. Colonel COCKERELL,	Major RUSSELL.

not

not as yet reached the vicinity of Fort St. George in full meaſure, ſtill the effects of the war were ſenſibly felt throughout every quarter of the Carnatic. The uncertainty of property; the unſettled ſtate of the country; the fears of the inhabitants; and, the conſequent neglect of cultivation, threatened a dearth of the neceſſary ſupplies, and encreaſed the wonted dependence on Bengal. Repeated deſultory inroads by the enemy's horſe, although checked with ſpirit and ſucceſs (1), contributed alſo to render the hardſhips of the times ſtill more grievous to the inhabitants, and to heighten the dependence on foreign ſupplies.

Anxious under theſe circumſtances, and in order to calculate with exactitude the daily conſumption of proviſion, Colonel KELLY on the 21ſt of the month, judged it incumbent on him, to diminiſh the number of followers, and to fix a poſitive ſtandard beyond which no rank or ſtation throughout the army ſhould be entitled to entertain a native. To the troops of the

(1) "The Commanding Officer of the Centre Army is happy to make public the following "paragraph of a letter from the Commander in Chief—and to expreſs at the ſame time, "his entire approbation of the ſpirit and alacrity of the officers and men, for their gal- "lant conduct in purſuing and defeating thoſe plunderers who lately viſited the Carnatic. "The Commander in Chief notices with particular pleaſure the alacrity and ſpirit of "the detachment made from the 1ſt Regiment of Native Cavalry, in puſhing and diſ- "perſing different parties of the Enemy's Horſe."—General Orders, 27th Auguſt, 1790.—

ſeveral

ſeveral eſtabliſhments he allowed in the following proportion—To Lieutenant Colonel COCKERELL as ſenior officer with the Bengal reinforcement, ſixty-four; to Major RUSSEL as commanding a brigade forty-eight; to each Captain twenty-four; to each ſubaltern fourteen; to each company of artillery nineteen; to each battalion of Bengal ſepoys three hundred and ſixty-ſix; to each company of laſcars twenty-eight, to the bazar of each battalion thirty; to the firſt regiment of native cavalry, as alſo, to each of his Majeſty's regiments one hundred and twenty; and to each battalion of Coaſt ſepoys two hundred.

But a few days had elapſed from the date of theſe regulations when the command of the troops aſſembled under Colonel KELLY, devolving by the death of that officer (2) on Lieutenant Colonel MAXWELL, as already

(2) The pen of that learned panegyriſt, Doctor RAMSAY, would in vain attempt to do juſtice to the various military qualifications of Colonel KELLY. Without having had the honor of his acquaintance, and not at all habituated to that ſpecies of writing I ſhrink from a taſk to which I feel ſo very unequal. The General ſenſe of the army; the feelings of his ſucceſſor; and, the laſt tribute to the ſoldier appear thus in the orders of the 24th September 1790. "Lieutenant Colonel MAXWELL is ſorry to announce to the centre "diviſion of the army in the field, the melancholy loſs it has ſuſtained in the death of its "veteran and able Commander whoſe remains will be interred this evening in the fort of "Arnee, and will move from head quarters at 3 P. M. in the following order. The "body will be eſcorted from head quarters to the grand parade in front of the artillery park, "by two mounted ſquadrons from the 1ſt regiment of native cavalry. The 4th battalion of "European Infantry, and a flank company from each battalion in the three brigades, drawn "up by ſeniority of brigades on the left of the 4th regiment, with their arms reverſed, "will form on the grand parade, to receive the body from the ſquadrons of horſe, who will "then form on the right of the 4th battalion and wait on their ground, until ordered to "lead the proceſſion by the Officer commanding the funeral party. The 4th European "battalion will follow the cavalry with their arms reverſed, the junior officers of the troops "leading each his reſpective diviſion. The body will follow next. The ſword and other military

noticed, the reduction of the Barahmahl Valley was entered upon with ample expectations. In every ſpecies of equipment this force was nothing behind that of Major General MEDOWS. The difference in numbers created but little uneaſineſs, as the relative ſituation of our main body and the enemy made an union apparently practicable, whenever the contingencies of the war ſhould render the meaſure neceſſary.

On the co-operation of the two armies much expectation was founded; equal in numbers and diſcipline to the centre force in the Carnatic, the army under General ABERCROMBIE, on the Malabar Coaſt, ſtrengthened every hope of ſucceſs; and, as the allies now preſſed on the enemy from all quarters, appearances again promiſed an early termination to the war, if not the total overthrow of the Sultaun.

" inſignia of the deceaſed borne on his coffin—His horſe next fully capariſoned and led. " The flank companies next with arms reverſed, and officers in inverted order, the whole " to be cloſed by the officers of the army off duty in inverted order likewiſe. As ſoon as " the proceſſion moves off the general parade, the drums and fifes will play the dead " march, and the guns from the park commence and continue to fire at intervals of a minute " between each, 54 rounds, being the number of guns correſponding with the age of the " deceaſed—On the approach of the proceſſion towards Arnee, a like number will be fired " from that fort at ſimilar intervals. The 4th battalion will form a lane in the fort of " Arnee, through which the corps will paſs to the place of interment; when the lane is " formed the battalion will ſtand faſt with arms reverſed as before, until the corps and " proceſſion ſhall have paſſed, it is then to reſt and reverſe arms and march by diviſions " to the place of interment, where it will remain reſting on its arms reverſed, until ordered " to fire three vollies by the officer commanding the party. The ſquadrons of horſe and the " flank companies of the army, will, for want of ſufficient room, be halted at a convenient " diſtance on the Glaſcis of the fort. Officer to command the funeral party Lieutenant " Colonel COCKBELL.

Although

Although the ſpirit of wiſdom that dictated conciliation of the natives to the Company's Government appears to have been well comprehended by thoſe entruſted with the management of affairs in the Eaſt, at former periods, the advantages which reſult from the practice of lenient meaſures, and from poſſeſſing the affections of that people, have not been felt in full force until the preſent times. Obſtacles formerly conſidered inſurmountable are now become as contingencies ever attendant on warfare. The prejudices of the ſepoys to expeditions by ſea appear for a time ſuſpended, if not altogether laid aſide. It is on this principle, too, that the pacific demeanour of thoſe who inhabited the borders of the Myſorean Empire, whether on the hills or in the vallies, can be beſt reconciled to reaſon, or accounted for with moſt probability of correctneſs.

If the principles and conduct of Chriſtian Governors are leſs calculated for the happineſs of the natives than thoſe of Mahomedan or Hindoo rulers; if the oppreſſions and extortions perpetually charged on the ſervants of the Eaſt India Company have any foundation in truth, it is ſomewhat remarkable, that on the en-

 trance

trance of our armies into the dominions of the enemy, the inhabitants of the borders, ſhould in general, ſeem to diſcover but little apprehenſion for the ſafety of their perſons, or for the ſecurity of their property, and but ſtill leſs concern at a change of maſters.

On the advance of Colonel MAXWELL into the Barahmahl valley (1), the fields covered with plentiful crops, were nowhere abandoned by the peaceful cultivators; the herdſman, as if conſcious of the invader's honour and the mildneſs of his ſupremacy, attended his numerous flocks; the weaver continued at his web, regardleſs of the calamities that the reſtleſsneſs of its ruler had brought upon the ſtate; and, the avaricious Bazar-man expoſed his whole ſtores to the ſoldiery without apprehenſion of injuſtice or deceit. Whilſt the line of conduct adopt-

					Miles.	Fur.
(1)	August	9,	1790,	Jamcallum,	9	0
		10,		Peonatoor,	11	0
		11,		Mumbaucum,	14	0
		12,		Weſt of Arnie,	6	0
		26,		Eaſt of Arnie,	6	0
	September	27,		Tirnery,	22	0
		28,		Arcot,	9	0
	October	18,		Trevancum,	5	0
		19,		Vellore,	9	0
		21,		Cuddipauttam,	14	0
		22,		Near Gencollam,	10	0
		23,		Ambore,	10	0
		24,		Vaniambuddy,	10	0

ed

ed by Colonel MAXWELL, was well calculated to confirm the confidence of ſuch as continued their occupations, it tended alſo to recall thoſe that from timidity took flight (2).

The poſſeſſions of the Sultaun in this quarter, previous to the war, were ſeparated from thoſe of the Eaſt India Company by a hedge and ditch incapable of defence, and intended ſolely as a boundary; Vaniambaddy, Sheagur, Tripatore, with various other inconſiderable mud forts, were abandoned at the approach of the army, or delivered up to detachments without oppoſition; and, beacons that blazed on the mountains, as ſignals of an approaching foe, were viewed with liſtleſs indifference by the Ryuts, and communicated concern to thoſe only who bore arms.

(2) "Lieutenant Colonel MAXWELL congratulates the Army which he has the honour to "command, on its having this day entered the enemy's country, where the troops will have an "opportunity of acquiring honor by the exertions of that bravery and diſcipline which he is "convinced they poſſeſs.—The conduct of the troops in the diſtricts throughout which they "have already paſſed, merits the higheſt encomiums, and the Commanding Officer truſts that "the ſame moderation will continue to mark their progreſs—for, it is his wiſh to attach the "inhabitants of theſe countries to the Britiſh Government, as well from a confidence of its "juſtice and humanity, as from the dread of its ſuperior power; and, he is confident the army "will readily ſecond his views; but, ſhould any individual of this army ſo far forget himſelf as "to injure the perſons or property of the Inhabitants of theſe diſtricts, many of whom have "received Cowle or aſſurances of protection from Government, he ſhall be ſeverely and inſtantly puniſhed.—It is to be conſidered as a ſtanding order that no perſon ſhall ſtraggle from "the line of march, or from camp, into the country or neighbouring villages for plunder, "even in thoſe diſtricts poſſeſſed by the enemy, which have not accepted Cowle—Any European, Sepoy, or Camp-follower, who ſhall be convicted for an offence ſo contrary to "Military Diſcipline, ſhall be puniſhed in a moſt exemplary manner."—General orders 24th October 1790.

Although

Although conſiderable quantities of grain had been captured in ſeveral forts already ſurrendered to the Britiſh troops; although a quantity ſtill greater had been purchaſed in the villages that lay on the route of the army; and, although much had been alſo procured by diſcovering concealments in the earth, diſtreſs fell upon the followers, who, notwithſtanding every precaution to the contrary, ſtill ſwarmed around the camp. The troops however were enabled to provide abundant ſupplies without recourſe to the original ſtock. In themſelves of no material import, the forts were readily entruſted to friendly Polygars at their own earneſt requeſts; paddy, pepper, fire arms, ammunition, with public ſtores of every deſcription were ſecured for the benefit of the troops or their employers; and, the agents appointed to take charge of property captured had a line for their conduct diſtinctly drawn, and pointed out, ſo as to become viſible to the moſt moderate capacity (1).

(1) "The Committee for regulating the management of prizes taken from the enemy, having "applied to the Commanding Officer, to inveſt the Prize Agents with full and complete power "to execute the truſt committed to their charge, and alſo to determine in what ſituation, and "under what circumſtances property found, be conſidered as the right of the army; Lieutenant "Colonel MAXWELL in compliance with their requeſt directs, that all Treaſure, Grain, Cattle "and property of every kind, excepting Arms and Military Stores, which have been or may hereafter be taken from the enemy by this army or by any detachment from it, ſhall be deemed

Early

Early in the month of November, Colonel MAXWELL approached the hill fort of Kiſtnaghery (2). although of itſelf ſcarcely acceſſible, this rock is rendered ſtill more formidable by well conſtructed walls and batteries, nature, too, as if with intention to ſtrengthen the fortreſs, has provided the valley in its vicinity, with jungles and other obſtacles that muſt ever obſtruct the approach of an enemy, and render their advance liable to be diſputed by inferior numbers. On reconnoitring the hill an attack upon it by regular approaches was deemed imprudent, and, as the garriſon was fully acquainted with its danger, a ſurpriſe could not be attempted with any probability of ſucceſs. The only point from whence any annoyance could be given to

"Prizes and the gentlemen who have been appointed Prize Agents, are empowered to take "poſſeſſion of the ſame, and to diſpoſe of it at their pleaſure for the benefit of the Army. In "ſuch diſtricts as take Cowle from the Company, the inhabitants are to be ſecured in the poſ"ſeſſion of their property in the ſame manner as any other ſubjects of the Company, but all pro"perty proved to belong to the Sircar, is to be conſidered as a Prize, and ſecured by the Agents "as ſuch. When Agents receive information of ſuch property, they are immediately to apply to "the Adjutant General to order a guard for its ſecurity, and if after examining the proofs, "they are ſatisfied, the property in queſtion is not private, they will report the ſame to the "Commanding Officer, who will order it to be taken by them for the benefit of the Army.—One "or more of the Agents will accompany the Officer who takes poſſeſſion of any garriſon taken "from the enemy, to take an account of the property found in it—They will take particular "notice to report to the Commanding Officer, if they meet with Arms or Military Stores in "their ſearch—and Officers commanding ſuch garriſons, are directed to give every aſſiſtance to "the Prize Agents in the performance of this part of their duty."

			Miles,	Fur.
(2)	October 27,	North of Tripatore,	10	0
	28,	South of Tripatore,	5	4
	31,	Malpaddy,	12	0
	November 1,	Near Kiſtnagery,	9	0

the

the troops on the top of the hill was at a diſtance too conſiderable to promiſe material advantage, but, as the poſt is now in poſſeſſion of the Company, minute deſcription may not be ſtrictly proper. Blue lights blazed on the ramparts at night; a few ſhots were fired on the engineers that reconnoitred the works; and, as the army marched on the 3d of the month, ſome guns opened without effect upon the line.

It was not until the 9th that any enemy whatſoever offered materially to diſturb the advance of the centre diviſion; an elephant and ſome bullocks were carried off by Looties on that day; ſeveral followers were miſerably mangled; and, various teſtimonies corresponded in confirmation of the Sultaun's near approach. Captain VIGORS of the Madras Eſtabliſhment, had been ſent back towards Amboor on the 4th of the month, with twelve companies of ſepoys, in order to eſcort a quantity of proviſion for the army; and, as his return was daily expected about this period, the danger to which he was expoſed, gave riſe to much alarm; however, having obtained correct information of the enemy's approach, he changed the direction of his march, and by a circuitous route, he joined the army

army on the eleventh with his convoy in ſafety.

Juſt as Captain VIGORS returned "the enemy's irregular horſe having driven off ſome cattle from the front of the camp, where they were grazing, the 1ſt regiment of cavalry imprudently purſued them through a narrow paſs, on the other ſide of which three thouſand horſe regularly drawn up immediately attacked them. Under theſe diſadvantages, however, the regiment made good their retreat, but not without conſiderable loſs. Lieutenant FONBLANQUE, Cornets Hoare and DE MORGAN, with fifty men and horſes, were reported miſſing. Cornet DE MORGAN was ſaid to have been killed, the other officers wounded and taken (1)."

News of theſe untoward circumſtances having reached the encampment, Colonel MAXWELL iſſued immediate directions to form the line. In order to cover the cavalry in their retreat he advanced towards the paſs with every expedition that the reduced ſtate of of his cattle would admit; but, as the enemy had ſucceeded, probably beyond their expectations, and, as

(1) Lieutenant Colonel MAXWELL to the Preſident and Council of Fort St. George, November, 1790.

night approached faſt, they diſcontinued the purſuit and retired to their encampment. Various accounts ſay that the horſe employed on this ambuſcade were ſupported by a ſtrong battalion of infantry.

It was now evident that the Sultaun oppoſed the centre diviſion in perſon with his principal force. A choice of difficulties afforded Colonel MAXWELL but little room to heſitate. To retreat muſt have been leſs diſgraceful than dangerous. To advance, not leſs hazardous, than inconſiſtent with inſtructions. The reſult of mature deliberation, which dictated reſiſtance of the enemy's approach in the poſition moſt capable of defence, appears to have been founded on the beſt principles of reaſon, and to have been executed with much tactical ſkill.

In full expectation of an attack, the Commanding Officer of the centre army, on the morning of the 12th, croſſed the Panaur river, leaving his encampment in charge of the 1ſt brigade. After reconnoitring he took every poſſible advantage of the ground. He extended the line from the 7th Bengal battalion on the right with his Majeſty's 76th regiment, the Coaſt ſepoys, and the 4th Carnatic European regiment. To the left

and

and nearly at right angles with the line, the greateſt part of the 28th Bengal battalion were ſtrongly poſted with a rock on either flank and paddy-fields with a deep ſwamp in front. In the rear of this diviſion the cavalry were completely concealed from the enemy; and, on a riſing ground which commanded a view of the country all round, and ſituated about the centre of the line, the commanding officer with two companies of the 28th battalion, and one twelve-pounder continued for the day.

In this ſituation, the Sultaun, repeatedly lowered on Colonel MAXWELL. Alternately in front, and on the left, about ſix thouſand horſe ſupported by a conſiderable body of infantry, with elephants and guns, threatened an attack. The nearer the Myſorean approached his antagoniſt, the leſs he was ſatisfied with his poſition. By various manœvres, he in vain attempted to decoy Colonel MAXWELL from his ſtrong hold. Towards three o'clock, he formed for the laſt time on this day at the bottom of the hills to the right; and, after ſhewing a line of more than three miles in length he reluctantly withdrew to his camp at ſunſet. Covered by the 28th Bengal battalion, the Britiſh troops in the

evening quitted their well choſen poſition, and recroſſing the river, they occupied their former ground.

As the enemy did not appear on the 13th, in force ſufficient to require that the troops ſhould ſtand to their arms, it is likely that a conſiderable part of their infantry and guns had not as yet arrived. Their formidable appearance on the 12th, however, muſt have occaſioned conſiderable alarm; and, it was from thence, probably, that an iſſue of five days rice to the army and the followers at this period took its riſe. On the appearance of the Myſoreans cloſe to our camp early in the morning of the 14th, orders were iſſued to form the line. Large bodies of horſe followed by heavy columns of infantry and ſupported with abundance of guns advanced in regular order. Our line, which conſiſted of the 1ſt and 2d brigades, changing front to the left, drew up acroſs the valley with the hills ranging on either flank; the baggage covered by the reſerve was thrown in the rear; and, three companies entruſted with grain in Coveripatam had no ſooner been withdrawn than the Sultaun who remained on the oppoſite ſide of the river, ſent to occupy the poſt.

Swarms

Swarms that advanced in front of our left apparently meditated an attack, but they were deterred by the fire of a gun and muſketry. Againſt our right their attempts were equally unſucceſsful. Foiled in their firſt deſign they croſſed the river and thronged in front of this quarter. A gun that opened with excellent aim, together with the determined countenance of the line, recalling to their remembrance the conduct of the gallant detachment at Sattimungulum, darkened every gleam of ſucceſs and awakened all their fears. Diſheartened and grieved at ſo many inſtances of judgment and ſcientific knowledge, the enemy withdrew from the centre army; and, the veracity of the hircarrah that reported the death of Colonel KELLY in the Myſorean camp, becoming now doubtful, it is ſaid, that his life was ſacrificed to the high opinion entertained of that officer by the Sultaun

It has been already ſhewn, that Tippoo appeared about noon, on the 15th of this month, before Major General MEDOWS, on the weſtern ſide of the Barahmahl Valley in full force; it is well known that his fears conducted him rapidly from thence not leſs than fifteen miles in the direction of Oodeadirgum without

one

one halt; and, as the ſun had nearly ſet on the 14th before he withdrew from Colonel MAXWELL at Coveripatam, he muſt have performed a journey of at leaſt forty-five miles in about twenty-four hours, notwithſtanding every incumbrance of cannon, proviſions and all the neceſſary equipments of an army. His judgment, too, in the poſitions that he occupied and in the arrangement of his marches is equally entitled to admiration as the wonderful celerity of his motion. The ground on which he intended to encamp at Pallicode, was not only well calculated to ſecure a retreat to Myſore by a Paſs the moſt eaſy of acceſs, but it would have placed him from eight to ten miles beyond the line by which the Engliſh troops could beſt approach each other.

Until the arrival of the armies at Poolamputty, it does not appear that the original intention of entering Myſore from the Coimbatore country had undergone either ſuſpenſion or change. With a force, now, far ſuperior in numbers and equipment to any that Great Britain had aſſembled in India at a former period, and "ſufficient (in the General's opinion) to ſecure his "convoys and to keep open the communication with "Paligautcherry

"Paligautcherry and Coimbatore, he meant forthwith "to proceed up the Coveriporum Paſs, and to take "poſt at the head of the Guzzlehatty, until the bat-"tering train expected from Bombay ſhould join, "and enable him to proceed to the ſiege of Serin-"gapatam (1)." The idea of invaſion by this route, laſting but for a ſhort while, was, from an unexpected movement of the enemy, in its turn laid aſide for the original plan of operations.

Inſtead of any attempt to defend the kingdom of Myſore againſt the grand army thus re-inforced, and doubly ſenſible by the junction of Colonel MAXWELL, of his inequality to face Major General MEDOWS in the field, the Sultaun, in order to give alarm for the Company's poſſeſſions upon the Coaſt, and for the ſafety of their garriſons in the conquered countries, determined to return of a ſudden to the eaſtward. By carrying the war into the heart of the Carnatic, he expected to withdraw the attention of the Engliſh Commander, from his intended invaſion, to the defence of his own poſſeſſions; by pointing towards Coimbatore, he threatened the ſeveral garriſons, as well as the

(1) Preſident and Council of Fort St. George to the Court of Directors, 20th January, 1791.

numerous

numerous ſupplies, collected in the diſtricts that had been lately acquired; and, by deſcending through the paſs of Tapoor, either, or both, of theſe operations lay perfectly at his option. For a time his ſucceſs was equal to the boldneſs of this deſign.

Although the two Britiſh armies were in readineſs to act collectively againſt the enemy in caſe of emergency, they continued to march and encamp in ſeparate diviſions for ſome days after they approached Poolamputty. Waſte of time in this ſituation of affairs would not have been conſiſtent with the known character of either of the oppoſing commanders. By break of day on the 18th, both powers were in motion in order to put their reſpective plans in execution. The Sultaun had, with deep deſign, ſhewn a decided intention to aſcend the Ghauts at Oodeadirgum; yet, relying on our want of intelligence, he doubled back from Pallicode, and re-croſſing the Barahmahl Valley, ſome miles to the ſouthward of Darampoory, his advance entered the Tapoor paſs before noon. Major General MEDOWS, leaving Colonel MAXWELL to follow in two or three hours with his diviſion, moved alſo towards Tapoor on his way to Coveriporum.

As

As our army approached the paſs, ſwarms of horſe were ſeen in front and on the right flank. A ſcorching ſun ſhone with uncommon heat; not a breath of wind was from the heavens; and, immenſe clouds of duſt that darkened the ſky not only beſpoke an armament in motion but ſtrongly indicated flight, terror, and confuſion at the entrance into the jungle. The Myſorean horſe, however, betrayed no ſigns of fear. Their moſt formidable body, probably about two thouſand, drew up on a riſing ground in the centre of the Barahmahl Valley.

With much diſplay of ſuperior diſcipline, our cavalry approached this force in open column of march, from the right of troops, preſerving intervals to form the line. The General headed the brigade in perſon; guns ſtrengthened either flank; yet the enemy diſcovered no apprehenſions of danger, no tokens of diſmay. With a firm countenance they threatened to oppoſe our advance; unequal to that, they attempted to inveigle our General from the principal object of purſuit; and, when ſtratagem could not prevail, bodies poſted for the purpoſe, covered their infantry by a manful diſpute of the heights. It was to cannon well ſerved by Lieutenant MACKIE, of the Coaſt eſtabliſhment, that they gave way; and, as if

 ſtruck

ſtruck with excellence of diſcipline more than proweſs, regardleſs of our martial appearance, they waited the ſhock of a charge, and reluctantly yielded each high ground to the meſſengers and not to the thunder of our guns.

The column in the centre of the valley retreated in a weſterly direction in order to attract the attention of the Engliſh commander from the paſs. In this they did not ſucceed. The brigade wheeled gently to the left; advanced in excellent order; and, as the artillery opened afreſh the horſe ſucceſſively fell back to eminences in their rear. Still bent on covering the infantry, and, alternately ſecuring the retreat of each other, as one party gave way another preſented a new front: Nor did they ceaſe theſe exertions until the nature of the country would no longer permit them to act.

The day was far in the decline; the crowds in the paſs hurried along by their fears gained ground on the purſuers; our troops exhauſted by a march of nineteen miles in a burning ſun, felt much occaſion for reſt from their fatigues; and, as the Myſorean horſe broke off in different directions ours returned towards the valley. The laurels acquired at Tapoor fell ſhort of expectation.

tion (1). To indulge a vein of conjecture on probable contingencies, in the event of further purſuit, might groſsly miſlead the reader, prove contemptuous of the General's judgement, and bear a conſtruction of impertinence to the whole army, and poſſibly of impoſition on the public at large. To connect a true relation of facts, in themſelves highly important, was the intention of this ſketch at the beginning; the original deſign gains ſtrength with the progreſs; and, from his firſt principle the writer is determined not to deviate one ſingle jot throughout the work.

Where the maſter-ſprings of motion in weighty concerns are ſtrict honour, diſintereſted zeal, upright diſcharge of duty, the aſſaſſin that indulges a miſchievous inclination to cenſure and abuſe, clogs the wheels of the beſt regulated machine, tears aſunder the ſtrongeſt bonds by which mankind are united, and endangers the very exiſtence of ſociety. "Diſappointment and failure" (2) are epithets by far too harſh when beſtowed on the firſt campaign in a manner ſo unqualified; "Partial ſucceſs"

	M.
(1) November 3d Cauverypatam,	8
17th Poolampooty,	14
18th North of Tapoor paſs,	19

(2) Rennell's marches of the Britiſh armies, page 8.

is

is ſtill more injurious when applied to the exertions that brought the war to ſo happy an iſſue; the principal actor, would ſpurn, at the expence of another, that to which he is, of himſelf, ſo juſtly entitled by every rule of right; the brilliant ſucceſſes above the Ghauts require no foils from the plains to ſet them off; and, although Major General MEDOWS was not enabled to force the enemy to a deciſive engagement, each meeting brought gladneſs to his heart, whilſt that of the Sultaun was frozen with fear.

Whereſoever rocks, jungles, or other obſtacles narrowed the paſſage on the march of the 19th, carcaſes of horſes and bullocks blocked up every path; fragments of tumbrils and gun carriages, ſtill burning, were ſcattered all over the principal road; and quantities of ſhot with various other articles difficult of conveyance, ſtrewed in every direction, furniſhed evident proofs of confuſion and terror. Unincumbered with baggage, Major General MEDOWS diſentangled his troops from the jungles in one day, but the diviſion of Colonel MAXWELL, detained by the ſtores and the train, encamped in the middle of the paſs, on the ground occupied by the grand army the 14th of this month.

About

About two hundred and fifty horſe poſted at the ſouth eaſt extremity of Tapoor, haſtened to acquaint the Sultaun, then at Dyaſundrum, with the approach of the Britiſh forces, and the conſequent ſucceſs of his deſigns.

Here a march of about forty miles furniſhes another conſpicuous inſtance of the rapidity with which the Myſorean moved, of his dexterity in the management of an inferior army, and of the facility with which he could avoid action, or eſcape from purſuit. If in addition to thoſe already adduced, more inſtances ſhould be neceſſary to prove the inutility of chaſing this enemy with a force equipped like ours, his firſt march from Dyaſundrum would fully anſwer the purpoſe; on that day he paſſed over a country of at leaſt thirty miles. In truth, as to the movement of an army with expedition, he appears to have attained a pitch of perfection unheard of in other countries at any period.

The junction of Colonel MAXWELL's diviſion, with that of Major General MEDOWS on the 20th (1), was immediately

(1) Arrangement of the army under Major General MEDOWS.—Cavalry brigade, Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD commanding, to conſiſt of his Majeſty's 19th regiment light dragoons, the 1ſt, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th regiments native cavalry, Major of brigade, Captain DALLAS, Quarter Maſter, Lieutenant DELMONTO, Aid de camp Lieutenant GREKIE. Firſt brigade, Major SKELLY commanding, to conſiſt of his Majeſty's 36th, 52d, and 76th regiments, ſix twelve pounders, and ſix fives, Major of brigade, Lieutenant NIGHTINGALE

mediately followed by an arrangement of the whole into ten brigades, and two parks of artillery. Theſe, excluſive of a body called the advance, were divided into two wings. The cavalry formed one brigade, the others conſiſted of a detail of infantry and ordnance. In each wing there were four brigades, with two eighteen pounders on either flank, and a park of artillery in the centre. The advance conſiſted of cavalry, ordnance, and one brigade of infantry. Lieutenant Colonel STEWART commanded the right wing, Lieutenant

Second brigade, Lieutenant Colonel CLARKE commanding, to conſiſt of his Majeſty's 71ſt 72d, and 74th regiments, ſix twelve-pounders and ſix ſixes, Major of brigade, Lieutenant Sir GEORGE LEITH, Bart. Third brigade, Lieutenant Colonel COCKERELL commanding, to conſiſt of the 3d, 13th, and 26th Bengal battalions native infantry, and ſix ſixes, Major of brigade, Captain DOUGLAS, Quarter Maſter Lieutenant M'DOWALL. Fourth brigade, Major RUSSEL commanding, to conſiſt of the 7th, 14th, and 28th Bengal battalions native infantry, and ſix ſixes, Major of brigade, Lieutenant OGG, Quarter Maſter Lieutenant YOUNGSTONE. Fifth brigade, Lieutenant Colonel OLDHAM commanding, to conſiſt of the 1ſt, 10th, and 22d battalions coaſt native infantry, and ſix ſixes, Major of brigade, Captain BANNERMAN, Quarter Maſter Lieutenant GIBBINS. Sixth brigade, Major LANGLEY commanding, to conſiſt of the 2d, 7th, and 21ſt battalions coaſt native infantry, and ſix ſixes, Major of brigade, Captain COSBY, Quarter Maſter Lieutenant CAMPBELL. Seventh brigade, Lieutenant Colonel DUPONT commanding, to conſiſt of 4th, 9th, and 23d battalions coaſt native infantry, and ſix ſixes, Major of brigade, Captain TURING, Quarter Maſter Lieutenant GRAHAM. Eight brigade, Major CUPPAGE commanding, conſiſting of the 5th, 6th, and 25th battalions coaſt native infantry, and ſix ſixes, Major of brigade, Captain GRANT, Quarter Maſter Lieutenant CUPPAGE. Ninth brigade, Major GOWDIE commanding, conſiſting of the Honourable Company's 4th European regiment, 13th and 27th battalions coaſt native infantry, two twelves and ſix ſixes, Major of brigade, Lieutenant CRANSTONE, Quarter Maſter Lieutenant RAND—Lieutenant Colonel STEWART to command the right wing which is to conſiſt of the 1ſt, 3d, 5th, and 7th brigades native infantry, with a park in the centre. Lieutenant YOUNG Aid de camp, Lieutenant WILKES Supernumery Aid de camp. Lieutenant Colonel MAXWELL to command the left wing which is to conſiſt of the 2d, 4th, 6th, and 8th brigades with a park in the centre. Captain CLARK Aid de camp, Captain AGNAW Supernumerary Aid de camp. Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD to command the advance, which is to conſiſt of the cavalry and the 9th brigade. Lieutenant Colonel GEILS commands the artillery of the army. Aid de camp Lieutenant CURRI, Brigade Major Lieutenant CONAN. Major General MUSGRAVE to command the line under the Governor and Commander in chief.

Colonel

Colonel MAXWELL the left, and Lieutenant Colonel FLOYD continued in charge of the advance.

Whatever advantages the union of the armies and the conſequent arrangements promiſed to the public cauſe, they materially affected the intereſts of individuals, and in particular of ſuch as held ſtaff appointments under Lieutenant Colonel MAXWELL. The gentlemen that officiated in the ſeveral departments of Adjutant General, Quarter-Maſter-General, Commiſſary of grain and proviſions, Pay-maſter, Muſter-Maſter, Surgeon-Major, Perſian Interpreter, Superintendant of Bazars, Baggage-Maſter, Commiſſary of Stores, were informed that their appointments muſt diſcontinue: Nay, ſuch was the ſtrict attention to œconomy that even the Provoſt was laid aſide. The articles in charge of thoſe whoſe appointments had ceaſed were delivered over to ſuch as filled ſimilar ſtations with Major General MEDOWS, and the army changing ground next day encamped agreeably to the new arrangement.

The ſevere fatigues that the enemy had of late undergone, and the degree of ſecurity that he acquired by the rapidity of his marches enabled him to

move

move with more leiſure in the vicinity of Sankeridergum, and to provide himſelf with all neceſſary ſupplies from that ſtrong-hold. Againſt the poſts in the conquered countries he abandoned every deſign. The danger that muſt have attended his croſſing the Cauvery gave ſecurity to that quarter, and as the troops that formerly protected the Carnatic, withdrawn from thence, were now ſome diſtance in his rear, he was certain that whilſt he laid waſte that country but little oppoſition could be made to his progreſs.

CHAPTER

CHAPTER THE FIFTH.

THE neceſſities that dictated a temporary ſuſpenſion of the Nawob's authority over the revenues of the Carnatic (1), introduced, at the ſame time, a claim on the Eaſt India Company, which although in itſelf apparently juſt, was on conſideration deemed utterly inadmiſſible, from its tendency to injure many reſpectable ſubaltern officers. Commandants of Sebandy and other corps, in the employ of his Highneſs, who formerly depended on certain diſtricts for their ſubſiſtence, expected, with the revenues of theſe diſ-

(1) "We pointed out to his Lordſhip in Council, the impolicy of depending, for our principal reſources, at a time when the greateſt exertions were neceſſary, and pecuniary ſupplies of the utmoſt importance, upon the operations and management of the Nawob's Government, of which the ſyſtem was perhaps as defective and inſufficient as any upon earth; and we did not hiſitate to declare it as our unqualified opinion, that this Government ought during the war, to take the Nawob's country under their own management, as affording the only means by which the reſources to be derived from it could be realized and the fidelity and attachment of the Poligars and Tributaries ſecured, which is of the utmoſt importance to the ſucceſsful operations of the war."—Governor and Council, Fort St. George to the Court of Directors, 16th September 1790.—For further particulars, ſee Appendix No. 10.

tricts, to be transferred to the Company; and, with their men, to find employment on the uſual allowances of the Madras eſtabliſhment, following after the youngeſt captain in rank.

Much diſtreſs brought on meritorious individuals at the expiration of aſſigned revenue on a former occaſion (1), pointed out the propriety of non-compliance with applications that muſt have led to ſimilar evils whenever the preſent aſſumption ſhould ceaſe. The expence neceſſarily attendant on taking whole corps with their full compliment of commiſſioned and non-commiſſioned officers into pay, preſented alſo an inſurmountable bar to this application; eſpecially, as men perfectly qualified for that duty might be found in a large eſtabliſhment of native invalids already maintained on the coaſt. Under theſe circumſtances it was judged adviſable not to admit any of the Nawob's officers into the Company's ſervice with rank above that of enſign, conformable to a principle which had been laid down for the military appointments at the commencement of the war.

(1) The corps here alluded to were commanded by the Captains Cockrane and Cudmore; by the Lieutenants Gordon, Dunbar, Livingstone, Halcot, Jacobs, and Hammond.

It

It was directed by Major General Medows that whatever number of troops ſhould be judged neceſſary for the collection of the aſſumed revenue, ſhould be formed into corps in the ſame manner, and on the ſame principle, as the eight battalions already employed on that ſervice (2). Beſides the vakeels and neceſſary ſtaff appointments, each battalion was to conſiſt of one European invalid commiſſioned officer, three European invalid non-commiſſioned officers, five ſubadars, five jemadars, twenty-five havildars, fifteen naicks, with eighty ſepoys, the whole to be taken from the invalids already on pay. The new levies, on their being formed into battalions by the officers commanding at the ſtations where their ſervices would be of moſt advantage, were to have their proportion of invalids drawn from the neareſt garriſons; and, the ſix corps, each conſiſting of five hundred and twenty privates, beginning at nine, were to be numbered upwards in ſucceſſion.

After the advance of Colonel Maxwell into the enemy's dominions, it does not appear that any officer, in particular, aſſumed the command of the troops in the centre diviſion. The commandants of the ſeveral

(2) See Page 48.

ſtations communicated with government on all matters neceſſary for their information, and received inſtructions occaſionally from the Board and from the General, except on what regarded the detail and diſcipline of the troops: The direction of theſe points the Commander in Chief reſerved for himſelf alone. With reſpect to recruits, returns, the circulation of General Orders, the neceſſary attention to individuals whoſe time of ſervice had expired; and the paſſes uſually ſigned by the Adjutant General, every communication was held with the Town-Major of Fort St. George. Indeed, the diſtance of the ſeveral garriſons from Head Quarters, muſt have occaſioned ſuch a delay in many matters that required the immediate attention of government, as to render any other mode of carrying on theſe duties tedious and hurtful.

From Wimbenellore (1) the General ſet out on the 22d, regulating the march of the army nearly on the ſame principle as before the junction of the force under Colonel MAXWELL (2). The diſtribution of pio-

(1) Nov. 19, Dyaſundrum, Miles, Fur. 14 2
20, Wombynellore, or Oobmalloor, 7 6

(2) "General Orders, Camp at Wombenellore, 21ſt November, 1790—Parole Saliſbury—for the day to-morrow, Major SKELLY—next for duty Major RUSSEL—The ſecond brigade gives the guard for the Money Tumbrils; the 5th the Brigade Major of the day; and

neers,

neers; the arrangement for protection of the baggage; the diſpoſition to be obſerved in the event of a neceſſity to form the line; and, the detail for the advance, rear, and other guards, underwent no material alteration, beſides an addition of ſtrength. The army proceeded for ſeveral days in a ſoutherly direction, and by the 27th of the month encamped at Veyloor on the banks of the Cauvery (3).

Although the Sultaun had moved from the vicinity of Sankeridirgum, towards the Carnatic, by the route of Namcul and Trichinopoly; it does not appear that

"the 5th and 6th a battalion each for the advanced Piquets—The General to beat at four to-"morrow morning, the aſſembly at five, and the army moves off immediately after from the "left—Order of march by half Companies, preſerving the proper intervals. Baggage on the "left, flanked by a regiment of native cavalry. The rear guard to be commanded by Major "DARLEY, with the 5th regiment of native cavalry and the battalion on piquet. The advance under Colonel FLOYD with the exception of the detail ordered for the rear guard and "for the baggage flank, is to move into the road as early as poſſible after the General beats "with the diviſion of pioneers in the left wing. The diviſion of pioneers in the right wing "to move on the right flank cloſe to the leading brigade of the right wing after furniſhing the "detail ordered for the baggage maſter with the flanking regiment. The Quarter Guards are "in future to pitch three hundred yards in front of their reſpective corps or as near that diſ-"tance from the Bills of arms as the nature of the ground will admit, the order placing them "under the field officer of the day is countermanded. Commanding Officers of wings and "the Commiſſary of Stores, to report to the officer commanding the line; and, the officer "commanding the line to the Commander in Chief. The Commiſſary of Stores will alſo re-"port the ordnance ſtores to the commanding officer of artillery as uſual—Orderly hours in "future on halting days at twelve, and on marching days at five—Brigade and regimental "Quarter Maſters with the Quarter Maſter Serjeants and Camp colour men to be formed and "marched regularly on the flanks of the advance oppoſite to its centre, viz. the detail from "the right wing on the right flank and the detail from the left wing on the left flank until "their attendance in front is called for by the Quarter Maſter General, to mark out the "ground of encampment."

(3) Nov. 22, Kavottyrungumpaliam, Miles, Fur. 5 4
23, Mallaſundrum, 14 0
24, Irrapetty, 10 4
26, Paloor near Paremutty, 11 0
27, Valoor, 6 4

the

the General had as yet, altogether, abandoned the design of entering Myſore by one of the paſſes to the Southward (1). The 5th and 8th brigades croſſed the river on the 28th under the command of Lieutenant Colonel OLDHAM; and, Major YOUNGE with the 4th regiment of Cavalry followed in the ſame direction a few days afterwards. The ſtrength of this detachment; the attention beſtowed on the Magazines in the conquered diſtricts (2); the eagerneſs with which the General ſought after boats in every direction (3); and, his inſtructions to different officers ſent on the recruiting ſer-

(1) "The Cauvery is riſen ſo conſiderably within thoſe two days, that it has been impoſſible to croſs over all the ordnance, Stores, and ſick deſtined for Carrore in charge of the 8th Brigade commanded by Major CUPPAGE. The General has therefore directed Lieutenant Colonel OLDHAM who commands the Detachment of Troops on the ſouth Bank, to dispatch a Battalion, and two troops of cavalry with the ſick and articles in the ſtore department, that have croſſed. This eſcort is to join Lieutenant Colonel OLDHAM's detachment again immediately, that is to ſay, the day after it arrives at Carrore, and is to bring back, all the doolies and doolie bearers, that accompanied the ſick, and all the carriage in the ſtore department employed in removing the ſtores. They are to be loaded on their return, with ſuch proportion of camp equipage, from Carrore, for the uſe of the army as they can carry, and the General deſires that you will accordingly direct it to be delivered to the order of Captain BELL the Commiſſary of ſtores, and that the eſcort may be delayed at Carrore as little time as poſſible. The four iron eighteen-pounders, and one of the braſs eighteen-pounders at Carrore, are to be held in readineſs to be ſent to camp."—Adjutant General to Captain PARR, 30 November, 1790.

(2) "The ſupply of grain at Carrore is of ſo much importance to the future operations of the army that the Commander in Chief is convinced your draſts upon it for the uſe of the troops under your command will be as ſparing as poſſible. Captain Parr is inſtructed to comply with the indents for grain that you authorize"—Inſtructions to Lieutenant Colonel OLDHAM, 5th December, 1790.

(3) "The commander in chief underſtands that you have at Carrore ſome boats, ſuch as are generally uſed on the Cauvery, and deſires that you will ſend them as expeditiouſly as poſſible under charge of a ſufficient eſcort from your garriſon to the ford at Veyloor, about eight miles up the river from Munganore. Major YOUNGE proceeds to-morrow with a detachment by that route to Carrore, as the ford of this place is not aſcertained to be ſo good as

vice

vice (4) argue ſtrongly in favor of this opinion. However, the formidable appearance of the Sultaun at Munſapett towards the latter end of November threatened an intention to beſiege Trichinopoly; and, although Colonel BRIDGES, then commandant, diſcovered no apprehenſions of danger, the importance of that poſt (5) unavoidably ſummoned the General to its defence.

"the ford at Veyloor, where Lieutenant Colonel OLDHAM's detachment croſſed. As Major "YOUNGE's detachment will remain on this ſide the Cauvery at the above ford until he has "an opportunity of croſſing, the General deſires you will direct the Officer commanding the "Eſcort with the boats to give the Major immediate notice of his arrival on the oppoſite "bank. It is ſuppoſed that any basket boats you may have at Carrore may be carried on "men's heads with the eſcort The General alſo deſires that you will give me every informa"tion in your power on the ſubject of boats procurable in your neighbourhood on the Cau"very, and that you will ſecure all in your power with the men belonging to them."—Adjutant General to Captain PARR 4th December 1790.

(4) "Commanding officers of corps of Coaſt Native Infantry belonging to the army in "the field, are directed to ſend recruiting parties to the garriſons of Trichinopoly, Tanjore, "Madura, and Pallamcottah not exceeding the complement of Commiſſioned and Non com"miſſioned Native officers for two companies. The Officers commanding at the above Sta"tions are to give every aſſiſtance in their power to forward this recruiting ſervice, they are to "appoint one or more Commiſſioned and Non-commiſſioned European officers to the charge "of the whole of the recruiting parties at each ſtation in addition to the detail ſent from "each battallion that the recruits may be diſciplined as expeditiouſly as poſſible. The pay of "the recruiting parties and of the recruits to be drawn at the above ſtations reſpectively "from the firſt of the preſent month, December, and the officers commanding them at each "ſtation are to tranſmit weekly and monthly returns to the commanding officer of the corps "to which they belong. Arms and accoutrements for the recruits are to be ſupplied at each "Station and the clothing of two complete Companies for each Coaſt battalion of the field "army, will be diſpatched from the Preſidency as expeditiouſly as poſſible to the above Sta"tions, according to the diſtribution made of the recruiting parties. Each corps to ſend a report "to the Adjutant General in the courſe of this day of the ſtations at which they propoſe to "recruit and the detail to be recruited."—General Orders, 1ſt December, 1790.

(5) "Every ſpot on the iſland of Seringham, on the oppoſite or Northern ſide of the Colle"roon, about Semiaveram and Volconda, as well as on the plains of Trichinopoly, are re"corded for the bloody conteſts of CHUNDA-SAHIB, ASTRUC, CLIVE, an LAWRENCE, "and mark with claſſical reverence the ſcene of thoſe atchievements. But above all, it be"comes important in a political and military view, as the ſtrongeſt and moſt advanced garri"ſon upon your frontiers towards the territories of Myſore, and the beſt poſition for can"toning your army, in order to menace that power" — Ful. on India, page 86.

whilſt

Whilſt the army lay at Veyloor the enemy's horſe hovered on the ſkirts of the encampment. Here a Rajpoot of high caſt, belonging to Captain M'LEOD's battalion, exhibited a wonderful inſtance of the reſolution juſtly aſcribed by ſeveral writers to that extraordinary people. He was a Subadar by rank, and had with him on this occaſion a ſepoy of the ſame corps. They unguardedly advanced ſome hundred yards in front of the out-centries, in order to perform ablution, when eight looties who lurked in a jungle darted out and ſeiſing the Sepoy commanded the Subadar to ſurrender. Unaccuſtomed to this language, the Rajpoot, although unſupported took poſt at an adjacent tree and drawing his Tulwar he refuſed to ſubmit. As there were no fire arms on either ſide ſwords were the only weapons for ſome time made uſe of in this apparently unequal conteſt. The Subadar made ſo manful a defence that the looties were neceſſitated to deſiſt or appeal to another mode of attack. One half their party diſmounted and with ſtones levelled their antagoniſt with the ground. They mangled his body in a moſt inhuman manner and leaving him weltering in blood returned to their encampment. A Rajpoot Sirdar in the ſervice of the Sultaun, on hearing

hearing the gallantry of his countryman obtained the releaſe of the Sepoy and inſtantly charged him to haſten to the aſſiſtance of his friend. This Subadar is ſtill in the army, but his recovery was deemed a prodigy, notwithſtanding the extraordinary cures performed on the natives in conſequence of the abſtemious lives they conſtantly lead.

To Mugganore, the Sultaun ſent another overture towards accommodation with much apparent importunity; on the 5th of December 1790, two hircarrahs brought a letter into Camp addreſſed to Major General MEDOWS, of which a tranſlation follows:—"MEER "MAHOMED SADICK Dewan, with ASSUFF and ALLY REZA "and APPAGEE-RAM, formerly Vakeels, offer their wiſhes "for your proſperity. They hope that Captain EVANS "who was taken at Darraporam, has made known to "your Excellency, the purport of a particular converſation, which took place between him and MEER MA-"HOMED SADICK."

"The exiſting treaties between our maſter and the "Engliſh nation, have not been infringed on, on his "part. Unfortunately, however, from the miſrepre-"ſentations of ſelf intereſted and treacherous perſons,

" our friendſhip has ſuffered a ſuſpenſion, this ſuſpen-
" ſion is productive of many evils; the poor are driven
" from their habitations and the bulk of the people are
" reduced to extreme miſery and wretchedneſs.

" Confident of your anxious wiſh to avert theſe cala-
" mities, and truſting in your endeavours to revive our
" friendſhip, we propoſe to ſend ſome men of rank and
" confidence, to confer with thoſe, whom you may
" think proper to appoint; and to meet wherever you
" may direct, in order that the matters in diſpute be-
" tween us may be diſcuſſed and equitably ſettled. We
" know that on a reference of the ſubject to our maſter,
" he will accord his aſſent. Favor us by a ſpeedy anſwer
" —What can we ſay more."

After the uſual compliments from Captain M'AULEY Aid-de-Camp to Major General MEDOWS, the following anſwer was diſpatched without delay addreſſed to MEER MAHOMED SADICK Dewan. " I am directed by the
" General to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter,
" and to ſay, that he has powers from Bengal to enter
" into a Treaty with the Sultaun, but that before he
" does ſo, he muſt have ſome perſon or place of con-
" ſequence put into his hands, as ſecurity for the Sul-
" taun's

" taun's being in earneſt, when the 1ſt Article will be,
" the unequivocal releaſe of every Engliſh Officer, known
" to be ſtill in exiſtence, and confinement in the Myſore
" Country.

" The Governor General of Bengal, Earl CORNWALLIS,
" who is known to be as juſt, as he is brave; is expect-
" ed every day at Madras, and will immediately take the
" field with a conſiderable reinforcement from Bengal;
" when every ſinew will be ſtretched and every nerve
" ſtrained in the Engliſh Empire to bring the War to an
" honorable concluſion. From the aſſiſtance of our Allies,
" but, above all, from our own reſources, and what we
" have ſeen, little is to be dreaded from the war, though
" from ſound policy, as well as humanity we wiſh for
" Peace—What can I ſay more."

Conſtant rains, and a conſequent riſe of the river about this period, prevented a conſiderable part of the ſick, ordnance and ſtores, that were intended for Carrore from croſſing; communications that intimated the intention of Earl CORNWALLIS to take the charge of the war in perſon, determined Major General MEDOWS to abandon every idea of invaſion for a time; and, as he returned with the army towards